

TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

**MNAs  
AT THE HEART  
OF OUR  
DEMOCRACY**

**FOR A FAIR AND EQUITABLE  
REMUNERATION**

Independent Advisory Committee  
on the conditions of employment and  
pension plan of the Members  
of the National Assembly

NOVEMBER 2013


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Québec, November 26, 2013

Mr. Jacques Chagnon  
President of the National Assembly  
Parliament Building  
1045, rue des Parlementaires  
1er étage, bureau 1.30  
Québec (Québec) G1A 1A4

Dear Mr. President,

We have the honour of presenting our report and recommendations in accordance with the terms of reference given to us by the Office of the National Assembly on June 13, 2013.

The goal we set for our committee proceedings was to be transparent both in our approach and in our recommendations.

We hope this report will be useful to the Members of the National Assembly.

Yours very sincerely,



Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, Committee Chair



Claude Bisson, Committee Member



François Côté, Committee Member and Secretary



*We would be stifling some of the best talent of the land if we did not give individuals who are well disposed, but without personal fortune, the means to sit in this Chamber.*

[Translation]

**Louis-Joseph Papineau**

From a speech by the Speaker of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada published in *La Minerve*, on February 17, 1831





## SUMMARY

The Independent Advisory Committee was mandated by the Office of the National Assembly of Québec in June 2013 to examine the conditions of employment and pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly. At the conclusion of its proceedings, the Committee framed some 30 recommendations. The Committee had two key objectives in mind, the first being to recommend employment conditions for the Members that reflect the importance of their office and their essential role in maintaining a healthy democracy and take the state of public finances into account and the second, to outline these employment conditions in a manner as transparent as possible. The Committee believes that a fair and equitable remuneration for MNAs will promote their independence and integrity as lawmakers, overseers of the public administration and representatives of the people in their riding.

The Committee perused the reports and recommendations on the subject by previous committees. Due to the prevailing economic situation or because MNAs have always felt uncomfortable setting their own remuneration, those committee proposals were never applied in full. Yet, it would have been preferable if the political authorities had implemented those reports, making subsequent catching-up exercises unnecessary. The reports submitted by previous committees underscored the importance and uniqueness of the work of MNAs, a complex and demanding task that has undergone profound changes over the past 50 years.

Over the course of its mandate, the Committee consulted MNAs, various experts and the public, and drew on the experience of other Canadian legislative assemblies. It also commissioned Hay Group to conduct an objective evaluation of the office of MNA. This analysis was a first in Québec. The Committee was thus able to establish strict comparisons with the remuneration granted to people in positions as demanding and complex in the public, parapublic and private sectors.

## Main recommendations

At present, a Québec Member receives a basic annual indemnity of \$88,186. To that sum is added a non-taxable annual expense allowance of \$16,027. The Committee considers the total of these two amounts to represent the MNA's basic remuneration.

For the sake of transparency, the Committee recommends that the annual expense allowance be integrated into the basic annual indemnity, as is the case in almost all legislative assemblies elsewhere in Canada. Since the annual expense allowance would become taxable, the amount would be increased to \$30,500 to match the allowance currently paid. Integrating the allowance would set the basic annual indemnity of an MNA at \$118,686. It would have no effect on an MNA's current remuneration but would make it more straightforward.

Even if the allowance were added to the basic indemnity, Québec MNAs would continue to earn 11% less than their Alberta counterparts, and 26% less than their federal counterparts. They would also be earning less than they would in a wide range of administrative positions in Québec's public and parapublic sectors.



In light of the particularities and demands of the office of MNA and based, among other things, on the results of the Hay Group evaluation, the Committee considers that the remuneration of Members should be revised upwards. The Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity be set at the maximum of the level-4 salary scale for officers and members of a government body or enterprise, that is \$136,010 in 2013. In addition, the Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity be increased each year by the percentage of salary increase granted to that job category. In view of the importance of the parliamentary office involved, the Committee recommends that the Premier's additional indemnity be set at 100% of the basic annual indemnity. In 2013, the Premier's total remuneration would have been \$272,020. The Committee also recommends that the additional indemnity of a Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the Leader of the Official Opposition be set at 60% of the basic annual indemnity. In 2013, the total remuneration for each of those offices would have been \$217,616. As a result, the remuneration of the Premier and of Ministers would be at least equal to that of the highest-ranking public servant under their responsibility.

The subject of the transition allowance comes up regularly in the news. The Committee recommends that no transition allowance be paid to MNAs who resign during their term of office, unless the resignation is due to a major health issue affecting them or a member of their immediate family, or to a serious family matter. The Ethics Commissioner would be in charge of determining whether a health issue or family matter has been established as the reason for an MNA's resignation.

The transition allowance was created as a safety net so those leaving politics could make an adequate transition back to private life, and it should once again serve that purpose. The Committee recommends that the allowance be calculated on the basis of the basic indemnity only. The Committee also recommends that any employment, professional, business or retirement income that former MNAs receive during the period they are entitled to a transition allowance be subtracted from the amount of the allowance. As well, former Members would be required to undertake to reimburse any overpayment to the National Assembly in the event that the total amounts paid as a transition allowance exceed the amounts to which the person was entitled, given the employment, professional, business or retirement income actually received.

The Committee recommends major changes to the Pension Plan of the Members of the National Assembly (PPMNA). The annual pension accrual rate under the PPMNA would be set at 2% of an MNA's total indemnity rather than 4%. New participating MNAs would not be allowed to earn a retirement pension greater than 70% of their career salary, as opposed to the current 100%. These modifications would ensure a better sharing of the cost of the plan between participants and the Government and would bring the plan's main characteristics into line with those of the major pension plans in the Québec public and parapublic sectors. The Committee also recommends that the proposed changes to the PPMNA be implemented without retroactive effect on the benefits acquired during previous years.

The Committee recommends that the changes to the conditions of employment of MNAs come into force at the beginning of the legislature that follows the adoption of the legislative and regulatory amendments giving effect to the recommendations in this report.

The Committee recommends that the National Assembly consider the creation of a permanent independent committee with decision-making authority concerning the employment conditions of MNAs. This recommendation would bring a long-term solution to the issue and put an end to the undesirable situation where MNAs are both judges and interested parties in the matter. So as to ensure the committee's independence and authority, the National Assembly would determine its terms of reference, the appointment process for its Members, and its operating rules.

Finally, again to improve transparency and strengthen public trust towards elected representatives, the Committee feels that the National Assembly of Québec should follow the example set by other legislative assemblies and make MNA spending public. The Committee leaves it up to the National Assembly to define the specifics of a system for the disclosure of expenses.



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# INTRODUCTION

## Terms of reference

On June 13, 2013, the Office of the National Assembly commissioned an independent advisory committee to study the overall employment conditions and pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly and to make recommendations on these matters. The Committee's terms of reference provide that it must take the following parameters into consideration:

- the characteristics of the office of MNA and the need to attract quality candidates;
- the rate of increase of the indemnities of MNAs compared with the rate of increase of the salaries for positions of responsibility in the public service and in the private sector;
- the indemnities paid to Members of other comparable legislative assemblies;
- the expansion of MNAs' duties resulting, in particular, from the parliamentary reform, the impact of new technologies and the new requirements of the Code of ethics and conduct;
- the areas of jurisdiction of the National Assembly compared with those of other legislative assemblies;
- any other parameter considered relevant by the Committee.

## The Committee

The Committee is made up of the Honourable Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, retired Supreme Court of Canada Justice, the Honourable Claude Bisson, retired Chief Justice of the Québec Court of Appeal and National Assembly Jurisconsult, and François Côté, Secretary General of the National Assembly from 2001 to 2010.

## Glossary

The conditions of employment of MNAs are determined by Acts and regulations in which specific terms are used to designate their various components.

In order to make this report intelligible and as consistent as possible with existing legislation, below is a short glossary of those terms.

**Indemnity:**

Remuneration paid to an MNA. It is made up of the basic annual indemnity and, if applicable, an additional indemnity for certain parliamentary offices. In everyday speech, the terms remuneration, salary and compensation are often used as synonyms of indemnity. In this report, the Committee uses the term indemnity to designate the remuneration paid to an MNA.

**Basic annual indemnity:**

Basic remuneration paid to an MNA.

**Additional indemnity:**

Additional remuneration paid to an MNA holding a parliamentary office. The additional indemnity is a percentage of the basic annual indemnity.

**Total remuneration:**

Total value of the components of a person's direct or indirect remuneration. Each such component has a financial value for the employee and a cost to the employer.

**Salary:**

Money paid by an employer to employees as remuneration. Strictly speaking, the indemnity of an MNA does not meet this definition since it is tied to a public office. However, the term salary is commonly used.

**Compensation:**

A person's remuneration. More generally, the term used for the remuneration attached to other positions in the public and parapublic sectors. It, too, is sometimes used to designate the indemnity of an MNA.

**Allowance:**

Amount paid to an MNA to reimburse certain expenses. An allowance can be a non-taxable lump sum or an amount refundable on the presentation of vouchers.

**Non-taxable annual expense allowance:**

Lump sum allowance paid to MNAs for the "reimbursement of expenses incurred in the performance of their duties". For tax purposes, MNAs are not required to include the allowance in their income.

**Allowance for accommodation expenses in Québec City:**

Allowance for expenses incurred by MNAs from outside the capital to secure accommodation in Québec City or its immediate vicinity and paid on the presentation of vouchers, up to a maximum annual amount.

**Transition allowance:**

Allowance paid to MNAs who leave office after an electoral defeat or because they resign or decide not to run again. Its objective from the outset was to offer a financial safety net for the return to private life.

This allowance is not separation pay as it is understood in the private sector.

**Office of the National Assembly:**

Body made up of the President of the National Assembly, five MNAs from the governing party and four Opposition MNAs. It is responsible, among other things, for the determination of the administrative rules of the National Assembly.



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PART 1

METHODOLOGY



- **Transparency of process and recommendations**
- **Rigorous and objective analysis of employment conditions**
- **Comprehensive approach**
- **Numerous consultations**

### 1.1 Transparency of process and recommendations

The goal we set for our committee proceedings is to be transparent both in our approach and in our recommendations. Transparency is especially important in public affairs in order to preserve the public's sense of trust in institutions, including the National Assembly of Québec. We therefore wish to clearly state the main elements on which we have based our findings, as well as all research and expert opinions we used in the process.

We held meetings with numerous stakeholders and made a call for public comment. This allowed us to make our mandate known and to initiate dialogue on the current situation as well as on possible changes. All information and comments received during these exchanges were taken into consideration in making our recommendations.

To render this report as comprehensible as possible, we have divided it into sections and used a clear style and plain language. Several sections include information boxes providing the reader with a brief overview. In addition, we opted for the use of tight reasoning to back our recommendations. The research and data underlying our findings are included either directly in this report or its appendices.

Over time, a number of provisions have been added to MNA employment conditions, rendering more complex and less transparent the process that is used to determine a Member's total remuneration. In this report, we are proposing a set of employment conditions that will be more straightforward for the public. This, we hope, will minimize the kind of misinterpretations that are most often due to misinformation and a lack of understanding about the unique nature and importance of the office of MNA.

### 1.2 Rigorous and objective analysis of employment conditions

We worked methodically, on the basis of an evaluation of the intrinsic value of the work of a Member and of other parliamentary functions. This assessment was necessary in order to determine as accurately as possible the working conditions that should apply to MNAs. Experts were consulted to facilitate the process and enhance objectivity. We also based our analysis on other sources of information and a variety of indicators. This broad approach helped to ensure all aspects of MNA remuneration were taken into account and to substantiate our findings and recommendations. In keeping with our mandate, we endeavoured to carry out a comprehensive analysis that covers the various aspects of overall remuneration.



In a system where changing one employment condition may affect other elements, for example, the impact which indemnities have on retirement pensions, all collateral effects must be considered to determine a fair and balanced remuneration. We have taken all such interactions into consideration.

## 1.3 Comprehensive approach

We were determined to take as comprehensive as possible an approach. We began by looking at the changing profile of Members, the nature of and changes to the office of MNA as well as the demands of that office. As the employment conditions that are currently in place are the result of piecemeal reforms, previous reports on the employment conditions of Québec Members and similar reports from other legislative assemblies had to be considered. In addition, comparative data between the National Assembly and other legislative assemblies or other professional groups was carefully analysed.

One of the methods commonly used to determine a particular group's employment conditions consists in establishing comparisons with another group with similarities in terms of personal profiles, responsibilities or tasks. Our mandate does as a matter of fact mention comparative analysis. We considered the remuneration paid for senior positions in the public service and in the private sector as well as the indemnities paid to Members of comparable legislative assemblies.

However, there are limits to the value of comparisons with other Canadian provincial legislative assemblies because the situations vary depending on factors such as population, areas of jurisdiction, collective wealth and cost of living. Further, until recently, no other legislative assembly had made an in-depth analysis of the value of the office of Member. Rather, a certain copycat phenomenon appears to exist: an increase in one province is often used as an argument in favour of raising indemnities in another.

We have found that it is difficult to conclusively determine a total remuneration package for Québec MNAs based on this type of comparative analysis. This view is shared by the Honourable John C. Major, commissioned by the Legislative Assembly of Alberta to review its Members' working conditions. This remark is taken from his 2012 report: "It is my view that this comparative procedure in some respects lacks an objective assessment of what the position of an MLA entails—what an MLA's duty is to the Assembly and to his or her constituents, and, perhaps most significantly, what an MLA's contribution is to our continuing democracy."<sup>1</sup>

Attempts to make comparisons with occupations in both the private and public sectors have also proven unsatisfactory. In the absence of an accurate assessment of the value of an occupation, the analysis is limited to making connections that are more likely to raise controversy than to provide clarity. The work of Members differs significantly from that of most occupations. Most jobs in the public and private sectors require specific training, previous experience, expertise, or membership in a profession. What's more, the usual professional career path prospects do not apply in the political arena. In this context, other studies, such as one recently carried out in the United Kingdom, reject the

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1. John C. Major, *Review of Compensation of Members of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta: A Report*, May 2012, p. 26.

idea of comparing professions directly in order to determine indemnities for parliamentary Members.<sup>2</sup> These studies chose a broader perspective that considers pay gaps with certain groups and other factors when developing a total remuneration revision proposal.

## Hay Group

Given these observations, we adopted the most comprehensive approach possible to carry out our work. We chose to go beyond a simple analysis of the employment conditions offered to one group or another, and, rather, to develop a clear perspective with respect to the value and importance of the office of MNA. In this regard, we turned to Hay Group, a specialized management consulting firm whose reputation and job evaluation methodology are recognized both nationally and internationally, and whose services are sought after by both the public and private sectors. This is the first time an objective analysis of the intrinsic value of the office of MNA has been carried out in Québec. It provides invaluable insight in determining the employment conditions of Québec Members.

## 1.4 Numerous consultations

To obtain the expert opinion of specialists on certain issues, we held meetings with the Ethics Commissioner, representatives of the Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d'assurances (CARRA) and representatives of SSQ Financial Group, manager of the group insurance plan currently offered to Members of the National Assembly and management personnel.

### Questionnaire and meetings

A questionnaire sent to all MNAs<sup>3</sup> yielded 59 responses, which is an appreciable response rate. To complete the process, we met with 20 or so Members, some of whom hold an additional parliamentary office. We also met with the President of the Amicale des anciens parlementaires du Québec so that we could also include the perspective of former Members. We gathered more input through meetings with individuals who, through their particular experience, skills or vision, contributed to enriching our reflection.

### Call for public comment

A first in Québec, we published two public notices in major newspapers requesting input from the public. The first notice was published on July 27 and the second on August 20, 2013.<sup>4</sup> We noted with interest the comments and suggestions received from citizens, some of which included very well-developed arguments.

2. Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, *MPs' Pay and Pensions: A New Package*, July 2013, p. 23.

3. Questionnaire included as Appendix I.

4. Public notice published in newspapers included as Appendix II.



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PART 2

**FAIR AND EQUITABLE  
REMUNERATION**



In our search for fair and equitable remuneration for Québec Members, and in accordance with our Committee's terms of reference, we deemed it essential to base our analysis on the following fundamental elements:

- The importance of the office
- The nature of the office
- How roles have evolved
- Independence and integrity

### 2.1 Importance of the office of MNA

Québec's parliamentary regime is the result of a long process and a series of historic battles. The election of the first House of Assembly of Lower Canada, the fight to control the civil list and the establishment of a responsible government are only a few of the steps in the development of the system that we know today. The National Assembly is the theatre where Québec's power struggles are played out and its population's aspirations are expressed. The institution is at the heart of all the decisions that have forged modern Québec society: compulsory school attendance, the nationalization of electricity, the adoption of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Charter of the French Language, the taking control of the levers of our economy, electoral reform, the affirmation of gender equality and the reform of the Civil Code, which is unique to Québec, to mention only a few examples.

The office of Member of the National Assembly is the cornerstone of our democracy and each Member plays an essential, unique role that is at the heart of our democratic process. The decisions Members make as lawmakers have a direct impact on all citizens and the development of society. It is worthy of note that the Government is born of the National Assembly and is accountable to that institution for its actions.

#### Unique responsibilities

There is no business or professional equivalent for the position of Member of the National Assembly. The responsibilities conferred on MNAs are unique in many respects. Few professions boast such a vast scope of practice and diversity of duties or make such a meaningful contribution to society. MNAs exercise three roles: that of legislator, that of overseer of government action, and that of intermediary between citizens and the public administration. Each role has specific requirements and demands knowledge in various fields of expertise.

## Legislator

Although the role of legislator and the legislative process have evolved greatly, and despite the more prominent role now assumed by the executive branch, Members today continue to play an essential role in the consideration and adoption of laws. The influence of Members of the governing party begins in caucus, where legislative initiatives are presented. If a bill receives a lukewarm reception at this stage, the Minister responsible may be inclined to review its content. MNAs are best qualified to anticipate public reaction to bills, because they are more often in contact with their constituents.

The committee stage also offers Members, in particular Opposition Members, the opportunity to contribute to the legislative process by examining each section of a bill and suggesting improvements. This exercise is extremely useful and is performed in great earnest. It allows MNAs to voice the concerns and opinions of the electors in their riding and of special interest groups. It should be noted that eighty percent of bills introduced in the National Assembly of Québec are adopted unanimously.

## Overseer of government action

Our democratic system relies on a legislative assembly that scrutinizes government action. Therefore, Members are by definition vested with the responsibility of overseeing the actions of the government administration. This duty has become increasingly important and complex with the advent of the modern State. Government action affects all facets of citizens' daily lives. In addition, public expenditure is now considerable. Members perform their role through the various oversight measures integrated in our parliamentary system, for example, question period, the consideration of budget estimates, interpellations and Opposition Members' motions.

One form of government oversight deserves particular attention: parliamentary committee hearings at which the Government must account for its management. Standards, regulations and directives are in place to regulate the Government's actions. The Auditor General, the Ombudsman and complaint mechanisms keep the Government in line as well. But that does not mean that the Members' role is diminished. On the contrary, MNAs are now needed more than ever, since they are called upon to delve deep into the actions of government departments and bodies and ensure that oversight mechanisms are adhered to and are effective.

The Members' role was reinforced in 2000 with the adoption of the *Public Administration Act*,<sup>5</sup> which entrusted parliamentarians with a key responsibility for applying the Act's fundamental principles, that is, to improve services to citizens, to contribute to making departments and bodies more efficient, and to make sure that public monies are used appropriately. Other laws extended the obligation to report to parliamentarians to other sectors, such as regional health and social services agencies, university-level educational institutions and state-owned enterprises. Given the immense needs that must be met by public programs, growing expectations for quality management and quality services, and budget constraints, the oversight exercised by Members will continue to grow in importance.

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5. S.Q., c. A-6.01.



### **Intermediary between citizens and the public administration**

Members have always played the role of intermediary between citizens and the public administration. Their role encompasses a broad array of actions that fall within various fields of expertise: regional development officer, mediator, government program information officer, promoter and even social worker. This range of expertise illustrates the diversity of MNAs' work in representing the people who elected them. Members interact directly with citizens, in particular when they are at their riding office, but also with organizations, businesses and the local and supralocal authorities of their region. The role of intermediary has also become more exacting over time. Since Members are well known in their constituency, expectations are high with regard to their participation in various activities or projects. In addition, they must participate in new bodies, such as the Conférence régionale des élus.

Assisting citizens in their interactions with the government administration is also a demanding and complex process because of the multiplication of programs and the size of government. When trying to solve a problem or meet a special need, people may have difficulty locating the proper resource, obtaining all the right information or complying with specific rules. In many cases, they rely on their MNA to guide them or act on their behalf. In the face of the machinery of government, their MNA is often their last resort to obtain services or defend their rights. Consequently, the cases Members must handle can be quite complex and require a great deal of time and energy.

## **2.2 Nature of the office of MNA**

### **Special characteristics**

Our democratic system hinges on the contribution of Members. Democracy is not merely a set of institutions, periodic elections or a government elected to steer the State to its destiny. The true embodiment of a democracy is its elected officials. The public expects MNAs to show good judgment, see to it that the large sums of money collected through income tax and other taxes are well administered and make the best possible decisions for the political, economic and social future of Québec. Very few people in our society bear such responsibility.

However, Members do not always get good press and are often given a rough ride in the court of public opinion. They can be said to be muzzled by their party, powerless in face of the government apparatus and dominated by partisan politics. Such views are no doubt due to a lack of knowledge about the work MNAs perform and its complexity and demands. The public's opinion is often based on a limited perception of reality, in this case, what people see during question period. Yet there is much more than this aspect of parliamentary work, although it receives the most media coverage. Off camera, Members are performing in-depth work in parliamentary committee and assisting citizens in their ridings.

## A precarious job

By definition, the office of Member is temporary. Although some Members carve out long mandates, the political careers of many others are cut short at the polls. Prior to 2007, majority governments ruled Québec for 100 years. Since then, however, Québec has seen two minority governments. Elections are more frequent and popular support, more volatile. Aspiring candidates must contend with many unknown variables, such as whether they will be selected as a party candidate, whether they will be elected and, if elected, how long they will stay in office. They may be forced to begin a new career on short notice. The end of a political career can be problematic for a number of reasons. Most of the time, people who decide to go into politics sever their links with their employer, unless they come from the public or parapublic sector. Even in such cases, returning to the labour market is not always a simple formality. It is precisely for this reason that the transition allowance was created in 1982.

## Interruption of professional life

For the vast majority of people, the leap into politics means interrupting a professional practice or other occupation. While in public life, MNAs cannot readily keep current and stay abreast of developments in their profession or occupation. Returning to work in the same sector is therefore more difficult. Former Members may even be stigmatized as a result of their time spent in politics. And if their party no longer has the public's support, such a return can be even more difficult. Of course, for some, the experience gained in politics translates into professional skills that are in demand on the labour market and creates a network of contacts. However, as many confirm, this is far from true in all cases.

In addition, the requirements of the *Code of ethics and conduct of the Members of the National Assembly*<sup>6</sup> and the obligations under the *Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Act*<sup>7</sup> make the transition to a job in the private sector even trickier. The decision to run for office is therefore, for many people, very risky professionally. This alone is enough to chill the enthusiasm of many a potential candidate.

## A distinct job

The diversity of their roles sets MNAs apart from their federal counterparts and, to a lesser extent, their peers in other provinces. Provincial governments are responsible for the vast majority of the services provided directly to the public, particularly health and social services and education services. A Member of the National Assembly is called upon to solve problems related to public programs more frequently than a Member of the House of Commons.

Moreover, in Québec, the National Assembly acts in many respects as a national Parliament, exercising more powers that affect the public. In a number of fields, Québec has chosen to exercise its full constitutional jurisdiction. In that context, it legislates and delivers its own programs, as in the case of the Québec Pension Plan, the collection of income tax and the Civil Code and its application. Part of what distinguishes Québec is also the manner in which public services are organized and delivered. One need only consider the substantial funds entrusted to the management of the Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec, the parental insurance program, subsidized daycare and no-fault automobile insurance.

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6. R.S.Q., c. C-23.1.

7. R.S.Q., c. T-11.011.

The National Assembly itself assumes responsibilities that other legislative assemblies do not have or only exercise in part. Among other things, it must approve international agreements and treaties to render them applicable in Québec, and maintains interparliamentary and international relations.

All these responsibilities impact the nature of the Members' work and add to their role as law-makers, overseers and intermediaries. Québec far exceeds the other provinces in terms of the number of Assembly sittings and hours spent in parliamentary committee. Only the Legislative Assembly of Ontario sits on average more often than the National Assembly of Québec. However, excluding election years, MNAs spend five times more hours in parliamentary committee than their Ontario counterparts.

## 2.3 How roles have evolved

The roles traditionally performed by Members' have evolved greatly in recent decades and as they continue to change, MNAs face new challenges. It must be acknowledged that the demands of the office of Member have increased over time. To perform their duties properly, MNAs must have a broad understanding of an increasingly complex State. Although they are not required to know every aspect of the government apparatus or programs, they must nevertheless know where to find the information they need to respond to the needs of the citizens in their constituency.

Members have had to adapt to their changing roles by developing specific skills. For example, in their role as overseers of the government administration, they examine the management of departments and bodies. This requires an approach that is rigorous, non-partisan and geared toward optimizing resources. Similarly, Members who work in their riding to promote economic, cultural and social development must demonstrate leadership and negotiation skills to mobilize the various players. Others devote more of their time to the consideration of legislation.

### Increasingly complex duties

Other factors relating to the work context, such as the media and information technologies, render Members' duties more complex. A longer parliamentary calendar and an increased presence at the National Assembly have also added to their workload in recent years.

### The media

Media scrutiny of parliamentarians' work is increasingly acute and diverse. With the arrival of 24-hour news networks and the accelerated dissemination of information, the coverage of National Assembly activities and politicians has been radically transformed. Political players must now constantly evaluate their communication strategy: how will the message be treated by the media and, consequently, how will it be received by the population? Over forty correspondents on permanent assignment at the Parliamentary Press Gallery cover the work of Members and the Government on a daily basis. Nowhere else in Québec is such a concentration of journalists on the watch for every morsel of news or the slightest faux pas. MNAs must now be aware of each news item and the ensuing reaction, which could drastically change the political agenda.

Members are constantly in the line of fire and must withstand a level of pressure that their predecessors never knew. In this context, they must be sure to have solid support before taking a public stance, because their position will inevitably be examined with a critical eye. There is little or no indulgence for human error. MNAs serve a public that is better educated, better informed and readily mobilized around the issues of the day. This results in a more vibrant democracy and intense active citizenship, but also makes the Members' work more demanding.

### Information and communication technologies

Information and communication technologies are part of everyone's life, including the lives of MNAs. They have contributed to enhancing the dissemination of information, informing the public of certain facts that might otherwise not have been addressed by the traditional media, and fostering closer ties between elected representatives and their constituents. Most Members are now on the Web and participate in social media. They have got to maintain this dialogue with citizens, often in real time and without intermediaries. Members are well known and followed by many on these platforms; their comments are often forwarded to other subscribers, thus increasing the risk of misinterpretation or malicious use. Members must also react quickly to requests by the public and the media. With multitasking phones and mobile equipment such as tablets, they are at work both day and night, which encroaches on their personal and family life.

### A longer parliamentary calendar

The most recent parliamentary reform introduced in 2009 has had a profound impact on Members' work. The Assembly's calendar was extended to cover a longer period of the year. Previously, the fall period began in October and the spring period began in March; they now begin in September and February. To accommodate the increased workload of the standing committees, the number of committees allowed to sit simultaneously was increased to four while the Assembly is sitting, and to five while it is not sitting (the previous limits were three and four, respectively).

The effects of this reform on the MNAs' workload have been significant. From 1984 to 2008, the National Assembly sat an average of 77 times a year; that number of sittings has risen to 83.<sup>8</sup> Since the Assembly sits three times a week during the regular sitting period, this increase represents two weeks of work. The impact on the work of parliamentary committees is even more noticeable, as illustrated in Table 1.

**TABLE 1**  
**Parliamentary committee activity (excluding election years)**

	1984–2008	2009–2011
Average number of sittings per year	390	526
Average number of sitting hours per year	1,281	1,545

8. For a more valid comparison, election years have been excluded from the calculation.

The extra volume of parliamentary committee work has resulted in a marked increase in the number of sittings held in January and August. Historically, less time was spent in committee during these months. The data further reveals a notable increase in the number of Monday and Friday sittings.<sup>9</sup>

### Increased presence in Parliament

As a result of the 2009 parliamentary reform, Members must be present at the Parliament Building more often, whether it is to participate in National Assembly or parliamentary committee proceedings. This poses a new challenge for Members as they must reconcile constituency work with their work at the National Assembly. In Québec parliamentary tradition, Mondays were reserved for work in the riding office. The increased number of committee sittings on Mondays forces MNAs to reallocate a portion of the time remaining, no doubt to the detriment of personal time and work-family balance.

## 2.4 Independence and integrity of MNAs

MNAs' independence and integrity are essential to ensuring the public's confidence in the institution and its elected Members. That MNAs must enjoy full independence in exercising their office is a fundamental principle enshrined in the *Act respecting the National Assembly*.<sup>10</sup> Because they represent their fellow citizens and carry their trust, they must not be subject to any intimidation, constraint or undue pressure. They must be guided only by their conscience and a motivation to do the public good. A true democracy demands no less. Such independence is a guarantee that MNAs will exercise their legislative authority in the best interests of the people, which is the underlying principle of the oath they must take under the *Act respecting the National Assembly* before assuming office.

It is undisputable that, by virtue of their power as lawmakers, MNAs are subjected to various pressures and solicited from all sides by interests, some of which are powerful interests. Their integrity must be beyond reproach, because it is the citizens' sole assurance that MNAs are working for the public good and not for personal gain. An ordinary citizen is not tested by such pressures.

### Ethics and professional conduct

The public wants those who represent authority or are the guardians of the constitutional State to be fully independent and display a level of integrity that is beyond reproach. They expect the same of MNAs. Independence and integrity are the basic tenets of the *Code of ethics and conduct of the Members of the National Assembly*,<sup>11</sup> which was unanimously adopted in December 2010. The Code recognizes that reality and expresses it in the values that must motivate Members in their work. All the provisions of the Code have been in force since January 1, 2012.

The Code lists the values embraced by MNAs, sets out the rules of conduct they must observe and provides for the application and enforcement of those rules. It affirms that the conduct of MNAs must be characterized by benevolence, integrity, adaptability, wisdom, honesty, sincerity and justice. Consequently,

9. Since the 2009 reform, the number of sittings in January and August has risen from an average of 15 to an average of 26 sittings per year; the average number of sittings held on Mondays and Fridays has risen from 55 to 84. See Appendix III.

10. R.S.Q., c. A-23.1.

11. R.S.Q., c. C-23.1.

MNAs must be loyal to the people of Québec and recognize that it is their duty to serve the citizens. The Code is the result of the will, clearly affirmed in the text, to maintain the confidence of the people in the Members and the National Assembly. In that respect, it makes an essential contribution to democratic life. It contains rules and requirements for MNAs and Cabinet Ministers. These rules complement the rules contained in the directives previously given by the Premier to Cabinet Ministers. The requirements of the Code have a definite impact on how MNAs exercise their role. Already complex by its nature and context, their office is in some ways made even more restrictive. In addition to the formalities that add to the workload, various sections of the Code have changed the way MNAs are to carry out their duties.

One need only examine a few provisions of the Code to notice the profound change it has made and its very real impact on the conduct of MNAs. In general, Members cannot put themselves in a situation where their private interest might impair the independence of their judgment in carrying out the duties of office (section 15). In addition, the Code stipulates that MNAs must not, in any manner whatsoever, further their private interests or those of a family member (section 16). These provisions constitute a major challenge for MNAs, who must anticipate any potential conflict of interest. It is a challenge rendered even more complex by the sheer number and diversity of interventions they must make. The Code has also set new stringent rules of conduct regarding gifts, hospitality or other benefits MNAs may receive. It also stipulates that they must not receive, directly or indirectly, any form of salary, indemnity, financial assistance or other benefit from a political party or party authority (section 27).

For Cabinet Ministers, the rules are more restrictive than they used to be, particularly in cases where a Minister or a member of a Minister's family has an interest in an enterprise whose securities are not listed on an exchange. This may even have an impact on the Minister's financial situation. In practice, the possibility for an MNA to continue to exercise any kind of professional activity outside the National Assembly is extremely limited.

Even though there were directives governing the conduct of former Cabinet Ministers upon leaving office, there are now very explicit rules in the Code. Although they are warranted, the post-term rules make the return to professional life ever more complicated. For example, the requirements of section 60 concerning the two years after Cabinet Ministers leave office could significantly reduce their chances of obtaining new employment. Broadly speaking, the Code forbids former Cabinet Ministers from disclosing confidential information obtained in the exercise of their office (section 58). Furthermore, they must not obtain any undue benefit from their prior position, nor act in connection with a proceeding, negotiation or other transaction in which they previously acted (sections 57 and 59).

These rules of the Code are in addition to the rules provided in the *Lobbying Transparency and Ethics Act*.<sup>12</sup> For two years after leaving office, anyone who has attended Cabinet meetings is forbidden from lobbying a person who holds a public office in the National Assembly and from lobbying any other public office-holder as a consultant lobbyist.

As well, MNAs are accountable to the public and the media as regards their personal situation under various provisions of the Code of ethics and conduct, which also makes it mandatory for MNAs to regularly file an interest disclosure statement.

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12. R.S.Q., c. T-11.011.

TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

PART 3

**PROFILE OF MNAs  
AND EVOLUTION  
OF THEIR  
EMPLOYMENT  
CONDITIONS**





## PART 3 - PROFILE OF MNAs AND EVOLUTION OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS

In our electoral system, any adult individual can become a candidate to represent his or her fellow citizens at the National Assembly. While not an exact representation of the population's overall composition, the group of elected representatives is quite diversified. We therefore felt it was relevant to examine MNAs' socio-demographic profile and take it into account, along with other factors, as we reflect on their employment conditions. Here is the profile, at a glance, of the MNAs representing Québec's 125 electoral divisions:

### PROFILE OF THE MNAs OF THE 40TH LEGISLATURE

- **Average age: early fifties**
- **Gender: 41 women and 84 men**
- **Education: university-level studies for 80%**
- **Occupational background: diversified**
- **Average time in office: 8 years**

#### Average age

The 1960s and 1970s were marked by the arrival of a younger class of politicians. However, in the periods that followed, the 50+ age group swelled the ranks of newly elected MNAs. This trend became most apparent at the beginning of the new millennium but it is still too soon to say if it will continue into the long term. Generally speaking, MNAs begin their political career after having already established themselves professionally. The transition into politics is, for the majority, a second or even third stage in their working lives. This is an important factor because the most active and productive part of a person's professional life often occurs when they are in their forties. It is also the time when professionals are on the rise within their organizations or businesses and accumulate savings for their retirement. A political career interrupts that trajectory and, while an MNA's work and public service may be extremely gratifying, these considerations are just not enough to attract some segments of the population or persons having certain professional backgrounds. This must be kept in mind when establishing MNAs' employment conditions.

#### Gender

Women now figure prominently in the National Assembly. In the 2012 general election, 41 women were elected, accounting for almost one third of the seats. This is a record high for Québec. The presence of women in our Parliament is a relatively recent phenomenon. Let us recall that the first woman was elected in 1961 and that it took another 50 years for Quebecers to elect their first woman Premier. Up until 1985, women held less than 10% of the seats in the National Assembly. Although their ranks have grown over the years, women are still clearly less present in the political arena than men.

## Education

A university degree has become one of the keys to entering active politics. Nowadays, more than 80% of new MNAs have pursued university-level studies whereas, in the early sixties, less than 60% of MNAs were university graduates. As well, over 40% of MNAs now have a postgraduate degree. More than ever before, Québec MNAs display a high level of competence, which is a consideration that should be foremost in our minds when determining their employment conditions.

## Occupational background

Over the past 50 years, the composition of the National Assembly has undergone profound changes where MNAs' occupational backgrounds are concerned. Whereas professionals from the private sector, most often lawyers, used to dominate the political arena, their relative proportion among Members has gradually decreased. MNAs' backgrounds began to be more diversified to include different groups of individuals who are equally well educated. Among them are professionals from the public and parapublic sectors. Their increasing presence in the political domain attests to just how much these sectors have progressed in the Québec economy. For their part, representatives of the business world have occupied a number of seats in the Assembly that has varied significantly over time and depending on the context. To a certain degree, the composition of the National Assembly reflects the evolution of contemporary Québec. Although a legislative assembly can never be the mirror image of the population it represents, political life must be possible for all constituents, no matter what their age, level of education or work background may be. Conditions of employment should not represent a drawback that limits its appeal.

## Time in office

As indicated above, the office of MNA is hardly a lifelong position. Statistical data concerning the length of Québec MNAs' time in office shows that 40% do not reach the five-year mark and 75% do not make it past the ten-year mark. Only a modest 12% of MNAs achieve 15 years or more in political life. Political careers, if they can be so called, are thus relatively short-lived in Québec. Excluding current Members, the average length of parliamentary office is barely eight years. Each of these elements must also be taken into consideration when determining MNAs' employment conditions.

## 3.1 The past

To clearly understand the current working conditions of Québec MNAs, it is helpful to trace the historical background that led to them, with special attention given to the pivotal moments that introduced major changes.

MNAs' employment conditions progressed at a very slow rate up to the 1960s, but improved at a faster rate afterwards. This shift is largely due to the professionalization of the office, which was itself related to the evolution of the Québec State. While MNAs managed to exercise their duties of office concurrently with other professional activities up to 1960, this was much less the case after that date. Recognizing this new state of affairs, Parliament revised the remuneration, allowances and other benefits accordingly. These once modest conditions only really began to undergo significant changes in the 1960s.

## Remuneration and other allowances

In 1958, the first pension plan for MNAs was introduced.<sup>13</sup> In 1961, the Lesage Government proposed increasing MNAs' basic indemnity and non-taxable annual expense allowance,<sup>14</sup> which had not been adjusted since 1953. Among the reasons invoked were the fact that the workload had increased and that sessional periods were longer, making it difficult for MNAs to carry on another work activity as they had done before. The issues of integrity and independence were also raised: insufficient remuneration made MNAs more vulnerable from an ethical perspective. Finally, if an MNA's salary remained too low, parliamentary office would only be within the reach of the rich and financially independent.

In 1965, an additional step was taken when the basic indemnity, until then paid only while Parliament was in session, was converted into an annual allowance. This is also the period during which other allowances were instituted to reimburse MNAs for the various expenses they incurred in the exercise of their duties.<sup>15</sup> These allowances were initially created and adjusted by way of legislation. In 1974, the National Assembly decided to entrust the responsibility for determining the conditions, scales and terms applying to allowances (except for the non-taxable annual expense allowance) to the Internal Economy Committee. The task was passed on to the Office of the National Assembly upon its creation in 1982. Moreover, indexation clauses set out in 1974 for the basic indemnity were systematically revised downwards by law in the years that followed.

## Allowances for additional duties

Before 1974, additional remuneration for parliamentarians who accepted extra duties either as parliamentary office-holders or as Cabinet Ministers was granted, by legislation, to just a few offices. An additional non-taxable expense allowance was also given to these office-holders. The *Act to amend the Legislature Act and the Executive Power Act*<sup>16</sup> of 1974 introduced a pivotal change by eliminating the additional non-taxable annual allowance and by replacing the additional fixed-amount indemnities by indemnities expressed as a percentage of the basic indemnity. Further down the line, legislative amendments added indemnities for certain other duties and adjusted the percentages. Major changes occurred in 1988, in particular the downward revision of the Premier's indemnity and that of Cabinet Ministers, the Leader of the Official Opposition and the President and Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

13. *An Act respecting the members of the Legislative Assembly*, S.Q. 1957–1958, c. 19.

14. For almost two centuries, namely since 1831, Members of the National Assembly have been entitled to compensation, in one form or another, for their travel expenses, in addition to their basic indemnity. From 1946 onwards, the *Legislature Act* provided for a non-taxable allowance for travel expenses, office expenses and all expenses inherent to the office. In 1971, the introduction of legislative amendments to add specific allowances simultaneously operates to earmark the non-taxable annual allowance for representation expenses. Lastly, the new *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* passed in 1982 refers to such an allowance as covering the expenses incurred in the performance of duties.

15. Among the most notable are the allowances for travel between the riding and the Parliament Building in 1965, for riding office expenses in 1970, for a secondary residence in Québec City in 1971 and for the hiring of a riding secretary in 1974, and finally, the transition allowance in 1982.

16. S.Q. 1974, c. 7.

### 3.1.1 Prior committees and their outcomes

The work conducted by extra-parliamentary committees also considerably influenced MNAs' employment conditions. In-depth examinations of indemnities, allowances and pension plans were followed by changes adopted by the National Assembly.

#### **Bonenfant committee (1974)**

In 1974, an advisory committee on the indemnities and allowances of Québec parliamentarians was formed under the chairmanship of Jean-Charles Bonenfant<sup>17</sup> by the Internal Economy Committee of the National Assembly. The committee's primary finding was that the office of MNA had become a full-time job and that Members should receive appropriate remuneration since they could not count on having other employment, as they could in the past, to earn a living for themselves and their families. The committee also noted that their work had become more onerous and complex, in particular because of the longer sessional periods and the fast-paced development of the Québec State.

In this respect, the Bonenfant committee underlined Québec's unique situation in relation to the rest of Canada. The National Assembly, through the expanded exercise of its jurisdictional powers, had become, for all intents and purposes, a national Parliament. It concluded that a revision was necessary and that MNAs were "entitled to better remuneration and to indemnities that correspond[ed] more closely to their actual expenses."<sup>18</sup> One of the report's recommendations was to set the basic indemnity at an amount equal to the average wage of class 4 salary scales for senior executive officers of the Québec Government. The committee felt that an MNA's duties were comparable to those of that group of public officers. The indemnity would then be adjusted whenever that particular class of officers' salary scale was adjusted. In the committee's mind, this measure had the added benefit of preventing MNAs from having to intervene directly in determining their compensation. In addition, the committee recommended that the non-taxable annual expense allowance remain the same, since it covered "the real expenses incurred by an MNA, but not deductible as specific expenses in a tax return because they are too difficult to keep track of and verify."<sup>19</sup>

As for the other allowances, the Bonenfant committee made no recommendations to change them, but did recommend that legislative amendments be made to grant regulatory powers regarding these allowances to the Internal Economy Committee. It was also silent concerning the indemnities for additional duties, preferring to leave this issue to the discretion of the National Assembly.

The *Act to amend the Legislature Act and the Executive Power Act* was assented to in 1974 as a partial response to these recommendations and fundamentally altered Members' conditions of employment. It increased the basic indemnity from \$15,600 to \$21,000 for 1974.<sup>20</sup> It also established an automatic

17. Comité consultatif sur les indemnités et allocations des parlementaires du Québec, Rapport, November 1974, 69 pp.

18. Ibid., p. 32.

19. Ibid., p. 42.

20. Contrary to the recommendation, this sum did not correspond to the average salary of class 4 senior executive officers. The Government instead chose to set the indemnity at the top of the lower third of the salary scale.

annual indexation mechanism geared to changes in weekly salaries in Canada. The additional indemnities were determined, from then on, as a specific percentage of the basic indemnity instead of being a fixed amount. Furthermore, the additional indemnities and the related non-taxable additional representation expenses were combined into fully taxable additional indemnities.<sup>21</sup> Lastly, the Act implemented the Bonenfant committee's recommendation to make the Internal Economy Committee responsible for determining the terms and conditions, scales and manner of payment of MNA allowances.

### Act of 1982

In the years that followed, despite a willingness to establish an automatic mechanism to increase the basic indemnity, the Government regularly resorted to legislation to restrict the indexation rates. The ranking of MNAs' compensation and, by extension, that of those holding parliamentary or executive offices, declined as compared to other groups. The *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*,<sup>22</sup> passed in 1982, introduced major changes. From then on, the basic indemnity was to be adjusted according to the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index for Canada.<sup>23</sup> In addition, a transition allowance was brought in. More importantly, the Act introduced a new pension plan that both substantially reduced the value of retirement benefits acquired after January 1, 1983 and cut back the indexation of the pension.<sup>24</sup>

### Lavoie committee (1987)

In 1987, the Office of the National Assembly entrusted another extra-parliamentary committee with the mandate to assess the basic indemnity, the non-taxable annual allowance, the indemnities for additional duties and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly. Jean-Noël Lavoie, former President of the National Assembly, chaired the committee.<sup>25</sup> The committee used a comparative approach in examining the basic indemnity. While noting that the office of MNA is unparalleled in other working environments, the committee did make use of certain reference points it found relevant. It considered the salary scales of senior executive officers in the public service, directors general of school boards, executive directors of health institutions, certain municipal elected representatives and provincially appointed judges.

In the end, much as the Bonenfant committee had done, the Lavoie committee recommended that the basic indemnity be progressively raised to the midpoint between the lowest and highest salaries on the salary scale for senior executive officers working for the Government.<sup>26</sup> In its view, linking

21. In 1978, further legislative amendments reduced many of the additional indemnity percentages.

22. R.S.Q., c. C-52.1.

23. The non-taxable annual allowance for expenses was from then on indexed in accordance with the same mechanism.

24. The previous plan was very generous. MNAs who had been in office for at least five years and had been Members in at least two legislatures were entitled to a retirement pension. The pension was payable from the time they left office and was indexed to cost of living.

25. Comité d'étude extraparlémentaire, *Rémunération et allocation de dépenses des membres de l'Assemblée nationale : rapport*, October 20, 1987, 66 pp.

26. While the Bonenfant report had proposed the average salary of class 4 senior executive officers, the Lavoie report favoured bringing MNAs closer to the average salary of the whole range of classes, thus raising their relative level of remuneration.

the basic indemnity to the salary scale for senior executive officers would avoid placing MNAs in the position of having to debate their own employment conditions. The committee also recommended, by a majority of its members, that the additional indemnity regime be simplified by grouping the various parliamentary offices into four categories. Each of the categories would be attributed its own percentage of increase. The committee also felt that the existing percentages of increase should be lowered. It agreed with maintaining the principle of the non-taxable annual allowance and proposed that the amount be determined by the Office of the National Assembly. It also made certain proposals concerning the pension plan. Of note was a proposal to lower the age requirement for receiving an unreduced annuity. The counterpart of the proposed measure was to lower the accrual rate from 4% to 3% in order to avoid adding to the plan's costs.<sup>27</sup>

Only very little of the Lavoie committee's report was translated into law. To determine the basic indemnity, the Government chose to fall back on the logic put forth by the Bonenfant committee and to match from year to year the average salary of the class 4 salary scale for senior executive officers. The indemnities for additional duties were lowered, but not as much as the committee had proposed. For instance, the Premier's additional indemnity fell from 130% of the basic indemnity to 105%, while that of Cabinet Ministers went from 90% to 75%. Lastly, a number of corrective amendments were made to the pension plan.

### 1992 legislative amendments

Following the deliberations of an extra-parliamentary committee asked to examine MNAs' retirement system, amendments to the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* were adopted in 1992.<sup>28</sup> These changes had become necessary because of the increasingly complex situation of Members who had earned pension credits under two or three pension plans, and the new federal legislation on retirement savings. This is how the pension plan for MNAs in its current form came to be.

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27. Comité d'étude extraparlémentaire, *Régimes de pension des membres de l'Assemblée nationale : rapport*, December 1, 1987, 28 pp.

28. *An Act to amend the Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly and other legislation*, S.Q. 1992, c. 9.

### Godin committee (2000)

In 2000, another committee, formed by the Office of the National Assembly and chaired by Serge Godin, president of the CGI consulting firm, scrutinized the employment conditions and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly.<sup>29</sup> The committee drew more or less the same conclusions as the previous committees had concerning the situation of MNAs, namely that

- parliamentary work is more and more demanding;
- the office of MNA leaves little time for any other work activity;
- the office of MNA requires diversified skills;
- the role of intermediary between citizens and the public administration is essential to the proper functioning of the State;
- an MNA's career is usually short-lived and fraught with uncertainty.

The Godin committee recommended that the basic indemnity no longer be linked to the average of the salary scale for class 4 senior executive officers. On the other hand, it noted that it is difficult to make comparisons with other groups of professionals. The committee based its recommendation to raise the basic indemnity by a little more than 10% rather on the progression in the growth of disposable personal income and on the remuneration of Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers and senior executive officers.<sup>30</sup> For subsequent years, it proposed pay hikes similar to those granted to government employees. As the committee felt it had not devoted enough time to examining additional indemnities, it recommended that they be studied in depth at a later time. In addition, the Godin committee pronounced itself in favour of maintaining the non-taxable annual expense allowance and the provisions of the pension plan. The report ended on a plea for periodic revisions of MNAs' employment conditions by an independent committee. The recommendation concerning the basic indemnity was implemented legislatively in 2000. Members thereby made up the ground they had lost since 1997 due to a 6% pay cut imposed by a law.<sup>31</sup> They even came out slightly ahead of the average of the class 4 salary scale. This advance was short-lived since salary scales for management personnel were markedly corrected in 2002 following a revision of that group's salary structure.

### A common thread

As we read through the recommendations made by each of the prior committees on MNAs' employment conditions, a common thread clearly appeared: the proposed changes have always been guided by the desire to offer MNAs fair overall remuneration. Because of the prevailing economic climate

29. Comité consultatif sur les conditions de travail et le régime de retraite des membres de l'Assemblée nationale, *Rapport présenté à Monsieur Jean-Pierre Charbonneau, président de l'Assemblée nationale*, November 8, 2000, 12 pp.

30. This recommendation actually raised the indemnity to about 3% beyond the halfway point of the class 4 senior executive officer salary scale.

31. *An Act respecting the reduction of labour costs in the public sector and implementing the agreements reached for that purpose*, S.Q. 1997, c. 7.



or due to the Members' historical reluctance to determine their own remuneration, the proposals these committees put forth were only partially implemented. Yet, it would have been appropriate for political authorities to do so, thereby avoiding having to play catch-up through periodic revisions. At the very heart of all the committees' recommendations is the patently obvious fact that an MNA's work is unique and that it has undergone marked changes in the past 50 years.

Over the decades, there have been efforts, without much success, to compare this "profession" and measure its demands. The question remains the same: what should an MNA's employment conditions be? Successive studies and legislative decisions have shaped their current structure. The evolution of the existing conditions bears the mark of both a search for a rational model to determine MNAs' remuneration and political decisions influenced by the social and economic circumstances of the time.

### 3.2 The present

This part presents, in broad strokes, the current situation of MNAs' employment conditions.

- **Basic annual indemnity**
- **Additional indemnity for parliamentary office-holders**
- **Non-taxable annual expense allowance**
- **Other allowances**
- **Riding office and payroll**
- **Pension plan**
- **Group insurance plan**

#### Indemnities

The **basic annual indemnity** paid to an MNA is \$88,186.<sup>32</sup> The *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*<sup>33</sup> provides that the indemnity is increased annually at the same rate as the salary scales for senior executive officers in the public service. However, a salary freeze was in effect from April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2012.

An **additional indemnity** is paid to MNAs who hold a parliamentary office.<sup>34</sup> It is a percentage of the basic annual indemnity. However, MNAs cannot concurrently receive more than one additional indemnity. Only the highest is paid. The percentages and amounts of such indemnities are listed in Table 2.

32. The amounts cited for the indemnities and allowances are those in force as at April 1, 2013.

33. R.S.Q., c. C-52.1.

34. *Executive Power Act*, R.S.Q., c. E-18 (for Cabinet Ministers); R.S.Q., c. C-52.1 (for other parliamentary office-holders).

**TABLE 2****Current basic indemnity and additional indemnities**

	Basic indemnity	Additional indemnity		Total: basic indemnity + additional indemnity
		Percentage of basic indemnity	\$	
<b>Premier</b>	\$88,186	105%	\$92,595	\$180,781
<b>Minister, including Government House Leader</b>	\$88,186	75%	\$66,140	\$154,326
<b>President of the National Assembly</b>	\$88,186	75%	\$66,140	\$154,326
<b>Leader of the Official Opposition</b>	\$88,186	75%	\$66,140	\$154,326
<b>Leader of the Second Opposition Group</b>	\$88,186	35%	\$30,865	\$119,051
<b>Official Opposition House Leader</b>	\$88,186	35%	\$30,865	\$119,051
<b>Vice-President of the National Assembly</b>	\$88,186	35%	\$30,865	\$119,051
<b>Chief Government Whip</b>	\$88,186	35%	\$30,865	\$119,051
<b>Chief Official Opposition Whip</b>	\$88,186	30%	\$26,456	\$114,642
<b>House Leader of the Second Opposition Group</b>	\$88,186	25%	\$22,047	\$110,233
<b>Deputy Government House Leader</b>	\$88,186	25%	\$22,047	\$110,233
<b>Chair of the Government Caucus</b>	\$88,186	25%	\$22,047	\$110,233
<b>Committee Chair</b>	\$88,186	25%	\$22,047	\$110,233
<b>Chair of Official Opposition Caucus (20 or more MNAs required)</b>	\$88,186	22.5%	\$19,842	\$108,028
<b>Committee Vice-Chair</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Whip of the Second Opposition Group</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Deputy Official Opposition House Leader</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Assistant Government Whip</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Assistant Official Opposition Whip</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Parliamentary Assistant</b>	\$88,186	20%	\$17,637	\$105,823
<b>Temporary Committee Chair</b>	\$88,186	15%	\$13,228	\$101,414
<b>Member of the Office of the National Assembly</b>	\$88,186	15%	\$13,228	\$101,414

## Non-taxable annual expense allowance

MNAs currently receive a non-taxable annual allowance of \$16,027 for expenses they incur in the performance of their duties (representation expenses, hospitality gifts, flowers for occasions such as birthdays, marriages or funerals, etc.). Each year, this allowance is adjusted to reflect increases or decreases in the Canadian Consumer Price Index.

## Other allowances

An MNA who is a member of a parliamentary committee is entitled to receive an attendance allowance of \$125 per sitting day if the Assembly is not sitting at that time. The same holds true for members and substitute members of the Office of the National Assembly.

Members are entitled to an annual allowance for their travel expenses within their riding and elsewhere in Québec. This allowance is also non-taxable and varies according to which group the electoral division belongs to. The groups are defined on the basis of the geographical size of the ridings to take into account the territory the MNA must cover.<sup>35</sup>

**TABLE 3**

**Annual allowance for travel expenses within the riding and elsewhere in Québec according to group<sup>36</sup>**

<b>Group 1 (73 electoral divisions)</b>	\$7,800
<b>Group 2 (14 electoral divisions)</b>	\$12,600
<b>Group 3 (36 electoral divisions)</b>	\$17,300
<b>Group 4 (2 electoral divisions)</b>	\$19,400

In addition, an MNA may claim a reimbursement for travel expenses between the riding office and the Parliament Building upon presentation of vouchers, in accordance with the scales and terms prescribed by the Office of the National Assembly. A maximum of 60 round-way trips is allowed. A parliamentary office-holder is entitled to 10 additional trips.

An MNA whose main residence is outside Québec City or a riding adjacent to Québec City is entitled, on presentation of vouchers, to a reimbursement for lodging expenses incurred in or in the immediate vicinity of the capital, up to an annual amount of \$14,900.

A transition allowance is granted to Members who leave office, are defeated in an election or choose not to run for reelection. This allowance is equal to twice the MNA's monthly compensation (including the basic indemnity and any additional indemnity) for each full year during which he or she was in office. The allowance cannot be less than four times or more than 12 times the monthly compensation.

35. Additional amounts are set aside for the Members for Ungava, Duplessis and Berthier, for the reimbursement of their actual expenses upon presentation of vouchers.

36. See the list of ridings included in each group in Appendix IV.

## Riding office and payroll

MNAs receive an operating budget for their riding office and a payroll for their staff. The National Assembly provides certain goods and services to them, such as computer and telephone equipment and support. The following amounts are provided for the operation of a riding office. They vary depending on which group the riding belongs to.

**TABLE 4**

### Riding office operating budget according to group

Group 1	\$56,700
Group 2	\$46,400
Group 3	\$50,900
Group 4	\$48,400

For the remuneration of regular and casual personnel and the payment of professional services, the amounts below apply. They are based on the geographical size of the riding, since offering services to the entire population in large electoral divisions entails extra costs.

**TABLE 5**

### Payroll according to group

Group 1	\$162,888
Group 2	\$162,888
Group 3	\$177,775
Group 4	\$210,711*

\*This amount is also granted to eight ridings in Group 3.

These amounts have no impact whatsoever on an MNA's remuneration.

## Pension plan

A pension plan was established specifically for the Members of the National Assembly. Participation in the plan is optional. An MNA's contribution to the plan is set at 9% of the basic indemnity and of any additional indemnity, subject to the maximum amount prescribed by the Income Tax Act.<sup>37</sup> A supplementary retirement benefit plan complements the pension plan. By combining the two plans, a participating MNA each year earns a pension credit equal to 4% of the indemnity for which he or she contributed, without exceeding 25 years. The pension credits are indexed annually according to the rate of increase of the Pension Index.<sup>38</sup> A person who ceases to be a Member is entitled to an unreduced retirement pension if 60 years of age or over. However, if the person wishes to receive pension benefits before the age of 60, a reduction, which varies according to age,<sup>39</sup> is applied. The pension benefits are equal to the aggregate of the pension credits accumulated. The indexation of the pension varies according to the periods during which the credits were earned, those earned after December 31, 1983 being only partially indexed. Once an MNA turns 69, he or she ceases to make contributions and becomes entitled to retirement benefits. If a participating MNA dies, the surviving spouse receives retirement benefits equal to 60% of those being paid at the time or that would have been paid if benefit payments had begun on the date of the MNA's death.

## Groupe insurance plan

MNAs must participate in their group insurance plan, which includes basic life insurance coverage, and accidental death or dismemberment coverage. The premiums are paid entirely by the MNAs. As for health insurance, serious illness insurance, travel and long-term disability insurance coverage, Members' participation is generally compulsory and the premiums are paid by the Finance Minister. The health insurance plan pays for 100% of the costs covered, subject, in certain cases, to a maximum eligible cost per treatment or to maximum annual benefits or maximum benefits for the contract's duration. The long-term disability insurance pays out benefits equal to 80% of an MNA's compensation from the moment the MNA ceases to carry out the functions of office.

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37. R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).

38. The rate of increase of the Pension Index is determined each year by the Régie des rentes du Québec using data from the Consumer Price Index for Canada. It is used to make annual adjustments to the pensions paid by the Régie.

39. The penalty is 0.0833% for each month between the ages of 55 and 60, 0.1666% for each month between the ages of 50 and 55 and 0.25% for each month before the age of 50.

TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

PART 4

**DETERMINING THE  
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS  
OF MNAs**



How MNAs' employment conditions are determined is contingent on a number of factors discussed above: the importance and nature of the office of MNA, its evolution over time, its growing complexity, its new demands (ethical and other), the state of public finances, etc.

- **A delicate operation**
- **Basic remuneration**
- **Additional indemnities**
- **Attendance allowance**
- **Transition allowance**
- **Travel allowance**
- **Riding offices and remuneration of staff**
- **Allowance for accommodation expenses in Québec City**
- **Pension plan**
- **Group insurance plan**
- **Other considerations**
- **Financial impacts of recommendations**
- **Coming into force of recommendations**
- **Periodic review of employment conditions**

### 4.1 A delicate operation

In Québec no less than in any other democracy, determining the employment conditions of parliamentary Members is and always will be an extremely delicate operation. This is so for a number of reasons. The first concerns the manner in which changes to employment conditions are decided on and implemented. If the changes require a legislative decision, Members are in the position of a judge handing down a ruling in his or her own case. In the past, the National Assembly has attempted to mitigate this situation by mandating extra-parliamentary committees to examine the situation and make recommendations. These committees have sometimes suggested quasi-mechanistic methods of setting salaries. One thinks, for example, of the Bonenfant committee, which in 1974 proposed for the first time that MNAs' basic indemnity be tied to the salary of senior public servants.

Another consideration is that MNAs are paid directly out of public funds. Citizens have every right to be informed of the employment conditions of the people who represent them and to voice their opinions on the subject. Public and media scrutiny is essential in our system of democracy, and it is fundamentally right and proper that the decisions of the governing class be subjected to such scrutiny.



MNAs' remuneration is often viewed in relation to the state of public finances and the State's capacity to pay, and must be part and parcel of any comprehensive remuneration policy for employees in the public and parapublic sectors. This is perfectly normal. MNAs' employment conditions must be based primarily on an appreciation of the importance and nature of the office and its demands, but the larger picture and the context of available resources cannot be ignored. Still, budgetary considerations must not go so far as to deny the indispensable role MNAs play in our democracy. There is always a price to pay for a healthy democratic system; refusing to pay it would contribute to the insidious undermining of the system at its very foundations.<sup>40</sup>

## 4.2 Basic remuneration

On this core subject of our mandate, we returned to the essential question: What constitutes fair remuneration for an MNA? In Québec as elsewhere, committees charged with examining the employment conditions of parliamentarians have struggled over this question. As there is no simple and universally applicable rule, we chose to draw on previous work and adopt as broad a view as possible, one that would allow us to examine all methods and approaches.

The basic annual indemnity of an MNA is currently \$88,186, to which is added a non-taxable allowance of \$16,027. We consider these two amounts to constitute the basic remuneration, and many Members agree.

Questions arise concerning each of these amounts:

- Should the non-taxable annual expense allowance be maintained in its current form? If not, what form should it take?
- Should the amount of the basic annual indemnity be changed? If so, how much should it be?

### Non-taxable expense allowance

As noted in Part 3, this allowance came into existence in Québec at a time when there was no other allowance to cover the expenses incurred by MNAs in the course of their duties. Beginning in the 1960s, with the professionalization of the office, various other allowances were created by law to reimburse specific expenses—expenses for travel within the riding and elsewhere in Québec, for travel from the riding to the Parliament Building, for accommodation in Québec City, etc. Nevertheless, many expenses inherent in MNAs' duties are not covered by the current allowances. Several Members drew our attention to the fact that they are constantly being solicited to participate in charitable activities and invited by various groups, which entails hospitality and meal expenses, etc. This is a reality that must be taken into account.

40. In 2013–2014, the budget appropriations for MNAs' indemnities and allowances amounted to \$27.1 million, or 0.04% of Québec's total appropriations. This represents \$3.37 per capita annually, or less than \$0.01 per person per day. If indemnities alone are considered, the amount is \$13.9 million.

We do not question the need to reimburse these expenses. The current non-taxable annual expense allowance was designed with simplicity in mind. The expenses it covers are diverse and difficult to define. To avoid a cumbersome system of reimbursement involving a plethora of vouchers, most Canadian legislative assemblies initially chose to avail themselves of the provision of the Canada *Income Tax Act*<sup>41</sup> that allows the payment of such a non-taxable allowance.<sup>42</sup> However, in the past two decades the situation has changed to such an extent that Québec is now the last Canadian province to maintain a non-taxable allowance. Apart from Québec, only the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut still do.<sup>43</sup> Under the reforms carried out in the rest of Canada, the amount was increased to offset the tax bite and added to the basic indemnity, and the resulting total constitutes parliamentarians' remuneration.

Assemblies that have abolished the non-taxable annual expense allowance cited various reasons for doing so. For one thing, the allowance was frowned upon by citizens, who for the most part do not enjoy such tax benefits themselves. Such an allowance also makes for less transparency, since a parliamentarian's income is more difficult to determine accurately when part of it is tax-exempt. Finally, as it is paid every two weeks along with the basic indemnity, some parliamentarians do not adequately distinguish it from their salary.

For the same reasons, we believe it is time for Québec to adopt the approach of other Canadian Parliaments. The allowance should be increased and integrated into the basic indemnity. The increase should take into account Québec's marginal tax rates and result in an after-tax net amount comparable to the current allowance. This change would still provide coverage of the expenses incurred by Members in the course of their duties. We calculate that \$30,500 would be equivalent to the current allowance of \$16,027.<sup>44</sup> Hence, the basic indemnity of an MNA would total \$118,686—the equivalent of what they are paid today.

We are fully aware that such a change would automatically impact not only on the additional indemnities, which are a percentage of the basic indemnity, but also on pension plan benefits. These aspects are discussed below. The essential thing is to ensure that the overall financial impact of the changes to MNAs' employment conditions are measured and reasonable, given that public funds are at stake.

41. R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.).

42. The same provision gives elected municipal representatives entitlement to a non-taxable amount.

43. Alberta was the last province, save Québec, to abolish the non-taxable allowance; it did so in 2012; the Parliament of Canada had done so in 2002.

44. This amount was determined on the basis of the 47.46% combined marginal tax rate applicable in Québec in 2013 to the \$100,000 to \$135,000 income range.

## RECOMMENDATION 1

The Committee recommends that the non-taxable annual expense allowance (\$16,027) be integrated into the basic annual indemnity (\$88,186). The amount of the annual expense allowance has been revised (\$30,500) to match, after tax, the allowance currently paid. With this integration of the allowance, the basic annual indemnity of an MNA would have been \$118,686 in 2013.

### Basic indemnity

The basic remuneration paid to MNAs must be sufficient to attract and retain persons from all sectors of society who have the qualifications Québec needs. In some cases, the salary paid to an MNA will not be as high as what the person would earn in the private sector. However, it must be sufficiently competitive that it does not impose undue financial hardship on people motivated by a desire to serve the public. It must also reflect the value of the office of MNA. Despite widespread cynicism, despite glib and often undeserved criticism, we as a society must recognize the essential democratic role played by the men and women who choose to serve their fellow citizens.

### Comparisons with other legislatures

An initial approach to setting the basic annual indemnity is to compare the situation of MNAs with that of Members of other provincial assemblies and the Parliament of Canada. Québec's special situation with regard to jurisdiction and the organization of the State have already been mentioned. Hard and fast comparisons cannot be made between the role of MNAs and that of Members from sparsely populated provinces. The workload, the scope of the issues, the challenges in budgetary and human terms, the extent of the State's range of activities—all are of a different order of magnitude. Also, the employment conditions of parliamentarians in general are subject to particular contexts which result now in stagnation,<sup>45</sup> now in sudden upswings. This further limits the usefulness of comparisons. Finally, as the basic indemnity is only one component of a parliamentarian's employment conditions, comparisons are sketchy at best.

In terms of the basic annual indemnity, but without taking into account the non-taxable expense allowance MNAs now receive, Québec ranks 9th out of the 14 assemblies examined (provinces, territories and the Parliament of Canada).

If the non-taxable allowance is included, Québec's ranking is raised to 3rd, behind the House of Commons of Canada and the Legislative Assembly of Alberta.

45. In Ontario, for example, a freeze on Members' salaries has been in effect since 2009, during what has been a strategic period of difficult negotiations with public-sector employees.

**TABLE 6****Basic indemnity in Canadian assemblies (2013\*)**

<b>House of Commons of Canada</b>	\$160,255
<b>Alberta</b>	\$134,000
<b>Québec</b>	\$118,686
<b>Ontario</b>	\$116,500
<b>Northwest Territories</b>	\$110,959**
<b>British Columbia</b>	\$101,859
<b>Nunavut</b>	\$95,928
<b>Newfoundland and Labrador</b>	\$95,357
<b>Yukon</b>	\$93,196
<b>Saskatchewan</b>	\$91,800
<b>Nova Scotia</b>	\$87,485
<b>Manitoba</b>	\$85,564
<b>New Brunswick</b>	\$85,000
<b>Prince Edward Island</b>	\$67,400

\* Québec, the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut are the only assemblies that still pay a non-taxable annual expense allowance. These amounts have been included in the above table for the purpose of comparison with the other assemblies.

\*\* The indemnity increases to \$126,313 for Members outside Yellowknife.

Given the special characteristics of MNAs' work, it is only normal that Québec ranks in the top third of the group. It may even be legitimately questioned whether it should rank behind the federal and Albertan assemblies. We believe that there is no rational justification for the fact that, even factoring in their non-taxable annual expense allowance, MNAs make 11% less than Alberta MLAs and 26% less than federal MPs. An independent commission was mandated in 2012 to examine Alberta MLAs' working conditions and submit its report to the Legislative Assembly.<sup>46</sup> The quality and depth of this analysis are impressive. The salary set on the basis of the report rests on solid data, which we have taken into account in our own analysis.

### Points of reference

Past committees, whether in Québec, the rest of Canada or foreign countries, have often noted that strict comparisons cannot be made between a Member's job and other types of employment. It may nonetheless be instructive to establish a few points of reference in order to gain perspective on the subject. In Québec, such points of reference are to be found in public and parapublic sectors. It is appropriate to look at MNAs' remuneration in relation to that of the management personnel in those sectors, since parallels have often been drawn between the demands of parliamentary and managerial functions. In their roles as legislators, overseers and intermediaries, MNAs are in frequent communication with public administrators. This is even truer of Cabinet Ministers, who are responsible for a government department, government bodies or institutions in the education or health and social services sectors.

We narrowed our selection down to a representative group of some 60 management positions and classes of management jobs. These include the following:

- State administrators (Secretary General, Deputy Minister, Assistant or Associate Deputy Minister)
- Delegates General of Québec, Foreign Delegates, Heads of Post
- Presidents, Vice-Presidents and members of government bodies
- Public service management personnel
- Directors General and Assistant Directors General of school boards
- Management personnel of the health and social services network
- Executive Directors and Assistant Executive Directors of health and social services institutions

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46. John C. Major, op. cit.

Considering the maximum salaries<sup>47</sup> these jobs pay, the remuneration of MNAs, whose basic indemnity is \$88,186, ranks last on the list<sup>48</sup> and is far below the salary of the highest paid Assistant Directors General of school boards and members of government bodies. It is also lower than the maximum salary for a level-5 manager in the public service (\$89,091), which a few years ago was recognized as the entry level for senior management personnel.

Even including the non-taxable annual expense allowance in its taxable equivalent, the salary of MNAs (\$118,686) is in the bottom quarter of the group of jobs considered. The situation does not radically change if calculations are based on the average of the salary scale for each job. These results are all the more striking given that the workload, responsibilities and pressure associated with MNAs' work are often equal to or greater than those associated with many of these other jobs.

In their reports, past independent committees have sought a valid mechanism for setting the salary of MNAs. In 1974, the Bonenfant committee proposed a salary alignment with class 4 management personnel. In 1987, the Lavoie committee recommended that the salary scale average of classes 1 to 5 be taken into account, maintaining that a larger group was more appropriate for the purposes of comparison and that the range of positions associated with those classes better represented the complexity of MNAs' work. It is interesting to note that a good many MNAs who answered our questionnaire also drew parallels between their role and that of management personnel, and even with that of senior public servants.

Like previous committees, we are convinced that it is appropriate to consider other jobs, especially senior public service positions, as points of reference in determining MNAs' remuneration. It seems altogether abnormal and illogical that MNAs' basic indemnity is at the bottom of the list of the management positions selected for comparison purposes. If the main recommendation of the 1987 Lavoie report had been implemented, the basic indemnity today would be about \$106,820, this being the average between the class 5 minimum for management personnel and the class 1 maximum (\$71,978 and \$141,663, respectively). Add to this the equivalent of the non-taxable annual allowance, increased to neutralize the impact of taxation, and the basic indemnity would be in the \$137,000 range.

The average salary in Québec (\$42,927 in 2012) may be seen as another point of reference. The reasoning here is that MNAs' remuneration should bear some relation to the general state of the economy and to average salaries. In the United Kingdom, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, charged with examining the remuneration of British MPs, used this as a point of reference in its own analysis.<sup>49</sup> Certain observations may be drawn from the parallel evolution of the average salary in Québec and MNAs' basic indemnity, though not in terms of a strict proportionality.

47. It is valid to consider the maximum salary for each job class, since this salary is available to anyone who progresses normally in their position. In contrast, MNAs are entitled to no salary increases based exclusively on their years of service. Any increase is conditional on holding an additional parliamentary office. Many of the jobs we looked at come with annual performance bonuses, which again are not available to MNAs.

48. Remuneration figures for these jobs are given in the table in Appendix V.

49. In its analysis documents, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority notes that over the long term Members' pay was three times higher than the average salary. However, in 2011 it was 2.7 times the average salary. Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, op. cit., p. 20.

This evolution was characterized initially by periods when MNAs' remuneration lost ground in relation to the average salary. The lost ground was made up from time to time, often pursuant to an examination of Members' employment conditions. This happened in 1988, after the Lavoie committee report, and from 2000 to 2002, following the Godin committee report. The fact that no adequate mechanism has been found to set MNAs' remuneration over the long term has so far resulted in a pattern of alternating gains and losses in relation to the average salary. Currently, the remuneration of MNAs is falling behind. Whereas the ratio of the basic indemnity to the average salary was approximately 2.3 in 2002, it is now 2.0.<sup>50</sup> To return to the 2002 ratio, the basic indemnity would have to be increased by about \$12,000. If this increase were added to the current basic indemnity (\$88,186) and to the taxable equivalent of the annual expense allowance (\$30,500), the basic indemnity would be at least \$130,000.

### Assessing the value of the office of MNA

The reports of previous independent committees all emphasized the special characteristics of the MNA's role—its complexity, demands and unique character. We agree with the Comité d'étude extraparlamentaire sur le système de retraite des députés, who wrote in 1991:

*[Translation] Few professions require as much discipline and flexibility at the same time. Few professions focus so intensely on a common goal and, to do so, bring together people from such diverse geographic, socio-economic and ideological backgrounds. Few professions make so many demands on time and energy for such relatively modest compensation in terms of remuneration. Few professions require their practitioners to make such a sudden break with their former activities or provide so few guarantees in return. Few professions require those who practice them to touch on so many fields or prepare them so little for an eventual smooth return to other activities. Few professions are as subject as that of MNA to the changes and fickleness of public opinion. And few professions lift a person to the heights of success one day only to relegate them to obscurity the next, often with the satisfaction of a job well done as the only reward.<sup>51</sup>*

On the question of MNAs' remuneration, the fundamental problem stems from a concept of public service according to which those who serve the State, MNAs included, cannot be remunerated at their true value. Too often one hears it said that people who enter politics do so of their own free will, and that, if they are unsatisfied with their employment conditions, they should not have run for office in the first place. Yet why is it accepted that doctors, lawyers and business leaders are paid much more than the average person? Essentially because people understand the value of these occupations and the contribution they make to society. Such recognition is largely lacking when it comes to the office of MNA. The picture is further distorted by considerations attributable more often than not to prejudices against politicians in general.

50. See Appendix VI for the ratio of MNAs' basic indemnity to the average salary.

51. Comité d'étude extraparlamentaire, *Système de retraite des députés*, National Assembly, 1991, p. 23.

Such a state of affairs profits neither individuals nor the public nor the State. It is high time to set aside the archaic concept of public service and to appreciate the true worth of the work of MNAs. In this sense, our analysis is entirely in keeping with the line of reasoning presented initially in the Bonenfant report, further developed in the Lavoie report and reprised in the Godin report. All three reports drew parallels between the Members' functions and those of certain senior public servants. However, we judged it necessary to carry our approach a step further by obtaining an intrinsic evaluation of the value of the work of Members. This is what the Legislative Assembly of Alberta did in 2012.

The Alberta Assembly mandated Commissioner John C. Major to review Members' compensation and benefits. Having made the same observations in relation to other legislative assemblies and to jobs judged to be similar, Major hired an outside firm—Hay Group—to conduct an objective assessment of the value of the work of Alberta's MLAs. Hay Group conducted its evaluation on the basis of a point factor analysis, a method that has emerged as a standard in the field of human resources and remuneration both in and outside Canada. A great many public and private Canadian organizations have resorted to the method. In Québec, the secretariat of the Conseil du trésor and the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs of the Ministère du Conseil exécutif rely on the Hay method to determine the salaries of managerial personnel and senior officers.

### Hay Group evaluation

For these reasons we retained the services of Hay Group.<sup>52</sup> The exercise consists in determining the value of a job on the basis of factors that are applicable to all spheres of activity. To simplify, the factors used can be divided into three broad categories:

- **Know-how:** the necessary capabilities and knowledge, including specialized, managerial and human relations skills;
- **Problem solving:** the thinking skills needed to deal with the problems the job routinely faces, including the environment in which the problems must be resolved and the challenge involved;
- **Accountability:** the influence that the job has on results, including the nature and degree of the impact, the function on which the job has the greatest impact, and the nature of that impact.

The characteristics of a job are analyzed in detail and points are given according to different factors within the parameters of the method. At the end of the exercise, the overall value of the job is expressed by the number of points given to it. Remuneration for the job can then be compared to the remuneration for jobs with a comparable score in government bodies, the public and parapublic sectors and the private sector.<sup>53</sup> In short, this approach provides an answer to the frequently recognized problem of making a meaningful comparison of different jobs. At our request, Hay Group analyzed five of the offices that may be held by Québec's elected representatives:

52. Hay Group is an international consulting firm specializing in human resources management. It operates in almost 50 countries, including Canada, and has approximately 2,800 employees.

53. See Appendix VII for the Hay Group report, which lists the organizations used for comparison purposes.



- MNA
- Chair of a parliamentary committee
- Whip
- Minister
- Premier

This list is far from exhaustive, but it gives a fair idea of the relative value of a range of offices from MNA to Premier, the latter being the one carrying the most individual responsibility in Québec's State apparatus. It is worthy of note that the scores assigned to Québec's parliamentary offices are comparable to those assigned to their Alberta counterparts.

**TABLE 7**  
**Hay Group scores for certain parliamentary offices**

OFFICE	QUÉBEC	ALBERTA
Member	1,142	1,000
Committee Chair	1,418	1,300
Whip*	1,628	-
Minister	3,536	3,000
Premier	6,384	5,872

\* Not evaluated by the Legislative Assembly of Alberta.

A comparison of the indemnities for these five offices with the direct pay for similar jobs<sup>54</sup> in all three sectors eloquently underlines the lag in the remuneration paid to Québec parliamentarians. The salary gap is already considerable in relation to similar jobs in government bodies, and grows even wider if the public, parapublic and private sectors are brought into the equation. Finally, with regard to the most important responsibilities—those of Ministers and the Premier—the gap in relation to jobs of similar complexity is wider still.

At the same time, it is clear that remuneration for even the most complex parliamentary offices cannot be made to rival the salaries offered in the private sector. No one would deny that the Premier has vast responsibilities or that his or her actions have a decisive impact on the life of citizens, on society in general and on the future of Québec. But the Premier's salary cannot be set according to the practices current in the private sector for jobs which, theoretically, may involve responsibilities of similar magnitude. No democratic State, even the richest, has gone this route.

54. By "similar jobs" we mean jobs that obtain a comparable Hay Group score.

As for the office of MNA specifically, the median remuneration for the job class that was assigned a comparable Hay Group score in government bodies is \$152,000. At present, MNAs' remuneration<sup>55</sup> is 22% lower than this median figure. Again, if the comparison is extended to include the public, parapublic and private sectors, the gap widens further.

**TABLE 8**

**MNAs' remuneration and median remuneration for jobs assigned a comparable Hay Group score**

<b>MNA</b>	\$118,686
<b>Government bodies</b>	\$152,000
<b>Public and parapublic sectors</b>	\$170,000
<b>Private sector</b>	\$231,000

Interestingly, the Hay Group method was used to determine the salary scales for managerial and other senior positions in Québec's public service. The score obtained by the office of MNA—1,142 points—aligns perfectly with the range of scores assigned to level-4 officers and members of government bodies and enterprises (DMO4). The maximum salary for such office-holders is currently \$136,010. A comparable basic indemnity for MNAs would be fair and reasonable. That being said, the above-mentioned office-holders also have job security and are eligible for annual performance bonuses, neither of which is available to MNAs.

The Hay Group results are meaningful and credible. They correlate to a high degree with the updated proposal of the Lavoie committee, which sets the MNAs' basic indemnity at \$137,000. As well, applying the 2002 ratio in relation to the average Québec salary would increase the basic indemnity to \$130,000.

Combined with the points of reference examined above, the Hay Group results argue strongly in favour of increasing current indemnities. For these reasons, and given that public funds are at stake, we favour an increase in MNAs' basic indemnity that would make it comparable to the salary for a job of equal complexity in the public service, that is, the maximum salary paid to level-4 officers and members of government bodies and enterprises.

But how is the remuneration of MNAs to be determined in the future? We believe that if the basic indemnity is to be aligned with the salary of a job class of senior public servants, it must also follow the progression of that salary. Accordingly, the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*<sup>56</sup> should be amended to ensure that the annual rate of increase in the basic indemnity is the same as that which applies to the salary of officers and members of government bodies and enterprises.

55. For the purposes of the comparison, MNAs' present remuneration is their basic indemnity (\$88,186) plus the taxable amount equivalent to the present non-taxable annual expense allowance (\$30,500), for a total of \$118,686.

56. R.S.Q., c. C-52.1.

## RECOMMENDATION 2

The Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity of an MNA be set at the maximum of the level-4 salary scale for officers and members of a government body or enterprise. In 2013, the remuneration would have been \$136,010.

## RECOMMENDATION 3

The Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity be increased each year by the percentage of salary increase granted to officers and members of a government body or enterprise.

### 4.3 Additional indemnities

Just as MNAs' basic indemnity must reflect as closely as possible the inherent value of their work, so must the additional functions exercised by some MNAs be fairly and equitably compensated. Because of these added responsibilities, every MNA who also holds another parliamentary office receives an additional indemnity that is a percentage of the basic indemnity. This practice has always had currency in the public, parapublic and private sectors as well as in all Canadian legislative assemblies.

The substantial increase we are recommending in the basic indemnity would disproportionately inflate the additional indemnities. Consequently, it is necessary to review the percentage corresponding to each parliamentary office. It is also important to re-evaluate each additional indemnity on the basis of the responsibilities and demands attributable to the office concerned. We found the Hay Group evaluation to be a useful tool in this regard. We also asked ourselves whether every additional indemnity was justified.

#### Office of Premier

The office of Premier is of capital importance in our political and parliamentary system. The responsibilities of the Premier are unequalled in Québec society. His or her actions play a decisive role in determining the direction society will take and have repercussions on the daily lives of millions of people. The expectations, visibility and accountability attendant on the office of Premier are in direct proportion to its importance. The workload, pressure and demands associated with the job are unparalleled in any other sector of activity.

The Hay Group evaluation amply shows the level of complexity of the Premier's job. The score—6,384—has no equal in government bodies, still less in the public and parapublic sectors. In the private sector, however, we find that the median remuneration for a job with a comparable score is \$2.2 million per year. Clearly, the Premier's current remuneration is vastly incommensurate to the complexity of the job. The MNAs who responded to our questions on the subject were unanimous in saying that the Premier is insufficiently remunerated. Judging by the comments we received from citizens, we are firmly convinced that a large proportion of the public shares this view.

We believe that a substantial increase in the indemnity paid to the Premier is absolutely necessary. There is no question of increasing it to a level that is perfectly competitive with salaries being paid on the open market for jobs of similar complexity, but it must, in our view, be as fair and equitable as possible, keeping in mind the principle of reasonableness that applies whenever public funds are involved. The Premier's remuneration should be comparable to that paid to Québec's highest-ranking public servant, the Secretary General of the Conseil exécutif.<sup>57</sup> It would then also be more or less equal to the salary of the Chief Judge of the Court of Québec.<sup>58</sup> The logic of such an alignment is undeniable.

57. See table in Appendix V for the remuneration for this position.

58. Nonetheless, it would still be well below the remuneration paid to some senior officers of large state corporations and some university rectors.

## RECOMMENDATION 4

The Committee recommends that the Premier's additional indemnity be set at 100% of the basic annual indemnity of an MNA. In 2013, the Premier's total remuneration would have been \$272,020.

### Offices of Minister, Assembly President and Leader of the Official Opposition

Historically, Ministers, the President of the National Assembly and the Leader of the Official Opposition have received the same amount as an additional indemnity. This is also the case in most other Canadian legislative assemblies and in the federal Parliament. Considering the responsibilities of these offices and in view of the practices in other assemblies, we feel this situation is justified and must be maintained.

The Hay Group score for the office of **Minister** is 3,536. The median remuneration for a job with a comparable score in the public and parapublic sectors would, according to Hay Group data, be more than \$400,000. The gap between that figure and a Minister's remuneration must be reduced. In keeping with the line of reasoning we applied to the office of Premier, a Minister should receive remuneration comparable to that of the highest-ranking public servant of the organization he or she heads, in this case the Deputy Minister. It is worth noting that this argument was also put forward by several MNAs.

In addition to presiding over parliamentary proceedings, the **President of the National Assembly** is invested with the task, essential in a democracy, of preserving the rights and privileges of the Members and of Parliament. In a role that somewhat parallels that of Minister, the President directs the Assembly's administration and is Québec's chief parliamentary diplomat. In many ways, he or she embodies parliamentary democracy in Québec.

The **Leader of the Official Opposition** plays a key role in our British-style parliamentary system. The Official Opposition's responsibility is two-fold: it oversees and criticizes government action, and it constitutes an alternative to the elected government. An effective opposition makes for a healthy democracy, often bringing citizens' displeasure and wishes to bear on the policy directions of the party in power. This role must receive due recognition, and the person who leads the Official Opposition must be adequately remunerated.

## RECOMMENDATION 5

The Committee recommends that the additional indemnity of a Minister, of the President of the National Assembly and of the Leader of the Official Opposition be set at 60% of the basic annual indemnity of an MNA. In 2013, the total remuneration for each of those offices would have been \$217,616.

## Other parliamentary offices

Having reviewed the responsibilities attaching to each of the other parliamentary offices, we propose the additional indemnities shown in Table 9. It will be seen that, as a rule, the differences in remuneration between the various offices are proportionately maintained.<sup>59</sup> However, we closed the gap somewhat between the additional indemnity of the **Leader of the Official Opposition** and that of the **Leader of the Second Opposition Group**. In this way, we acknowledge the importance of the latter office and of the demands and responsibilities incumbent on an opposition leader who, under our system, may legitimately aspire to become head of the Government. It is also worth noting that the Legislative Assembly of Ontario and the House of Commons of Canada set the percentage at about 35%.

We also propose that the additional indemnity for Temporary Chairs of parliamentary committees be abolished. The indemnity has sparked controversy. Critics maintain that the workload and responsibilities involved are very limited, and that the purpose of the indemnity is patently to increase the basic indemnity of MNAs who hold no other remunerated parliamentary office. We agree that such an additional indemnity, granted unconditionally, is ill-suited to the office in question, the more so because recommendation 2 increases the basic indemnity to \$136,010. Further, the office itself has no equivalent in other Canadian assemblies. In our view, Temporary Chairs should be paid a lump sum of \$250 for each sitting they preside over. This would be more in keeping with the task they perform and fair compensation for their time and for any expenses they might incur.

We recognize that **members of the Office of the National Assembly** have certain responsibilities and tasks to carry out. The role of the Office of the National Assembly is comparable to that of the board of directors of a business. Its members deserve to be compensated for the time they spend preparing for and attending meetings. However, as the number of meetings and the workload are limited, here again we propose a lump sum of \$250 for each full meeting as fair compensation for both regular and substitute members.

The proposed lump sum would serve to compensate Temporary Chairs of parliamentary committees and regular and substitute members of the Office for their time and availability. MNAs who serve in those capacities should therefore be entitled to the amount even if they receive an additional indemnity in connection with another parliamentary office.

Among Canadian legislative assemblies, the National Assembly grants one of the highest number of additional indemnities—23—for parliamentary offices. Our recommendations would abolish two of them while reorganizing and simplifying the remaining ones. Under the new system, with the exception of the indemnities for the office of Minister, the office of Assembly President and the office of Leader of the Official Opposition, additional indemnities would be divided into four percentage-based categories. This change reflects in its essentials a reform measure proposed in the Lavoie report of 1987.

Finally, it should be noted that the remuneration we propose for the five parliamentary offices submitted to Hay Group for evaluation remains lower in all cases than the median remuneration for comparable jobs in government bodies, the public and parapublic sectors and the private sector.

59. See Appendix VIII for the percentages and amounts (current and proposed) for each parliamentary office.

**TABLE 9**

**Additional indemnity and total remuneration for other parliamentary offices, based on recommended basic indemnity of \$136,010**

	Basic indemnity	Additional indemnity		Total: basic indemnity + additional indemnity
		Percentage of basic indemnity	\$	
Leader of the Second Opposition Group	\$136,010	30%	\$40,803	\$176,813
Vice-President of the Assembly	\$136,010	25%	\$34,003	\$170,013
Official Opposition House Leader	\$136,010	25%	\$34,003	\$170,013
Chief Government Whip	\$136,010	25%	\$34,003	\$170,013
Chief Official Opposition Whip	\$136,010	20%	\$27,202	\$163,212
House Leader of the Second Opposition Group	\$136,010	20%	\$27,202	\$163,212
Deputy Government House Leader	\$136,010	20%	\$27,202	\$163,212
Chair of the Government Caucus	\$136,010	20%	\$27,202	\$163,212
Parliamentary Committee Chair	\$136,010	20%	\$27,202	\$163,212
Parliamentary Assistant to a Minister	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Chair of Official Opposition	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Whip of the Second Opposition Group	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Official Opposition House Leader	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Government Whip	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Official Opposition Whip	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412
Parliamentary Committee Vice-Chair	\$136,010	15%	\$20,402	\$156,412

**RECOMMENDATION 6**

The Committee recommends that the additional indemnities for other parliamentary office-holders be adjusted as proposed in Table 9.

**RECOMMENDATION 7**

The Committee recommends abolishing the additional indemnities for Temporary Chairs of parliamentary committees and regular members of the Office of the National Assembly. Instead, the Committee recommends that those office-holders and the substitute members of the Office of the National Assembly be paid a lump sum of \$250 for each full sitting or meeting.

**4.4 Attendance allowance**

Under the administrative rules of the Office of the National Assembly,<sup>60</sup> a \$125 attendance allowance is paid

- (1) to MNAs who are members of a parliamentary committee and to MNAs from the Official Opposition or the Second Parliamentary Group who are not, for each sitting of a parliamentary committee or subcommittee they attend on a day when the Assembly is not sitting;<sup>61</sup> and
- (2) to MNAs who are regular or substitute members of the Office of the National Assembly, for each meeting of the Office they attend on a day when the Assembly is not sitting.

This allowance compensates MNAs for their time and availability, since in some cases they must make an extra trip to the Parliament Building when the Assembly is not sitting. To our way of thinking, MNAs are by definition required to make themselves available for sittings or meetings necessitated by parliamentary business or by the administrative activities of the Office of the National Assembly. As travel and accommodation expenses are covered by other allowances, there is no reason to maintain the attendance allowance, which could even be seen by some as an indirect, less visible form of remuneration.

60. *Règlement sur les allocations aux députés et aux titulaires de cabinet et sur les sommes versées à des fins de recherche et de soutien*, Decision 1603 of November 10, 2011, Office of the National Assembly, updated June 13, 2013, 44 pp.

61. This provision does not apply to the President of the Assembly, the Leader of the Official Opposition or Ministers.



## RECOMMENDATION 8

The Committee recommends abolishing the attendance allowance granted, when the Assembly is not sitting, to MNAs who attend a sitting of a committee or subcommittee and to members and substitute members who attend a meeting of the Office of the National Assembly.

## 4.5 Transition allowance

In the course of our work, we could hardly fail to take note of the debate in recent years surrounding the transition allowance granted to MNAs, in particular those who decide to leave office before their term has ended. We approached this question, which is part of our mandate, fully aware that the Assembly is currently examining legislative amendments in this area.<sup>62</sup>

It is important to place the concept of the transition allowance in its proper historical context. The allowance was created in 1982 with the passage into law of the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*. Along with the allowance came a major reform of MNAs' pension plan. Prior to this time, a person who ceased to be an MNA after serving at least two terms for a total period of more than five years was entitled to pension benefits immediately, regardless of age. Under the 1982 Act, the minimum age for a former Member to receive pension benefits without actuarial penalty was set at 60. This meant that some former Members could find themselves out of work and in financial difficulty. The legislator recognized that finding work was not necessarily easy for them and that, unlike other workers, they were not entitled to employment ("unemployment" at the time) insurance benefits.

With the decided purpose of providing a safety net to former MNAs, the Act instituted a transition allowance.

[Translation] *The idea of a separation allowance is clearly to allow an MNA to make the transition from political life back to private life with, of course, the possibility of finding work after leaving politics. But on that score the jurisprudence (if one may so term it) shows that of MNAs who have left political life over the past five, ten, fifteen, twenty or twenty-five years, some, including former Ministers, have found it difficult to find a job once their political career ended. [There is a] real need to be met for those who leave political life and need some form of income security.*<sup>63</sup>

62. *An Act to amend the Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*, Bill 33, 1st Session, 40th Legislature; *An Act respecting the review of the financial benefits granted to the Members of the National Assembly*, Bill 390, 1st Session, 40th Legislature.

63. *Journal des débats* (Hansard), October 21, 1982, p. B-8788 (Jean-François Bertrand, Government House Leader), Committee on the National Assembly.

The National Assembly is not the only Canadian assembly to provide such a safety net. In fact, nearly all the others grant a similar allowance.<sup>64</sup> With these points in mind, we sought a solution that would reconcile the primary and still valid objective of the allowance with the legitimate concerns of the public.

The transition allowance is currently granted in three instances: when an MNA resigns during his or her term of office; when an MNA decides not to run for re-election after serving a full term; and when an MNA is defeated in a general election.

### **Resignation during term of office**

The first question to ask is whether an MNA who resigns during his or her term of office should be entitled to a transition allowance at all. Most Canadian legislative assemblies grant the allowance to Members who resign in the course of their term, regardless of their reasons for doing so. The exceptions are the House of Commons of Canada and the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia. The reasoning is that such a resignation violates the implicit contract, ratified by the election result, between the Member and his or her constituents. Some observers also point to the high costs of holding a by-election after such resignations.

For all these reasons, we do not think that MNAs who resign before their full term is over should be paid a transition allowance, except in special circumstances. Hence, for obvious humanitarian reasons, the allowance should still be paid to MNAs who resign for serious family reasons or because of major health issues affecting them or their immediate family members.

As the rules in this area must be applied fairly and objectively and with due respect for the Member's private life, an independent third party, namely the Ethics Commissioner, should alone be responsible for determining whether an MNA's transition-allowance application sufficiently establishes the existence of health or family reasons for the resignation.

### **RECOMMENDATION 9**

The Committee recommends that no transition allowance be paid to MNAs who resign during their term of office, unless the resignation is due to a major health issue affecting them or a member of their immediate family, or to a serious family matter. Any allowance granted would be calculated and paid in accordance with recommendations 11 to 17.

64. The exception is Alberta, which abolished its transition allowance for Members elected after April 23, 2012. This despite the fact that Commissioner John C. Major, in his 2012 report, recommended that the allowance be maintained, albeit with sweeping changes to the way it was calculated and with a ceiling on the total amount paid (two months' basic salary for every year served to a maximum of 12 months).

## RECOMMENDATION 10

The Committee recommends that the Ethics Commissioner be mandated to determine whether a health issue or family matter has been established as the reason for an MNA's resignation. The Committee also recommends that the Ethics Commissioner's conclusions and recommendations be communicated to the MNA concerned and to the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

### End of term of office

A Member's term of office ordinarily ends when he or she decides not to run for re-election or is defeated in a general election. In either case, the MNA is placed in the same situation and faces the same challenge of making a harmonious transition from political to private life. Consequently, there is no valid reason to question entitlement to the transition allowance, and the amount should be the same in both cases. A single Canadian assembly, the House of Commons of Canada, grants no transition allowance to Members who decide not to run for re-election. This is not, in our view, an example to be followed.

### Amount of transition allowance

Whatever the circumstances that give rise to a transition allowance, it should be paid on the termination of the MNA's term of office, in a lump sum or in instalments, as the person wishes. Instalments should be spread over a period of up to 12 months instead of the current 36 months.

## RECOMMENDATION 11

The Committee recommends that the transition allowance be paid as soon as an MNA's term ends. At the MNA's option, the allowance would be paid in a lump sum or over a period of up to 12 months.

But how is the transition allowance to be calculated? We believe that the current rule, which bases the amount on the basic indemnity and any additional indemnity for a parliamentary office, must be changed. The allowance should still be equal to twice the MNA's monthly salary for each full year of service, with a minimum of 4 times and a maximum of 12 times that monthly salary. However, the monthly salary used for calculation purposes should be limited to the basic indemnity as it stands when the MNA's term ends. This change is justified by the proposed substantial increase in the basic indemnity, which would translate into a sufficient sum to ensure a smooth transition for all parliamentarians.

## RECOMMENDATION 12

The Committee recommends that the monthly salary used to calculate the transition allowance be limited to the MNA's basic indemnity at the end of the MNA's term.

We are well aware of the criticism that surrounds payment of the transition allowance in certain specific circumstances. Quite rightly, the public does not see why the full allowance should be paid to an MNA who is receiving full pension benefits or has found lucrative employment in the public, parapublic or private sector. Such situations fuel public cynicism. It is essential, therefore, that the conditions for payment of the allowance be reviewed to ensure that the allowance serves as the safety net the legislator intended it to be in the first place.

We propose that the amount of the allowance paid in each case be adjusted to reflect any employment, professional, business and retirement income<sup>65</sup> received by the former MNA during the period covered by the allowance. Similar provisions already exist with regard to MNAs' staff, House Officers' staff, and Ministers' staff, though they apply only to income from public sector employment.<sup>66</sup> We have drawn upon those provisions in formulating our own proposed changes to the transition allowance rules. It should also be noted that the National Assembly would not be the first Canadian legislative assembly to take this route. In British Columbia, all employment income goes into the calculation of the net transition allowance a former Member is entitled to.<sup>67</sup> In other Canadian assemblies (6 out of 12), former Members who are receiving parliamentary pension benefits do not qualify for the allowance.

We recommend that, before any transition allowance is paid, former MNAs be required to file with the Ethics Commissioner a statement of their expected income<sup>68</sup> for the period covered by the allowance. Additionally, to receive the allowance a former MNA should have to make a prior undertaking to reimburse any overpayment if the allowance received exceeds the amount allowable in the circumstances. He or she should also have to undertake to declare immediately to the Ethics Commissioner any employment, professional, business or retirement income received during the period the allowance is being paid.

A former MNA who qualifies for the allowance and whose income is lower than the salary used for calculation purposes would receive the difference between the two amounts until the end of the period of entitlement to the allowance. Conversely, if his or her income is equal to or greater than that salary, the allowance would cease to be paid. Under the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly*, such a rule already applies to MNAs who qualify for benefits under a disability pension plan when they leave office.

65. Retirement income from the MNA's own registered pension plan or supplementary benefits plan.

66. Under the rules concerning the remuneration and employment conditions of MNAs' staff and House Officers' staff, political personnel are entitled to receive a severance allowance. It ceases to be paid when the person obtains a position in the public sector. However, if the salary is lower than that the person was receiving as an allowance, he or she receives the difference between the two. A similar rule exists with respect to Ministers' staff.

67. For more information, go to <http://members.leg.bc.ca/mla-remuneration/employment-benefits.htm>.

68. By "income" we mean all employment, professional, business and retirement income regardless of source (i.e. public, parapublic and private sector).

For the purposes of the new rules, we recommend that former MNAs file a statement of any employment, professional, business and retirement income they receive during the period they are entitled to the allowance. The statement should be filed with the Ethics Commissioner no later than 60 days after the end of that period. The Ethics Commissioner would be responsible for communicating the relevant information to the Secretary General of the National Assembly for the purposes of the final calculation of the allowance in each case.

### RECOMMENDATION 13

The Committee recommends that any employment, professional, business or retirement income that former MNAs may receive during the period they are entitled to a transition allowance be subtracted from the amount of the allowance. The Committee also recommends that, before receiving the allowance, a former MNA be required to declare any expected income to the Ethics Commissioner, who would inform the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

### RECOMMENDATION 14

The Committee recommends that, before receiving a transition allowance, a former MNA be required to undertake to reimburse any overpayment to the National Assembly, if the total amounts paid as a transition allowance exceed the amounts to which the MNA was entitled, given the employment, professional, business or retirement income actually received.

### RECOMMENDATION 15

The Committee recommends that, during the period covered by the transition allowance, former MNAs be required to declare immediately to the Ethics Commissioner any change in their employment, professional, business or retirement income. The Ethics Commissioner would inform the Secretary General of the National Assembly of the change.

**RECOMMENDATION 16**

The Committee recommends that, at the end of the period covered by the transition allowance, a former MNA be required to file an income statement with the Ethics Commissioner within 60 days, listing any employment, professional, business or retirement income he or she received or was entitled to receive at the same time as the transition allowance. Should the former MNA fail to provide the information required to the Ethics Commissioner within the prescribed time, the Secretary General could demand a full reimbursement of the transition allowance, subject to the subsequent filing of the information required.

**More than one transition allowance**

Another issue in the transition allowance debate is the fact that the same person may be granted a transition allowance more than once. MNAs who resume their political career after a period of interruption are granted the allowance when, eventually, they leave political life for a second time. Some observers see this as unjustified and maintain that the allowance should be granted only once to any given individual.

It should be noted, however, that the *raison d'être* of the allowance—to provide a safety net as a means of facilitating the person's return to private life—remains operative even in the case of a non-consecutive second term. The challenges facing the former MNA remain essentially unchanged. Some will make the transition easily, others will have more difficulty finding work.

There are all kinds of reasons for temporarily interrupting one's political career. A parent with young children may want to spend more time with his or her family, and decide to return to politics in a few years' time. It is not in the interests of our democracy to forgo the contribution of people who, after a time away, still wish to serve their fellow citizens as a parliamentarian. Abolishing the allowance for such people could be a factor in dissuading them from returning to political life.

The changes we are proposing to the transition allowance will generate substantial savings. In this context, it does not appear advisable to introduce further restrictions. Any potential additional savings would be offset by the negative effects such restrictions would have on people's sincere desire to resume their political careers.

## Prosecution for office-related offence

What measures should be taken, as regards the transition allowance, when an MNA or former MNA is prosecuted for an offence related to the functions of office? In our view, the allowance should not be paid or should cease to be paid as soon as charges have been laid. Payment of the allowance should be suspended until a judgment has been rendered and becomes final. If found guilty, the person would no longer be entitled to the allowance and would be required to reimburse any amounts previously received. If acquitted, he or she would continue to be entitled to the allowance, including the amount withheld while payment was suspended.

### RECOMMENDATION 17

The Committee recommends that the transition allowance not be paid or cease to be paid if an MNA or former MNA is prosecuted for a penal or criminal offence related to the exercise of the functions of office, until a judgment has been rendered and become final. If found guilty, the person would lose entitlement to the allowance and be required to reimburse the amounts already paid. If acquitted, the person would be entitled to the transition allowance, including the amount withheld.

We are convinced that our recommendations regarding the transition allowance answer the concerns that have been raised about it and are true to its logical underpinnings. If implemented, they will substantially reduce transition allowance spending and help maintain public confidence in our democratic institutions.

## 4.6 Travel allowance

On this subject, we began by examining the intra-constituency and extra-constituency travel allowance. To be clearer and more transparent, the name of the allowance should be changed to reflect its real nature. It should be called “intra-constituency and extra-constituency travel and expense allowance”.

The allowance is non-taxable, and should remain so in our opinion. Its purpose is to reimburse MNAs for the expenses they incur to attend activities held mostly in their own riding, but sometimes elsewhere in Québec. The expenses vary widely and are often small amounts. Being neither taxable nor conditional on presentation of vouchers, the allowance gives MNAs the flexibility and freedom from paperwork they need to get on with their daily activities. A system based on the presentation of vouchers would create excess paperwork and entail unwarranted administrative costs.

Generally speaking, the amount of the allowance is sufficient to cover expenses, but a problem was pointed out to us in the case of large ridings. For the purposes of some allowances, Québec's 125 ridings are divided into four groups according to geographic size. Each group is defined by a minimum and maximum area. Unlike groups I and II, group III consists of ridings that comprise anywhere from 1,775 km<sup>2</sup> to 60,000 km<sup>2</sup>—a very wide range indeed. One can see how an MNA representing an electoral division that approaches the 60,000 km<sup>2</sup> maximum might be at a disadvantage compared to one representing one near the 1,775 km<sup>2</sup> minimum. Consequently, we propose that the Office of the National Assembly examine this question and make any necessary changes.

As regards the present system of reimbursing expenses incurred for travel back and forth between an MNA's constituency office and the Parliament Building, we see no reason to modify this aspect of Members' employment conditions. Nor were any arguments advanced in the course of our meetings to justify such changes. The expenses are reimbursed on presentation of vouchers, and we believe that this system should remain unchanged.

It should be noted that neither allowance is granted to members of the Cabinet.<sup>69</sup>

## 4.7 Riding offices and remuneration of staff

In the course of our work, we heard from MNAs who maintained that the budgets allocated to some Members to cover riding office expenses and remunerate constituency staff are insufficient. Though sensitive to these representations, we feel that this is a question for the Office of the National Assembly to examine.

## 4.8 Allowance for accommodation expenses in Québec City

### Maximum allowance

MNAs who represent a riding outside Québec City and its immediate vicinity (electoral divisions of Chauveau, La Peltre and Montmorency) must either rent an apartment, buy a secondary residence or stay in a hotel. In all three cases, vouchers must be presented before the reimbursement (up to a maximum of \$14,900 for the 2013–2014 fiscal year) is made.

The latest available data shows that this maximum is reasonable and suffices to cover the expenses incurred. For instance, the average rent in October 2012 for an apartment in Upper Town Québec City was \$813 per month according to the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation.<sup>70</sup> To this must be added direct and indirect costs, such as heat, electricity, telephone, etc. As for hotel accommodations, it appears that the maximum reimbursement, with few exceptions, has been sufficient thus far to cover the expenses incurred.

69. *Règlement sur les allocations aux députés et aux titulaires de cabinet et sur les sommes versées à des fins de recherche et de soutien*, op. cit., ss. 1 and 15.

70. Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation, *Rental Market Report, Québec CMA*, fall 2012, p. 10.



**RECOMMENDATION 18**

The Committee recommends that the maximum amount reimbursed for accommodation expenses in Québec City be maintained at \$14,900 annually, subject to the existing indexation clause.

**Additional amount for certain parliamentary offices**

Under the present rules, MNAs who hold certain parliamentary offices<sup>71</sup> are entitled to an additional \$3,000 for their accommodation expenses in Québec City. The justification is that the offices they hold require them to be present in Québec City more often than other MNAs. By the same token, then, they should be reimbursed only for the accommodation expenses occasioned by their increased presence in Québec City. Since this increased presence does not affect the accommodation expenses of those who rent an apartment or have a secondary residence in the Québec City region, we believe that the additional amount should be paid only with regard to hotel accommodations, upon presentation of vouchers.

It is worth noting that Ministers are not entitled to the additional amount, even though they are frequently required to be in Québec City in order to fulfill their ministerial responsibilities. For this reason, we believe that the Office of the National Assembly should include them in the list of those entitled to the additional amount.

**RECOMMENDATION 19**

The Committee recommends that an additional reimbursement amount of \$3,000 be granted only in cases where an MNA holding a designated office stays in a hotel establishment and only on presentation of vouchers.

**RECOMMENDATION 20**

The Committee recommends that the office of Minister be included in the list of parliamentary offices eligible for the additional reimbursement amount of \$3,000 for accommodation expenses in Québec City.

71. That is, the offices of Assembly President, Premier (if he or she has no official apartment or residence), Leader of the Official Opposition, Leader of the Second Opposition Group, Government House Leader, Official Opposition House Leader, House Leader of the Second Opposition Group, Chief Government Whip, Chief Official Opposition Whip, Whip of the Second Opposition Group, Chair of the Government Caucus and Chair of the Official Opposition Caucus.

### Determination of principal residence

We believe it is important to dispel all possible ambiguity regarding reimbursements of expenses for accommodation in Québec City. Consequently, an objective and impartial party, namely the Ethics Commissioner, should be given the responsibility of receiving and verifying a declaration of principal residence from each MNA. The information would remain confidential, but would be certified by the Ethics Commissioner and communicated to the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

#### RECOMMENDATION 21

The Committee recommends that the *Code of ethics and conduct of the Members of the National Assembly* be amended to require MNAs to file a declaration of principal residence with the Ethics Commissioner each year. The information would be verified by the Ethics Commissioner and then sent to the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

### Area defined for purposes of accommodation expense allowance

Under the rules on accommodation expenses, the “immediate vicinity” of Québec City is defined as the electoral divisions of Chauveau, La Peltre and Montmorency. This definition is too restrictive, as it excludes the entire South Shore of the city, an exclusion which no geographical consideration can justify. A new definition of “immediate vicinity” is needed. It must be simple, and should therefore be based on a distance rule rather than on geographical or administrative designations, both of which are subject to change whenever riding or municipal boundaries are redrawn.

#### RECOMMENDATION 22

The Committee recommends that an MNA be entitled to the reimbursement of expenses for accommodation within 50 kilometres of the Parliament Building by road, provided his or her principal residence is situated outside that area.

## 4.9 Pension plan

By definition, a pension plan to which an employer contributes represents a deferred salary and must be included in the calculation of an individual's total remuneration. Consequently, any balanced and coherent scheme we propose for MNAs' employment conditions must include the pension plan. This is doubly important in that changes to indemnities necessarily have repercussions on pension plan benefits. Historically, the pension plan has been used to provide Members with a good total remuneration package and to partially compensate for an annual basic indemnity that was at times insufficient and could not bear comparison with salaries paid in other sectors.

We compared Québec's pension plan for MNAs (the PPMNA) to the plans of other Canadian legislative assemblies and to the main pension plans of employees in Québec's public and parapublic sectors. The administrator of the PPMNA is the Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d'assurances (CARRA), who provided us with their expertise. We also paid mind to the debate on the future of pension plans, in particular as illustrated in the recent report of the expert committee on the future of the Québec retirement system (D'Amours report).<sup>72</sup>

Our recommendations take into account such facts as the hard times pension plans are currently experiencing, the generosity of the PPMNA, the necessity of retaining some of its features and the cost-sharing imbalance. All of these subjects are examined below.

### Hard times for pension plans

Pension plans everywhere have been experiencing difficulties in recent years, and Québec is no exception. This is explained by two main factors. First of all, defined benefit plans are affected by increased life expectancy after retirement, which generates additional costs not anticipated in actuarial assumptions.

*Defined benefit pension plans were developed at a time when the labour market was mainly composed of men, and there was an expectation of paying pensions for a maximum period of 13 years. Today, taking into account early retirement, it is not unusual for some plan members to be retired for 30 years.*<sup>73</sup>

Second, defined benefit plans face challenges with respect to capital market yields and interest rates, both of which have fallen well below assumptions. The result has been a sharp deterioration in the financial situation of many plans. These pressures have created serious solvency problems, called the benefits of certain plans into question and, more generally, tempered employers' enthusiasm for defined benefit plans. The growing trend is to convert defined benefit plans into defined contribution plans or to provide new workers with plans in which they assume all the risks.

72. Expert committee on the future of the Québec retirement system, *Innovating for a Sustainable Retirement System, Report*, 2013, 231 pp.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

These same pressures have prompted some governments to make an in-depth review of their employee pension plans. In September 2013, the Government of Alberta announced its intention to reform its main pension plans. New Brunswick has done the same.<sup>74</sup> As for federal Members, in 2012 the House of Commons of Canada amended the *Members of Parliament Retiring Allowances Act*.<sup>75</sup> A fifty-fifty cost-sharing scheme will be implemented progressively,<sup>76</sup> and the age at which MPs begin to receive benefits will increase from 55 to 65.

It should be noted that only 35% of Québec workers are members of a defined benefit plan, the type that theoretically offers future retirees the most financial security. Approximately 47% of Québec workers do not have any kind of group pension plan. Only 4% have a defined contribution plan, and 14% have another type of plan, such as a group RRSP or a deferred profit-sharing plan.<sup>77</sup>

### A generous plan

The comparisons we made show that the PPMNA is a generous plan. Two main features illustrate this fact.

- **The pension accrual rate**
- **The pension accrual period**

First, the pension accrual rate of 4% annually<sup>78</sup> is twice the 2% provided under the Government and Public Employees Retirement Plan (RREGOP) and the Pension Plan of Management Personnel (PPMP), which together cover a large proportion of the workers in Québec's public and parapublic sectors.<sup>79</sup> It is also higher than that of the Retirement Plan for Senior Officials (RPSO) and the Pension Plan for Elected Municipal Officials (PPEMO). It exceeds the rates generally offered by other Canadian legislative assemblies. It should be further noted that the clear trend in Canada at the moment is to reduce Members' pension benefits.<sup>80</sup>

74. Some of the changes announced by Alberta are as follows: conversion of the public sector's defined benefit plan into a form of target benefit plan; a moratorium on all benefit increases until 2021; fifty-fifty cost-sharing between employer and employees; and increased actuarial penalties for early retirement. The New Brunswick reform provides for the following: increased actuarial penalties for early retirement; more stringent solvency rules; less guarantee of ancillary benefits; and a calculation method based on career salary rather than best years.

75. R.S.C., 1985, c. M-5.

76. The proportion paid by federal Members used to be 14%. After a transition period, this will increase to 50%, or a contribution of \$38,796 per year according to a press release published on October 18, 2012 by the Office of the President of the Treasury Board.

77. Expert committee on the future of the Québec retirement system, op. cit., p. 33.

78. The 4% rate is composed of the 1.75% PPMNA rate and the 2.25% MNA supplementary benefits plan rate. The latter plan is not a registered plan and Members make no contributions to it.

79. The rate is 2% before the age of 65. It is then adjusted downwardly to coordinate these plans with the Québec Pension Plan.

80. For example, the pension accrual rate of the plan for Members of the House of Commons of Canada was reduced from 5% to 4% in 1995, and again to 3% in 2001; in New Brunswick, the rate was recently cut from 4.5% to 3%; and in Nova Scotia, it was lowered from 5% to 3.5% in 2011.

Second, MNAs accrue pension credits over a maximum of 25 years, and these credits are fully indexed every year prior to retirement. Consequently, an MNA with 25 years of service or more receives a pension equal to 100% of his or her career salary. The pension may not, however, exceed the highest indemnity received by the MNA in a year. By comparison, the maximum pension under the RREGOP, the PPMP and the RPSO is currently 76% of the salary paid in the best years (for 38 years of service). In other Canadian legislative assemblies, the maximum generally varies between 70% and 75%.

With respect to both these factors, there is a gap between the plans of Québec's public and parapublic sectors and the PPMNA, and a somewhat smaller gap between the plans of the Members of other Canadian assemblies and the PPMNA. In the past, the nature of the office of MNA has been cited to justify the higher accrual rate of the PPMNA in relation to other major plans. Hence, noting that the average age for new MNAs was 40 and the average political career lasted eight years, the Comité d'étude extraparlamentaire chargé d'examiner le système de retraite des députés québécois wrote in 1991:

[Translation] *It follows that MNAs devote to public life what everyone would agree are their most productive years. In doing so, they will not have risen in the ranks in their former career or contributed to a pension plan geared to that career and to the progressively higher salary that goes with it and will even possibly have missed the opportunity of becoming a partner in their firm. And despite working 70 hours a week or more, they find themselves in a potentially difficult position when, by their own choice or that of the electorate, they must look for a new job at an age our society often considers too old.*<sup>81</sup>

The social, professional and economic context has changed considerably over the past 20 years, in particular with regard to the later age at which individuals now enter politics. For new MNAs, politics is often a second or third career. In addition, the labour market is increasingly characterized by workforce mobility. The traditional model, where employees spend their whole career with the same employer, is no longer dominant. Retirement income consists more and more of benefits accrued while in different jobs and—a necessity of which workers are becoming increasingly conscious—of personal retirement savings.

Consequently, a plan can no longer consider the interruption of a career as sufficient justification for granting benefits beyond those habitually granted. Moreover, the financial stability and the fairness of pension plans have become a matter of great concern. This is all the more true of public plans, since the citizenry assumes part of the costs.

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81. Comité d'étude extraparlamentaire, *Système de retraite des députés : rapport*, National Assembly, 1991, pp. 39–40.

### A pension plan to be preserved

The PPMNA compensates in part for the precarious nature that characterizes the political careers of most MNAs, providing undeniable security for those who serve during the most productive years of their lives.

Some Canadian provinces have abolished their Members' pension plans, defined benefit plans for the most part. Ontario abolished its plan in 1995, replacing it by an annual amount paid into a retirement account for each Member. Alberta suspended its plan in 1993, but in 2012 instituted a system under which 13% of a Member's indemnity is invested in a registered retirement savings plan.<sup>82</sup> British Columbia offered its Members a group registered retirement savings plan from 1997 to 2006, before returning to a defined benefit plan. For 12 years or so, Manitoba also suspended its pension plan, then replaced it with a system similar to Alberta's. In 2005, having recognized the negative impacts of its decision, Manitoba reintroduced a defined benefit plan and gave new Members a choice between the two systems.

At the National Assembly, the defined benefit plan uses the career-salary method to calculate benefits. This means that benefits are based on the remuneration received by an MNA during all the years he or she contributed to the plan. Each year, the MNA earns a benefit equal to 4% of his or her remuneration for that year. The method is particularly suited to situations where annual remuneration is not tied to progressively higher salary scales and may vary according to the circumstances, which is precisely the case of MNAs. Aside from their basic indemnity, MNAs who become Cabinet Ministers or hold certain parliamentary offices are granted additional indemnities. For some MNAs, the pension plan may be a factor in their decision to embark on a political career in the first place.

For all these reasons, we believe that certain features of the PPMNA should be preserved. The type of plan now in force recognizes the value of MNAs' important contribution to public service and provides them with some assurance of financial security once their political careers have ended. The PPMNA has fulfilled its role well for many years. In a sense, it has served to make up for MNAs' indemnities, which have been lower than they should be.

82. In his report on the working conditions of Alberta MLAs, Commissioner Major recommended setting up a career-salary defined benefit plan, with an accrual rate of 2.5% annually.

## Cost-sharing

The PPMNA is characterized by an imbalance in cost-sharing between MNAs and the Government. MNAs contribute 9% of their basic indemnity and any additional indemnity, up to their maximum contributory earnings (about \$154,000 in 2013). Beyond this maximum, income is non-contributory. However, pension credits are calculated on the basis of an MNA's total indemnity. The PPMNA has no retirement fund for the payment of pension benefits.<sup>83</sup> Instead, the Government pays plan benefits out of the consolidated revenue fund.

MNAs' annual contributions represent only about 21% of the plan's total cost. This contrasts sharply with the major pension plans of Québec's public and parapublic sectors, which are funded in equal measure by employers and employees.

## Proposed changes

- **Pension accrual rate**
- **Pension accrual period**
- **Cost-sharing**
- **Non-retroactivity**
- **Maximum age of contributors**

In view of the hard times pension plans find themselves in, the generosity of the PPMNA, the need to preserve certain features of it, and the cost-sharing imbalance, as well as the general context, the trends in pension plans generally and the expectations of taxpayers, we recommend a number of changes to the PPMNA as it presently stands.

## Pension accrual rate

Convinced that PPMNA benefits must be readjusted, we recommend a reduction in the pension accrual rate. If MNAs' basic annual indemnity is increased to reflect the intrinsic value of their work, there is no further reason for other components of overall remuneration to be more generous than the same components for a comparable job. This conclusion reflects the principle, advocated throughout this report, that MNAs' remuneration must be fair.

Consequently, the provisions of the PPMNA should be brought more into line, in their essential features, with those of the Retirement Plan for Senior Officials (RPSO) applicable to level-4 officers and members of a government body or enterprise—the job group with which, in our view, the office of MNA should ideally be compared. If the pension accrual rate is not reduced, the proposed indemnity

83. In its 2012 report, CARRA estimated the unfunded actuarial liability of the plan to be \$188 million.

increases will disproportionately inflate PPMNA costs in absolute terms. Left unadjusted, those costs for one year would shoot up 50%. As it is necessary to strike a balance that is acceptable both to MNAs and to taxpayers, we propose that the pension accrual rate be reduced to match that of the RREGOP, the PPEMO and the RSPO, that is, to 2% per year.

The contribution rate should be maintained at the current 9%, which is the maximum permitted under current tax rules. Contributions should be determined on the basis of an MNA's total indemnity, subject to applicable tax limitations. Benefits should be based on the total indemnity received by the MNA.<sup>84</sup> By way of illustration, for an MNA receiving the new basic indemnity of \$136,010, the changes would represent an annual contribution increase of the order of \$4,300. The pension credit acquired for one year of service would be reduced by approximately \$800.<sup>85</sup>

### RECOMMENDATION 23

The Committee recommends that the annual pension accrual rate under the Pension Plan of the Members of the National Assembly (PPMNA) be set at 2% of an MNA's total indemnity.

### RECOMMENDATION 24

The Committee recommends that the annual rate of contribution to the PPMNA be maintained at 9%.

### RECOMMENDATION 25

The Committee recommends that contributions to and benefits under the PPMNA be calculated by reference to an MNA's total indemnity, subject to applicable tax limitations.

84. The maximum contribution for 2013 is 9% of salary or 70% of the pension adjustment + \$1,000. The maximum contributory indemnity for 2013 would be \$195,211 compared to the current \$154,095. Changes with regard to the payment of contributions would have to be made to the provisions applicable in the event of death.

85. See Table 10 below.



## Pension accrual period

As noted above, MNAs' pension credits accrue at the rate of 4% per year over a maximum period of 25 years, which results in a pension equal to 100% of their career salary. We believe that the maximum accrual period should be extended to 35 years, for a maximum replacement rate of 70% of the career salary. This rate is comparable to those of other Canadian legislative assemblies and to those of the major pension plans in Québec's public and parapublic sectors. MNAs who have earned pension credits before the proposed changes come into effect could continue to contribute even if, by doing so, they build up a pension exceeding 70% of their career salary. As is currently the case, however, their pension could not exceed the highest indemnity they received in a year.

The change in the pension accrual rate would markedly reduce the annual cost of servicing the PPMNA, which now stands at \$5.8 million. Our proposals would reduce it to \$4.3 million. The savings for the Government would be in the area of \$2 million annually, since total plan costs would be cut by \$1.5 million and total MNA contributions augmented by \$0.5 million.

## RECOMMENDATION 26

The Committee recommends that the maximum number of years of contribution to the PPMNA be set at 35 years. New participating MNAs would not be allowed to earn a retirement pension greater than 70% of their indexed career salary. However, MNAs who participated in the plan before the changes came into force would be allowed to earn a retirement pension greater than 70% of their salary, without exceeding the highest indemnity received in a year.

## Cost-sharing

A significant cost-sharing imbalance also needs to be addressed. Given the problems pension plans have been experiencing in recent years, a more equitable division must be established between the portion MNAs contribute and the portion paid for out of public funds, especially in light of the cost-sharing schemes prevailing in the major plans of the public and parapublic sectors, which are funded on a fifty-fifty basis.

Under our proposals, MNAs would pay 41% of the costs for each new year of the plan, compared to the 21% they currently pay. This comes closer to the fifty-fifty cost-sharing model of Québec's public sector plans and of the plan for Members of the House of Commons of Canada.

### Non-retroactivity

It is essential, however, that changes to the PPMNA not apply retroactively. Instead, they should take effect on a given date and apply only to subsequent years. Pension benefits and credits acquired in previous years would not be affected. It would be altogether unfair to apply new rules that change the employment conditions MNAs worked under in the past.

#### RECOMMENDATION 27

The Committee recommends that the proposed changes to the PPMNA be implemented without retroactive effect on the benefits acquired during previous years.

### Maximum age of contributors

Another feature of the PPMNA needs to be adjusted. As things now stand, MNAs stop contributing at age 69, and their entitlement to benefits begins at that age. The tax rules allow this to be set at 71, an age limit that has been adopted by the Pension Plan of Management Personnel and the Retirement Plan for Senior Officials. To bring the PPMNA up to date in this regard, the participation age limit should be hiked from 69 to 71.

#### RECOMMENDATION 28

The Committee recommends that the age limit for participation in the PPMNA be set at 71 years.

We should like to add, in concluding this part of our report, that we are well aware that our proposed changes add up to a major overhaul of the PPMNA. But such an overhaul is needed in the present situation. Our proposed changes take into account the situation of the main Québec pension plans, in particular defined benefit plans. They also strike a new balance: indemnities that fully recognize the value and demands of the office of MNA, and a fair pension plan.

The changes to indemnities (including the integration of the non-taxable expense allowance), taken together with the changes to the PPMNA, will boost MNAs' overall remuneration by approximately 11%.<sup>86</sup> Our evaluation of how the changes will affect an MNA and the PPMNA is presented in tables 10 and 11 below.

**TABLE 10**

**Effects of proposed PPMNA changes on an MNA**

	<b>At present</b>	<b>After proposed changes</b>
Basic indemnity	\$88,186	\$136,010
Annual contribution	\$7,937	\$12,241
Pension credit acquired for one year	\$3,527	\$2,720
Total cost estimate for one year of service	\$37,259	\$28,732
Percentage of cost borne by	21%	43% <sup>87</sup>

**TABLE 11**

**Effects of proposed PPMNA changes on the plan as a whole**

	<b>At present</b>	<b>After proposed changes</b>
Total indemnities	\$13.8 million	\$20.5 million
Total annual contributions	\$1.2 million	\$1.8 million
Total cost of plan	\$5.8 million	\$4.3 million
Total cost of plan for the Government	\$4.6 million	\$2.6 million
Proportion of total cost of the plan borne by MNAs collectively	21%	41% <sup>88</sup>

86. On this subject, see Section 4.12 on the financial impacts of our recommendations.

87. This percentage applies to MNAs who receive the \$136,010 basic indemnity only.

88. This percentage takes all MNAs into account, including those who receive additional indemnities.

## 4.10 Group insurance plan

In the course of our work, we carefully examined MNAs' group insurance plan and compared it to other such plans in the public and parapublic sectors. The coverage provided by the MNA plan is among the best, especially if one considers that contributions for health insurance, long-term disability insurance, critical illness insurance and travel insurance are paid entirely by the Minister of Finance. This remains a very considerable and seldom seen advantage,<sup>89</sup> even allowing for the fact that the contributions constitute a taxable benefit for plan members.

Our basic approach all along has been that MNAs' employment conditions and overall remuneration must be commensurate with the intrinsic value of their work. As this report has demonstrated, if that value is comparable to the value of certain senior positions in Québec's public and parapublic sectors, then logically the other aspects of MNAs' employment conditions should be similarly comparable.

The MNA group insurance plan is made up of two components. Life insurance premiums and accidental death and dismemberment premiums are paid entirely by the plan members, which is also the case for management personnel and senior public servants. With regard to health insurance, critical illness insurance, disability insurance and travel insurance, however, the MNA plan is far more advantageous than the management personnel plan.

The group insurance plan is provided under a contractual agreement between the National Assembly and a service provider, SSQ Financial Group. Any changes to the contract must be the result of negotiations, and not legislative or regulatory decisions. Cost-sharing, coverage and all other aspects of the plan are determined by the interested parties, who must negotiate the terms and estimated costs.

In our view, the idea that group insurance plans should be substantially similar in terms of the cost-sharing of premiums goes hand in hand with the quest for fairness. Moreover, a review of the group insurance plan for MNAs is perfectly in keeping with our approach of considering their employment conditions as a whole. We hope, therefore, that cost-sharing will be one of the components of the plan to be reconsidered when the current contract between the National Assembly and SSQ Financial Group expires.

In another connection, most of the MNAs we met with suggested that their health insurance coverage be extended to include dental and vision care, which are known to be relatively costly. Such care is more in the nature of prevention, and therefore does not correspond, in the strictest sense, to the notion of insurance. The costs are foreseeable, and insurers that provide such coverage set the premiums high enough to meet all outlays. Hence the insurer takes no risk. For this reason, coverage of this kind is rare or partial in the public and parapublic sectors. In conjunction with a reconsideration of the cost-sharing of health insurance premiums, we suggest that the plan members as a group make an informed decision as to whether they want dental and vision care included in the package.

89. By way of illustration, the most costly component of this plan—health insurance—represents a total contribution of approximately \$1,800 per year for individual coverage and \$5,200 per year for family coverage. Under the group insurance plan for public service management personnel, the employer pays approximately 40%, and the employee approximately 60% of the premiums.

**RECOMMENDATION 29**

The Committee recommends that, at the end of the contract currently binding the National Assembly and SSQ Financial Group, the Office of the National Assembly examine whether the MNAs' group insurance plan should be amended. Amendments could be considered to make the plan equivalent to the plan offered to management personnel and senior public servants, as regards coverage and the sharing of costs between plan members and the State.

## 4.11 Other considerations

### Reimbursement of training expenses

Some MNAs had things to say about the reimbursement of training expenses. At present, only the cost of second-language courses is covered, to a maximum of \$1,500 per year. We suggest that the rules be revised to increase the yearly maximum and to allow for the reimbursement of other types of training that relate directly to an MNA's functions of office, such as media relations.

### Underappreciation of MNAs' work

In the course of our various meetings, it became clear that the public is woefully uninformed as to the role of the National Assembly and the work carried out by MNAs. More often than not, about the only image the public has of parliamentary business comes from short televised excerpts of Question Period, which represents an infinitely small portion of the work MNAs do.

A better understanding would help boost public confidence in the institution of Parliament and the office of MNA. We believe that the National Assembly should have an ambitious, Québec-wide plan of action to address this problem.

### Work-family balance

We know how difficult it can be for MNAs to juggle work and family responsibilities. In fact, a number of MNAs we met with mentioned problems in this regard. Admittedly, this question takes us beyond the mandate entrusted to us by the Office of the National Assembly, yet it must be given its due. The work-family dilemma may actually deter some people from considering a political career and force others to resign before the end of their terms. The problem cannot be ignored, particularly if we want to attract highly qualified young people to enter active politics. Consequently, we believe the National Assembly should give a lot of thought to this question.

Disclosure of MNAs’ expenses

Confidence in an institution is intimately connected with the degree of transparency it evinces. The absence of credible information leaves the door open to false or unsubstantiated information. To deal with this situation and bolster public confidence, we advocate transparency—in particular with regard to MNAs’ expenses—as one of the fundamental principles that must guide Parliament in its relations with citizens. Most Canadian provinces, and the House of Commons of Canada, require periodic reports on Members’ spending; likewise the British Parliament. Moreover, the reports are made public and can be accessed via the Internet.

The National Assembly should follow the lead of other Parliaments and make information on MNA spending public. The manner and frequency of such disclosures are matters for the Assembly to decide.

4.12 Financial impacts of recommendations

Remuneration and pension plan

With regard to direct remuneration, we recommend that the non-taxable expense allowance be integrated into the basic indemnity, that the basic indemnity be increased and that the additional indemnities for parliamentary offices be adjusted. As to deferred remuneration, that is, the pension plan, we recommend that the accrual rate be reduced to a level comparable to that of the major plans in the public and parapublic sectors.

Both these components of overall remuneration directly impact the costs paid by the Government. We have evaluated these impacts, in keeping with the objective of transparency that has guided our approach throughout. Our evaluation is based on the current composition of the Assembly and the existing parliamentary offices.

The table below gives direct remuneration as it now stands and as projected with the new indemnities. To remuneration costs are added the annual pension plan costs paid by the Government.

**TABLE 12****Financial impacts of recommendations\***

<b>Current situation</b>	
Indemnities	\$13,940,002
Non-taxable annual expense allowance	\$2,003,375
Sub-total	\$15,943,377
Cost of pension plan to the Government	\$4,604,000
Total	<b>\$20,547,377</b>
<b>Projected situation</b>	
Indemnities	\$20,323,993
Cost of pension plan to the Government	\$2,555,000
Total	<b>\$22,878,993</b>
Increase in overall remuneration	11.3%

\*The projection is based on the current number of parliamentary office-holders.

If applied, our recommendations would increase MNAs' overall remuneration by \$2.3 million, or 11.3%.<sup>90</sup> However, this increase would be offset for the Government by additional Québec income tax revenue amounting to an estimated \$1.5 million annually. Consequently, the net increase for the Government would be of the order of 4%, or approximately \$800,000.

### Transition allowance

It is no easy matter to precisely evaluate the effects our proposed changes will have on the transition allowance. For one thing, the variables—the number of departures, the number of years of service and the reasons for leaving politics—simply cannot be anticipated. Similarly, the amount of the allowance actually paid will depend on the amount of income a former MNA earns after leaving political life.

Nonetheless, an examination of the cases in which MNAs have resigned during their term of office in recent legislatures indicates that the savings will be considerable. However, in other cases, the increase in the basic indemnity will translate into a higher average amount of transition allowance, though this effect will be mitigated by the fact that the allowance is to be calculated on the basis of the basic indemnity and not the total indemnity, as was formerly the case. Also, the fact that income earned during the period covered by the allowance is to be subtracted from the allowance will have a potentially significant effect in reducing the amounts paid by the Government.

90. If our recommendations are implemented, the Assembly will cease to pay the annual non-taxable expense allowance. Instead it will pay out \$6.4 million more in taxable indemnities (the taxable equivalent of the expense allowance + the increased basic and additional indemnities). Supposing a Québec income tax rate of 25.75% applicable to the highest income bracket, the additional income tax collected will be \$1.5 million.

All in all, we estimate that the total amount paid in transition allowances will be lower under the new system than it would be if the present indemnities and rules were to be maintained. It should also be noted that the abolition of the attendance allowance and the change made to the additional allowance for accommodation in Québec City will result in savings of tens of thousands of dollars annually.

### 4.13 Coming into force of recommendations

We recommend that the proposed changes come into force at the start of the legislature that follows the adoption of the legislative and regulatory amendments implementing the recommendations of this report. This would both prevent MNAs having to vote on their own employment conditions, and allow future political candidates to know the employment conditions before they run for office.

#### RECOMMENDATION 30

The Committee recommends that the changes to the employment conditions of MNAs come into force at the beginning of the legislature that follows the adoption of the legislative and regulatory amendments giving effect to the report's recommendations.

### 4.14 Periodic review of employment conditions

Fundamentally, the problem of MNAs setting their own employment conditions can only be solved in the long term by creating a mechanism whereby the matter would at regular intervals be placed in the hands of an independent committee whose recommendations would be binding. Others have gone this route, notably Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and the United Kingdom.

In Manitoba, under a system inaugurated in 2004, the Legislative Assembly Management Commission appoints a commissioner who decides on Members' indemnities, allowances and pension plan. The commissioner is also responsible for drafting the regulations that give effect to these decisions. The commissioner must be appointed within six months following a general election and his or her report must be submitted to the Speaker of the Assembly no later than six months after the appointment. The report is then tabled in the Assembly. In Prince Edward Island, the *Legislative Assembly Act* provides for the appointment by the Speaker of a commission composed of "three independent, neutral and knowledgeable persons from private life". The commission must report annually to the Speaker on the remuneration and allowances granted to Members, parliamentary office-holders and Ministers. The report is tabled in the Assembly and takes effect on the date determined by the commission.

In the United Kingdom, an external, independent body was established under the *Parliamentary Standards Act 2009*. The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) is empowered to determine Members' remuneration and pension. IPSA's first process of review, consultation and decision began in 2012. The process must be repeated in the first year of each new legislature. IPSA is overseen by a board of directors appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of the House of Commons.



The National Assembly of Québec would do well to adopt similar practices. We are thinking here in terms of an independent three-member committee with decision-making authority that would be mandated to review MNAs' indemnities, allowances and pension plan on a regular basis. Such reviews could be conducted in the first year of each new legislature and at any other time the committee judges necessary. The Jurisconsult of the Assembly should be a member of the committee.

### RECOMMENDATION 31

The Committee recommends that the National Assembly consider the creation of a permanent independent committee with decision-making authority concerning the conditions of employment of MNAs. So as to ensure the committee's independence and authority, the National Assembly would determine its terms of reference, the appointment process for its members, and its operating rules.

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PART 5

RECOMMENDATIONS



## Annual expense allowance and basic annual indemnity

### RECOMMENDATION 1

The Committee recommends that the non-taxable annual expense allowance (\$16,027) be integrated into the basic annual indemnity (\$88,186). The amount of the annual expense allowance has been revised (\$30,500) to match, after tax, the allowance currently paid. With this integration of the allowance, the basic annual indemnity of an MNA would have been \$118,686 in 2013.

### RECOMMENDATION 2

The Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity of an MNA be set at the maximum of the level-4 salary scale for officers and members of a government body or enterprise. In 2013, the remuneration would have been \$136,010.

### RECOMMENDATION 3

The Committee recommends that the basic annual indemnity be increased each year by the percentage of salary increase granted to officers and members of a government body or enterprise.

## Additional indemnities

### RECOMMENDATION 4

The Committee recommends that the Premier's additional indemnity be set at 100% of the basic annual indemnity of an MNA. In 2013, the Premier's total remuneration would have been \$272,020.

**RECOMMENDATION 5**

The Committee recommends that the additional indemnity of a Minister, of the President of the National Assembly and of the Leader of the Official Opposition be set at 60% of the basic annual indemnity of an MNA. In 2013, the total remuneration for each of those offices would have been \$217,616.

**RECOMMENDATION 6**

The Committee recommends that the additional indemnities for other parliamentary office-holders be adjusted as proposed in Table 9.

**RECOMMENDATION 7**

The Committee recommends abolishing the additional indemnities for Temporary Chairs of parliamentary committees and regular members of the Office of the National Assembly. Instead, the Committee recommends that those office-holders and the substitute members of the Office of the National Assembly be paid a lump sum of \$250 for each full sitting or meeting.

**Attendance allowance****RECOMMENDATION 8**

The Committee recommends abolishing the attendance allowance granted, when the Assembly is not sitting, to MNAs who attend a sitting of a committee or subcommittee and to members and substitute members who attend a meeting of the Office of the National Assembly.

## Transition allowance

### RECOMMENDATION 9

The Committee recommends that no transition allowance be paid to MNAs who resign during their term of office, unless the resignation is due to a major health issue affecting them or a member of their immediate family, or to a serious family matter. Any allowance granted would be calculated and paid in accordance with recommendations 11 to 17.

### RECOMMENDATION 10

The Committee recommends that the Ethics Commissioner be mandated to determine whether a health issue or family matter has been established as the reason for an MNA's resignation. The Committee also recommends that the Ethics Commissioner's conclusions and recommendations be communicated to the MNA concerned and to the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

### RECOMMENDATION 11

The Committee recommends that the transition allowance be paid as soon as an MNA's term ends. At the MNA's option, the allowance would be paid in a lump sum or over a period of up to 12 months.

### RECOMMENDATION 12

The Committee recommends that the monthly salary used to calculate the transition allowance be limited to the MNA's basic indemnity at the end of the MNA's term.

**RECOMMENDATION 13**

The Committee recommends that any employment, professional, business or retirement income that a former MNA may receive during the period they are entitled to a transition allowance be subtracted from the amount of the allowance. The Committee also recommends that, before receiving the allowance, a former MNA be required to declare any expected income to the Ethics Commissioner, who would inform the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

**RECOMMENDATION 14**

The Committee recommends that, before receiving a transition allowance, a former MNA be required to undertake to reimburse any overpayment to the National Assembly, if the total amounts paid as a transition allowance exceed the amounts to which the MNA was entitled, given the employment, professional, business or retirement income actually received.

**RECOMMENDATION 15**

The Committee recommends that, during the period covered by the transition allowance, former MNAs be required to declare immediately to the Ethics Commissioner any change in their employment, professional, business or retirement income. The Ethics Commissioner would inform the Secretary General of the National Assembly of the change.

**RECOMMENDATION 16**

The Committee recommends that, at the end of the period covered by the transition allowance, a former MNA be required to file an income statement with the Ethics Commissioner within 60 days, listing any employment, professional, business or retirement income he or she received or was entitled to receive at the same time as the transition allowance. Should the former MNA fail to provide the information required to the Ethics Commissioner within the prescribed time, the Secretary General could demand a full reimbursement of the transition allowance, subject to the subsequent filing of the information required.

**RECOMMENDATION 17**

The Committee recommends that the transition allowance not be paid or cease to be paid if an MNA or former MNA is prosecuted for a penal or criminal offence related to the exercise of the functions of office, until a judgment has been rendered and become final. If found guilty, the person would lose entitlement to the allowance and be required to reimburse the amounts already paid. If acquitted, the person would be entitled to the transition allowance, including the amount withheld.

**Accommodation expenses (Québec City)****RECOMMENDATION 18**

The Committee recommends that the maximum amount reimbursed for accommodation expenses in Québec City be maintained at \$14,900 annually, subject to the existing indexation clause.

**RECOMMENDATION 19**

The Committee recommends that an additional reimbursement amount of \$3,000 be granted only in cases where an MNA holding a designated office stays in a hotel establishment and only on presentation of vouchers.

**RECOMMENDATION 20**

The Committee recommends that the office of Minister be included in the list of parliamentary offices eligible for the additional reimbursement amount of \$3,000 for accommodation expenses in Québec City.



**RECOMMENDATION 21**

The Committee recommends that the *Code of ethics and conduct of the Members of the National Assembly* be amended to require MNAs to file a declaration of principal residence with the Ethics Commissioner each year. The information would be verified by the Ethics Commissioner and then sent to the Secretary General of the National Assembly.

**RECOMMENDATION 22**

The Committee recommends that an MNA be entitled to the reimbursement of expenses for accommodation within 50 kilometres of the Parliament Building by road, provided his or her principal residence is situated outside that area.

**Pension plan****RECOMMENDATION 23**

The Committee recommends that the annual pension accrual rate under the Pension Plan of the Members of the National Assembly (PPMNA) be set at 2% of an MNA's total indemnity.

**RECOMMENDATION 24**

The Committee recommends that the rate of contribution to the PPMNA be maintained at 9%.

**RECOMMENDATION 25**

The Committee recommends that contributions to and benefits under the PPMNA be calculated by reference to an MNA's total indemnity, subject to applicable tax limitations.

**RECOMMENDATION 26**

The Committee recommends that the maximum number of years of contribution to the PPMNA be set at 35 years. New participating MNAs would not be allowed to earn a retirement pension greater than 70% of their indexed career salary. However, MNAs who participated in the plan before the changes came into force would be allowed to earn a retirement pension greater than 70% of their career salary, without exceeding the highest indemnity received in a year.

**RECOMMENDATION 27**

The Committee recommends that the proposed changes to the PPMNA be implemented without retroactive effect on the benefits acquired during previous years.

**RECOMMENDATION 28**

The Committee recommends that the age limit for participation in the PPMNA be set at 71 years.

**Group insurance plan****RECOMMENDATION 29**

The Committee recommends that, at the end of the contract currently binding the National Assembly and SSQ Financial Group, the Office of the National Assembly examine whether the MNAs' group insurance plan should be amended. Amendments could be considered to make the plan equivalent to the plan offered to management personnel and senior public servants, as regards coverage and the sharing of costs between plan members and the State.

## Coming into force of recommended changes

### RECOMMENDATION 30

The Committee recommends that the changes to the employment conditions of MNAs come into force at the beginning of the legislature that follows the adoption of the legislative and regulatory amendments giving effect to the report's recommendations.

## Periodic review of conditions of employment

### RECOMMENDATION 31

The Committee recommends that the National Assembly consider the creation of a permanent independent committee with decision-making authority concerning the conditions of employment of MNAs. So as to ensure the committee's independence and authority, the National Assembly would determine its terms of reference, the appointment process for its members, and its operating rules.

## CONCLUSION

Coming to the end of this report, we wish to emphasize the main principles that have guided us throughout our proceedings.


We were determined that our committee's approach be both transparent and comprehensive. We adhered resolutely to carrying out a rigorous and as objective as possible analysis of the employment conditions of MNAs. With regard to their annual remuneration, we focused on the importance and the unique nature of the office of MNA and on the need for total independence and integrity on the part of those who are legislators, overseers of the Québec public administration, and chosen intermediaries between the people and the National Assembly, the Government and the administration.

We are convinced that the changes we are suggesting to the employment conditions of MNAs are fair, timely and equitable for all. They reflect the intrinsic value and the demands of the office exercised by the Members of the National Assembly of Québec for the well-being of the people and the vitality of parliamentary democracy.

We are aware that this report is likely to give rise to debate. Nevertheless, it is our hope that through this report and its recommendations, the office of MNA will be better understood by the public.



Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, Committee Chair



Claude Bisson, Committee Member



François Côté, Committee Member and Secretary

Québec City, November 26, 2013



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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We wish to thank all those who were involved, in whatever capacity, in the preparation of this report and made our work so much easier.

Michel Bonsaint, Secretary General of the National Assembly, deserves special mention for having provided the support we needed to fulfill our mandate. The National Assembly's administrative team was exceptional. It included Jacques Gagnon, Director of the Research Service of the National Assembly Library, whose expertise and remarkable historical memory made his contribution invaluable. Geneviève Barry, Marc Painchaud and François Dubreuil assisted us throughout the exercise and we are very thankful to them. As well, we wish to express our gratitude to the team from the Communications, Educational Programs and Visitor Services Directorate for their advice and their editing of the report, as well as to Michel Héroux for his help with its drafting.

We also commend the participation of representatives of the civil society and MNAs, as well as citizens who willingly answered our call for public comment. We much appreciated the collaboration of Alain Jacob of CARRA, Johane Moreau and Dany Caron from SSQ Financial Group and Ethics Commissioner Jacques Saint-Laurent, who shared their expertise with us.

To all these persons, we reiterate our sincere thanks.



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## APPENDIX I

### **QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**





# INDEPENDENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENSION PLAN OF THE MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

## QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MNAs

**THIS DOCUMENT IS STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

(Feel free to answer the questions of your choice.)

### SECTION A – Personal information

1. Last name: \_\_\_\_\_
2. First name: \_\_\_\_\_
3. Number of years as an MNA: \_\_\_\_\_
4. Do you hold an additional parliamentary office?  
 a) Yes ☐      b) No ☐  
 If so, which one? \_\_\_\_\_
5. At what age were you first elected to the National Assembly? \_\_\_\_\_
6. Occupation before being elected as an MNA: \_\_\_\_\_
7. How many years of study have you completed?  
 a) Fewer than 12 ☐      c) Between 15 and 18 ☐  
 b) Between 12 and 15 ☐      d) More than 18 ☐

## SECTION B – Office of MNA

1. Identify among the following choices the **five** that best reflect how you **see your work as an MNA**. Please indicate beside the role chosen whether it is your first, second, third, fourth or fifth choice.

- a) Representing the constituency \_\_\_\_\_
- b) Promoting the party's policy platform \_\_\_\_\_
- c) Overseeing the work of the government administration \_\_\_\_\_
- d) Providing personal expertise on matters of public interest \_\_\_\_\_
- e) Acting as an intermediary between constituents and the administration \_\_\_\_\_
- f) Overseeing government initiatives \_\_\_\_\_
- g) Representing all Québec citizens \_\_\_\_\_
- h) Legislating \_\_\_\_\_
- i) Participating in the constituency's social, economic and cultural development \_\_\_\_\_

2. Overall, how many days and hours per week do you spend exercising your parliamentary and constituency duties?

During the sessional period:                      Number of days \_\_\_\_\_

Number of hours \_\_\_\_\_

Outside the sessional period:                      Number of days \_\_\_\_\_

Number of hours \_\_\_\_\_

3. How many hours per week do you spend on the following activities?

Activities	During sessional period	Outside sessional period
a) Assembly proceedings		
b) Committee proceedings		
c) MNA meetings (caucus, working committees, etc.)		
d) Meetings with stakeholders		
e) Constituency matters and meetings with local constituents		
f) Social and representation activities		
g) Party or Cabinet meetings		
h) Travel		
i) Other activities		

4. What are the main reasons citizens contact you and your staff? Indicate your **first three choices** in the list below by writing "1", "2" and "3" in order of decreasing importance.

- a) To request information \_\_\_\_\_
- b) For the correction of an administrative error \_\_\_\_\_
- c) To provide information \_\_\_\_\_
- d) To obtain goods or services \_\_\_\_\_
- e) To apply for jobs in the public sector \_\_\_\_\_
- f) To make suggestions \_\_\_\_\_

5. How many requests do you receive **at your riding office**, on average, per week? Specify **the number**.

- a) In person \_\_\_\_\_
- b) By letter \_\_\_\_\_
- c) By telephone \_\_\_\_\_
- d) By email \_\_\_\_\_

6. How many requests do you receive **at the Parliament Building**, on average, per week? Specify **the number**.

- a) In person \_\_\_\_\_
- b) By letter \_\_\_\_\_
- c) By telephone \_\_\_\_\_
- d) By email \_\_\_\_\_

7. Has your role as an MNA changed over the past few years with regard to **the workload**?

- a) No ☐
- b) A little ☐
- c) Moderately ☐
- d) A lot ☐

Please elaborate:

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8. Has your role as an MNA changed over the past few years with regard to **the complexity of the activities?**

a) No ☐ c) Moderately ☐  
 b) A little ☐ d) A lot ☐

Please elaborate:

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### SECTION C – Income

1. How would you describe your financial situation since your election as an MNA?

a) Worse ☐ b) Better ☐ c) Same ☐

2. If applicable, how much do you evaluate the gain or loss to be, on an annual basis?

a) \$1 to \$25,000 ☐ c) \$50,000 to \$75,000 ☐  
 b) \$25,000 to \$50,000 ☐ d) \$75,000 or more ☐

3. Do you consider your income as an MNA to be sufficient?

a) Yes ☐ b) No ☐

Please elaborate:

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**SECTION D – Basic annual indemnity and annual expense allowance**

Under section 1 of the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* (chapter C-52.1), every MNA receives a basic annual indemnity.

1. Do you think that, today, the basic annual indemnity of \$88,186 is suitable compensation for the office of MNA?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

2. If not, why do you believe this amount is insufficient?

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3. What criteria or parameters should be used to set the basic annual indemnity?

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Under section 10 of the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* (chapter C-52.1), every Member receives a non-taxable annual allowance of \$16,027 to cover expenses incurred in the performance of their duties.

4. As this allowance is on your pay cheque, do you consider it more as part of the salary you receive as an MNA?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

5. If not, how do you use this allowance (meals, flowers, association membership fees, hospitality, training costs, etc.)?

Please elaborate:

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6. In your opinion, the amount granted is:

a) Insufficient ☐

b) Sufficient ☐

c) Too high ☐

Please elaborate:

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If this amount were to be revised, what criteria or parameters do you believe should be used to set the allowance?

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7. Are you in favour of maintaining the non-taxable allowance in its current form or would you like to see it integrated into the basic annual indemnity, as is the case for the House of Commons and most Canadian legislative assemblies (increasing the amount so that the net allowance after tax matches the current allowance)?

a) Maintain allowance ☐  
in current form

b) Integrate allowance into ☐  
basic annual indemnity

Besides the basic annual indemnity and annual expense allowance, MNAs holding an additional parliamentary office receive, on an annual basis, an additional indemnity equal to a percentage of their basic indemnity.

8. For each of the following parliamentary offices, please indicate by a checkmark whether the current percentage is insufficient, sufficient or too high:

<b>Additional parliamentary offices</b>	<b>Current additional %</b>	<b>Insufficient</b>	<b>Sufficient</b>	<b>Too high</b>
a) Premier	105%			
b) Minister and Government House Leader	75%			
c) President of the Assembly	75%			
d) Leader of the Official Opposition	75%			
e) Vice-President of the Assembly	35%			
f) Leader of the Second Opposition Group	35%			
g) Chief Government Whip	35%			
h) House Leader of the Official Opposition	35%			
i) Chief Whip of the Official Opposition	30%			
j) Deputy Government House Leader	25%			
k) House Leader of the Second Opposition Group	25%			
l) Government Caucus Chair	25%			
m) Committee Chair	25%			
n) Official Opposition Caucus Chair	22.5%			
o) Whip of the Second Opposition Group	20%			
p) Deputy House Leader of the Official Opposition	20%			
q) Assistant Government Whip	20%			
r) Assistant Whip of the Official Opposition	20%			
s) Parliamentary Assistant	20%			
t) Committee Vice-Chair	20%			
u) Temporary Committee Chair	15%			
v) Member of the Office of the Assembly	15%			



Comments:

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The *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* (chapter C-52.1) provides that the basic annual indemnity is adjusted according to the same percentage of increase granted to senior executive officers in the public service, as of the same effective date.

**9.** Should this formula be amended?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

**10.** If so, what changes do you propose?

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## SECTION E – Intra-constituency and extra-constituency travel allowance

Under the *Règlement sur les allocations aux députés et aux titulaires de cabinet et sur les sommes versées à des fins de recherche et de soutien* (Regulation respecting Members' and House officers' allowances and research and administrative support funding) (Decision 1603 dated November 10, 2011), MNAs who are not Cabinet Ministers receive a non-taxable monthly allowance that varies according to the group of constituencies to which the MNA's constituency belongs.

(Group 1: \$7,800, group 2: \$12,600, group 3: \$17,300 and group 4: \$19,400)

1. For what purposes do you use this allowance (mileage, meal expenses, living expenses, etc.)?

Please elaborate:

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2. In your opinion, the amount granted you is

a) Insufficient ☐

b) Sufficient ☐

c) Too high ☐

Please elaborate:

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3. If this allowance were extended to other expenses (meals with constituents, association membership fees, hospitality, training costs, flowers, etc.), would you agree to those expenses being reimbursable, in whole or in part, on presentation of vouchers?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

Please elaborate:

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## SECTION F – Transition allowance

Under the *Act respecting the conditions of employment and the pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly* (chapter C-52.1), an MNA who resigns as a Member of the Assembly, is defeated in an election or serves out his or her term but is not a candidate in the next election is entitled to a transition allowance. The allowance is equal to twice the MNA's monthly salary for each complete year during which he or she was a Member of the Assembly. The MNA is also entitled, where applicable, to twice the portion of the monthly salary equal to the fraction of a year during which he or she was a Member of the Assembly. However, the allowance may not be less than four times or more than 12 times the MNA's monthly salary.

1. Should the current system be maintained as is?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

2. If not, what changes should be made and for what reasons?

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## SECTION G – Pension plan

Members of the Assembly contribute an amount equal to 9% of their indemnity (basic annual indemnity plus additional indemnity, for a maximum of \$154,095 for 2013) to their pension plan. The pension credit is between 4% and 100% of the indemnity received each year by the MNA, according to the number of years in office. A person 60 years of age or more who ceases to be an MNA is entitled to a retirement pension without actuarial penalty.

1. Should the current system be maintained as is?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

2. If not, what changes should be made and for what reasons?

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## REPORT

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The members of the Committee thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. Once you are done, please place the questionnaire in the enclosed stamped envelope and return it to us **before August 26, 2013** at the following address:

Office Secretariat

c/o Martine Minville  
Édifice Pamphile-Le May  
1035, rue des Parlementaires  
2e étage, bureau 2.24  
Québec (Québec) G1A 1A3

**PLEASE NOTE**

This is a strictly confidential document and the identity of respondents will not be disclosed.

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## APPENDIX II

**NOTICE PUBLISHED  
IN THE NEWSPAPERS**



## Independent advisory committee on the employment conditions and pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly

### PUBLIC NOTICE

The Office of the National Assembly has commissioned an independent advisory committee to study the overall employment conditions of the Members of the National Assembly, including their pension plan. The committee is to submit its report to the President of the National Assembly by December 1, 2013.

The committee is made up of the Honourable Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, retired justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Honourable Claude Bisson, retired chief justice of the Québec Court of Appeal and National Assembly Jurisconsult, and François Côté, former Secretary General of the National Assembly.

In order to gather input for its reflection, the committee invites individuals and organizations to send their comments concerning the employment conditions of MNAs by September 6, 2013 to the following address:

#### Independent Advisory Committee

Édifice Pamphile-Le May  
1035, rue des Parlementaires  
Bureau 2.24  
Québec (Québec) G1A 1A3

Comments may also be sent by email to:

[comiteconsultatifindependant@assnat.qc.ca](mailto:comiteconsultatifindependant@assnat.qc.ca)

Information on the employment conditions of the Members of the National Assembly is available on the Assembly website under Members/Indemnities and Allowances at: [assnat.qc.ca](http://assnat.qc.ca)





## Comité consultatif indépendant sur les conditions de travail et le régime de retraite des membres de l'Assemblée nationale

### AVIS PUBLIC

Le Bureau de l'Assemblée nationale a confié à un comité consultatif indépendant le mandat d'analyser l'ensemble des conditions de travail des membres de l'Assemblée nationale, y compris leur régime de retraite. Ce comité doit remettre son rapport au président de l'Assemblée nationale au plus tard le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 2013.

Il est composé des honorables Claire L'Heureux-Dubé, juge à la retraite de la Cour suprême du Canada et Claude Bisson, juge en chef à la retraite de la Cour d'appel du Québec et jurisconsulte des membres de l'Assemblée nationale ainsi que de François Côté, ex-secrétaire général de l'Assemblée nationale.

Afin d'alimenter ses réflexions, le comité invite les citoyens et les organismes qui souhaitent s'exprimer sur les conditions de travail des membres de l'Assemblée nationale à lui transmettre par écrit leurs commentaires au plus tard le 6 septembre 2013, à l'adresse suivante :

**Comité consultatif indépendant**

Édifice Pamphile-Le May  
1035, rue des Parlementaires  
Bureau 2.24  
Québec (Québec) G1A 1A3

ou par courriel à l'adresse suivante :

**[comiteconsultatifindependant@assnat.qc.ca](mailto:comiteconsultatifindependant@assnat.qc.ca)**

Pour plus d'information sur les conditions de travail des membres de l'Assemblée, on peut consulter le site Internet de l'Assemblée nationale, à l'adresse suivante **[assnat.qc.ca](http://assnat.qc.ca)**, dans la section Députés – indemnités et allocations.



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## APPENDIX III

### **STATISTICAL PORTRAIT: THE CHANGING WORKLOAD OF MNAs IN THE ASSEMBLY AND IN PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE**



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# Statistical Portrait

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## **The changing workload of MNAs in the Assembly and in parliamentary committee**

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A document produced at the request of the  
Independent Advisory Committee on the  
conditions of employment and pension  
plan of the Members of the National  
Assembly

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Parliamentary Proceedings Directorate  
**JULY 2013**

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## Introduction

This document was prepared at the request of the Independent Advisory Committee on the conditions of employment and pension plan of the Members of the National Assembly established in June 2013. Its objective is to draw a statistical portrait of the parliamentary workload of MNAs in the Assembly as well as in parliamentary committee. Various statistics are presented, among them the number, length and scheduling of Assembly sittings and parliamentary committee meetings. Other relevant information is also included that helps to depict the workload of Members in the National Assembly.

In September 2013, the Assembly entered its fifth year since the adoption of the new calendar born of the 2009 parliamentary reform. Although statistics are available for only four years (including an election year), the impact of the parliamentary reform on the workload and the organization of MNAs' working time is already perceptible. We have compared pre- and post-reform data in order to better illustrate the effects of the reform on MNAs' work in the Assembly and in committee.

We hope that the data compiled in this report will be of help in evaluating the workload of MNAs and will make it possible to identify certain trends over the years.

### Notes regarding available data and its interpretation

- The data concerning the number and length of Assembly sittings is incomplete. Although we have the data for the number of Assembly sittings per calendar year since 1984, information regarding the length of sittings has only been compiled since 1996 and is based on fiscal years (as at March 31).<sup>1</sup>
- Complete data concerning parliamentary committees has been available since 1984 (number and length of meetings, orders carried out, etc.) and is compiled based on fiscal years. As regards the number of meetings held in January and August as well as on Mondays and Fridays, we compiled the data as of 1999–2000.
- The calendar and schedule of Assembly and committee proceedings have changed a few times since the significant 1984 reform. Statistics on the number and length of Assembly sittings and committee meetings must be interpreted in light of those changes. The main historical benchmarks are presented in Appendix 1 to this document.


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<sup>1</sup> Because of the limited time available to us to prepare this document, the data on Assembly sittings was not compiled for the years preceding 1984. If need be, we could complete the data by compiling the length of each of the sittings as recorded in the Assembly's *Votes and Proceedings*.

## Workload in the Assembly

### Sittings per year

Since 1984, the Assembly has sat, on average, 72 times per year. If we exclude the years during which an election was held, with their inevitably lower number of sittings, the average number of Assembly sittings per year is 78. The data gathered since 1984 shows that this number has remained rather constant over the years. However, the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, which follow the adoption of the new parliamentary calendar, are above average, with 84, 84 and 82 sittings, respectively. Those years were the first since 1984 where more than 80 sittings were held three years in a row. Bear in mind that during its ordinary sitting schedule, the Assembly sits three times a week, while it sits four times a week during the period of extended hours of meeting. As an example, if we compare the three years that followed the 2003 election (77, 78 and 73 sittings) and the three years following the 2008 election (84 (+7), 84 (+6) and 82 (+9)), we can see that the increase in the number of sittings reflects the two to three additional weeks during which MNAs had to be in Québec City to participate in Assembly proceedings.



\* election years

72 → average number of Assembly sittings per year since 1984

78 → average number of Assembly sittings per year since 1984 excluding election years


77 → average number of Assembly sittings per year from 1984 to 2008 (excluding election years)

83 → average number of Assembly sittings per year since the 2009 reform (excluding 2012)



## Hours of work in the Assembly

Since 1996, the Assembly has sat, on average, 360 hours per year. That number climbs to 393 if we exclude election years. The data reveals that for the same number of sittings per year, the number of hours may vary greatly. As an example, for the years 2001–2002 (78 sittings), 2005–2006 (78 sittings) and 2011–2012 (79 sittings), the total number of hours was 475, 391 and 293, respectively. It may be further noted that although the Assembly has held more sittings on average since the adoption of the 2009 parliamentary reform, the number of sitting hours is actually below average.



\* election years

Note: The numbers in the columns represent the number of Assembly sittings that year.

360 → average number of sitting hours per year since 1996


393 → average number of sitting hours per year since 1996 excluding election years

410 → average number of sitting hours per year from 1996 to 2009 (excluding election years)

342 → average number of sitting hours per year since the 2009 parliamentary reform (excluding 2012–2013)

Average length of sittings

Data compiled since the mid-1990s shows a regular decrease in the average length of Assembly sittings. This means that although MNAs have had to travel to the Assembly more often in recent years to attend sittings, the average length of the sittings has been shorter.



5 hours and 1 minute → average length of Assembly sittings since 1996


5 hours and 20 minutes → average length of Assembly sittings from 1996 to 2009 (before the parliamentary reform)

4 hours and 2 minutes → average length of Assembly sittings since the 2009 reform

## Workload in parliamentary committee

### Meetings per year

Since 1984, parliamentary committees have held, on average, 382 meetings per year (410 meetings on average if we exclude election years). For the four fiscal years since the 2009 reform, the average number of meetings is 483 (526 if we exclude election year 2012–2013); and a record 572 meetings was reached in 2011–2012. It is worth noting that since the 2009 reform, four committees may meet simultaneously when the Assembly is sitting (five if the Assembly is not sitting). Only three committees could meet at the same time before the reform (four if the Assembly was not sitting).



\* election years

Meetings include public meetings and deliberative meetings.

382 → average number of committee meetings since 1984


410 → average number of committee meetings since 1984 excluding election years

390 → average number of committee meetings from 1984 to 2009 (excluding election years)

526 → average number of committee meetings since the 2009 reform (excluding 2012–2013)

## Hours of work in committee

The total number of hours of committee work per year has also increased since 2009. The annual average of 1,184 hours before the reform (1,281 hours if we exclude election years) rose to 1,408 after the adoption of the new parliamentary calendar (1,526 hours if we exclude 2012–2013). Since the 2009 reform was implemented, then, committees have sat an average of 264 more hours annually.<sup>2</sup>



1,215 hours → average number of hours per year since 1984

1,318 hours → average number of hours per year since 1984 excluding election years



1,281 hours → average number of hours per year from 1984 to 2009 (excluding election years)

1,545 hours → average number of hours per year since the 2009 reform (excluding 2012–2013)

<sup>2</sup> Appendix 3 includes two graphs with more detailed information. They show the number of committee meetings and meeting hours during the Assembly's sitting period and outside that period since 1999.

## January and August meetings

While the statistics indicate an increase in the committees' workload since 2009, they also reveal that their activity period has become longer. A compilation of the number of parliamentary committee meetings held in January and August since 1999 shows a marked increase for the past few years, especially as regards meetings held in August. As a result, there has been an extension of the period during which MNAs might be required to be present at the Assembly. It would be interesting to find out if, as a corollary, MNAs have had to travel more often between their ridings and the Parliament Building.




\* election years – Note that the 2012 election campaign was held in August.


## Monday and Friday meetings

In addition to seeing their work year become longer, committees have also had to put in longer weeks. The data since 1999 shows a significant increase in the number of meetings held on Mondays and Fridays. Monday meetings have become more frequent particularly during the Assembly's ordinary sitting period and outside its sessional period. Friday meetings have been increasingly frequent during the Assembly's ordinary sitting schedule.<sup>3</sup>

### Monday meetings since 1999




### Friday meetings since 1999



<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 3 for more detailed graphs showing data broken down by number of meetings held by committees on Mondays and Fridays during the Assembly's ordinary sitting schedule and extended hours of meeting, and outside sessional periods.

Traditionally, Mondays have been reserved for riding work, but it is no longer rare for one or more committees to meet on Monday afternoons between 2 and 6 p.m. The encroachment of parliamentary work on riding work puts additional pressure on parliamentarians, particularly when it comes to balancing their various roles and responsibilities.


**Number of committee meetings on Mondays since 1999**



14 → average number of Monday meetings from 1999 to 2009  
37 → average number of Monday meetings since the 2009 reform

Overall statistics on Friday meetings are less eloquent and should be interpreted with caution, as the parliamentary calendar before the parliamentary reform had eight weeks of extended hours of meeting during which the Assembly and the committees met on Fridays. There are only four weeks of extended hours of meeting in the present parliamentary calendar.

**Number of committee meetings on Fridays since 1999**




38 → average number of Friday meetings from 1999 to 2009  
36 → average number of Friday meetings since the 2009 reform

## Mandates carried out

There has been a decrease in the number of mandates carried out by the committees during the past few years, although 2009–2010 is above average in that respect. The situation may be explained in various ways: changes in the nature and type of mandates, substantial mandates that extend over more than one year, etc. Thus, these statistics do not really allow us to quantify the workload of MNAs in parliamentary committee, as a low number of mandates carried out during the year may have required a great number of hours. As an example, 2011–2012 was a big year in terms of hours of meeting, but the number of mandates was below average.

Such data is therefore more useful for qualitative analyses, over time and after reforms, of the nature and the organization of MNAs' committee work.



\* election years

144 → average number of mandates per year since 1984

156 → average number of mandates per year since 1984 excluding election years

158 → average number of mandates per year from 1984 to 2009 (excluding election years)

144 → average number of mandates per year since the 2009 reform (excluding 2012–2013)



## Conclusion

The statistics for the years 1984 to 2012 in this report reveal certain trends over time as regards the workload of MNAs in the Assembly and in parliamentary committee. Among other things, they show an increase in the number of both Assembly sittings and committee meetings in the past few years. They also reveal an extension of the parliamentary year and week, as MNAs are required since the 2009 parliamentary reform to be present on Parliament Hill for a longer period during the year and to meet more frequently in committee on Mondays and Fridays, which are usually devoted to riding work. This situation necessarily has an impact on the balance between the MNAs' various roles and on their workload.

Based on this statistical portrait, the following appear as the 2009 parliamentary reform's most important impacts on the MNAs' workload:

- an increase in the number of Assembly sittings per year, which translates into two to three more weeks per year during which MNAs must be in Québec City;
- an approximate 16% decrease in the average number of Assembly sitting hours per year and an approximate 24% decrease in the average length of Assembly sittings;
- a 35% increase in the average number of committee meetings;
- an approximate 20% increase in the average number of committee meeting hours per year;
- an 80% increase in the average number of committee meetings in January and August, compared with the average for the years 1999 to 2009;
- a 164% increase in the average number of committee meetings held on Mondays, compared to the average for the years 1999 to 2009.

# APPENDICES

## Appendix 1 – Parliamentary calendar and schedules

### Assembly calendar and schedule

**In 1984**, the Assembly adopted a set parliamentary calendar by which it met for two periods every year, from the second Tuesday in March until June 23 at the latest, and from the third Tuesday in October until December 21 at the latest. It sat three days a week, from Tuesday afternoons until Thursday evenings, but could decide to sit also on Mondays. During the period of extended hours of meeting (June 1 to 23 and December 1 to 21), it could sit starting at 10 a.m. until it decided to adjourn the proceedings. Thus, a sitting could last until 10 o'clock the next morning.

**In 1997**, the schedule was modified so that during ordinary hours of meeting each sitting would end at 6 p.m. at the latest, barring exceptions. In addition, the Assembly stopped sitting on Mondays unless it decided otherwise on a motion without notice by the Government House Leader. During extended hours of meeting (May 25 to June 23 and November 25 to December 21), the Assembly could not sit later than midnight.

**In 2009**, the Assembly adopted a new calendar that took effect on September 14 of that year. Under Standing Order 19, it now meets during two periods every year, from the second Tuesday in February for 16 weeks of ordinary hours of meeting followed by two weeks of extended hours of meeting; and from the third Tuesday in September for 10 weeks of ordinary hours of meeting followed by two weeks of extended hours of meeting. During those periods, the Assembly goes into recess for a few weeks so MNAs can concentrate on work in their ridings. Those weeks are determined by the President after a meeting with the House Leaders at the beginning of each sessional period. They are as follows: three weeks during the sessional period beginning in February, one week during the sessional period beginning in September and one week following the second week of extended hours of meeting for that period. Although the Assembly may not sit during those weeks, they are considered to be weeks during which the Assembly meets for the purposes of Standing Order 19.

### Committee calendar and schedule


**In 1984**, committee meeting hours were the same as Assembly sitting hours. However, committee meetings could not extend past midnight, even when the Assembly could sit late into the night. Committees could also meet on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays, from 10 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

**In 1998**, the schedule was changed and committees could meet Monday afternoons, Tuesday to Thursday from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m., and Fridays until 12:30 p.m. During extended hours of meeting, committees could meet from Monday to Friday between 10 a.m. and midnight.


**In 2009**, the Assembly made more changes to the committees' schedule. Outside the periods where the Assembly sits, committees may now meet on Monday afternoons, Tuesday to Thursday from 9:30 a.m. to 6 p.m., and Fridays until 12:30 p.m. When the Assembly is sitting according to its ordinary schedule, the committees may also meet on Tuesday evenings until 9:30 p.m. During extended hours of meeting, the committees may meet on Monday afternoons, from Tuesday to Thursday all day and during the evening, and Fridays until 1 p.m. Also, contrary to what was allowed since 1984, the committees may not meet at all times during the year, as they are not allowed to meet during the five weeks reserved for riding work.

## Appendix 2 – Miscellaneous statistics


## Number of committee meetings




## Number of hours worked by committees




**Total number of Mondays and Fridays on which committees met**




**Number of Mondays and Fridays on which committees met during ordinary hours**



**Number of Mondays and Fridays on which committees met outside ordinary hours**



**Number of Mondays and Fridays on which committees met during extended hours**





TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

## APPENDIX IV

### GROUPS OF ELECTORAL DIVISIONS





Group	Area
I	Up to 550 km <sup>2</sup>
II	550 km <sup>2</sup> to 1,775 km <sup>2</sup>
III	1,775 km <sup>2</sup> to 60,000 km <sup>2</sup>
IV	Over 60,000 km <sup>2</sup>

## GROUP I

Acadie	Marguerite-Bourgeoys
Anjou – Louis-Riel	Marie-Victorin
Beauharnois	Marquette
Blainville	Masson
Borduas	Mercier
Bourassa-Sauvé	Mille-Îles
Bourget	Montarville
Chambly	Montmorency
Chapleau	Mont-Royal
Charlesbourg	Nelligan
Châteauguay	Notre-Dame-de-Grâce
Chicoutimi	Outremont
Chomedey	Pointe-aux-Trembles
Chutes-de-la-Chaudière	Repentigny
Crémazie	Robert-Baldwin
D'Arcy-McGee	Rosemont
Deux-Montagnes	Saint-Henri – Sainte-Anne
Fabre	Saint-Jean
Gouin	Saint-Jérôme
Granby	Saint-Laurent
Groulx	Sainte-Marie – Saint-Jacques
Hochelaga-Maisonneuve	Sainte-Rose
Hull	Sanguinet
Jacques-Cartier	Sherbrooke
Jean-Lesage	Taillon
Jeanne-Mance – Viger	Taschereau
Jean-Talon	Terrebonne
Jonquière	Trois-Rivières
LaFontaine	Vachon
La Pinière	Vanier-Les Rivières
Laporte	Vaudreuil

La Prairie  
L'Assomption  
Laurier-Dorion  
Laval-des-Rapides  
Lévis  
Louis-Hébert

Verchères  
Verdun  
Viau  
Vimont  
Westmount – Saint-Louis

## GROUP II

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Beauce-Nord  
Champlain  
Iberville  
Îles-de-la-Madeleine  
Joliette  
La Peltrie  
Mirabel

Orford  
Richelieu  
Rousseau  
Saint-François  
Saint-Hyacinthe  
Saint-Maurice  
Soulanges

## GROUP III

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Abitibi-Est  
Abitibi-Ouest  
Argenteuil  
Arthabaska  
Beauce-Sud  
Bellechasse  
Berthier  
Bertrand  
Bonaventure  
Brome-Missisquoi  
Charlevoix – Côte-de-Beaupré  
Chauveau  
Côte-du-Sud  
Drummond – Bois-Francs  
Dubuc  
Gaspé  
Gatineau  
Huntingdon

Johnson  
Labelle  
Lac-Saint-Jean  
Laviolette  
Lotbinière-Frontenac  
Maskinongé  
Matane-Matapédia  
Mégantic  
Nicolet-Bécancour  
Papineau  
Pontiac  
Portneuf  
René-Lévesque  
Richmond  
Rimouski  
Rivière-du-Loup – Témiscouata  
Roberval  
Rouyn-Noranda – Témiscamingue

## GROUP IV

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Duplessis

Ungava

TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

## APPENDIX V

### REMUNERATION OF CERTAIN MANAGEMENT POSITIONS IN PUBLIC AND PARAPUBLIC SECTORS



Remuneration of certain management positions in public and parapublic sectors As at April 1, 2013					
Rank at maximum	Class of employment	Level	Salary scale minimum	Salary scale maximum	Salary scale average
1	Secretary General		\$204,791	\$245,750	\$225,271
2	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC10	\$152,008	\$209,164	\$180,586
3	Deputy Minister	4	\$170,660	\$204,791	\$187,726
4	Officer or member – government body	9	\$157,531	\$204,791	\$181,161
5	Deputy Minister	3	\$165,487	\$198,584	\$182,036
6	Officer or member – government body	8	\$152,755	\$198,584	\$175,670
7	Officer – health and social services	30	\$152,023	\$197,631	\$174,827
8	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC9	\$143,349	\$197,246	\$170,298
9	Deputy Minister	2	\$155,915	\$187,098	\$171,507
10	Officer or member – government body	7	\$143,921	\$187,098	\$165,510
11	Officer – health and social services	29	\$143,614	\$186,698	\$165,156
12	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC8	\$135,207	\$186,026	\$160,617
13	Officer – health and social services	28	\$135,666	\$176,368	\$156,017
14	Director general – school board	18	\$132,267	\$176,368	\$154,318
15	Deputy Minister	1	\$146,339	\$175,608	\$160,974
16	Assistant Deputy Minister	2	\$135,083	\$175,608	\$155,346
17	Officer or member – government body	6	\$135,083	\$175,608	\$155,346
18	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC7	\$124,591	\$171,449	\$148,020
19	Officer – health and social services	27	\$128,161	\$166,613	\$147,387
20	Director general – school board	17	\$124,958	\$166,613	\$145,786
21	Officer – health and social services	26	\$121,075	\$157,396	\$139,236
22	Director general – school board	16	\$118,046	\$157,395	\$137,721
23	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC6	\$112,567	\$154,907	\$133,737
24	Assistant Deputy Minister	1	\$116,327	\$151,227	\$133,777
25	Delegate general of Québec		\$116,327	\$151,227	\$133,777
26	Officer or member – government body	5	\$116,327	\$151,227	\$133,777
27	Officer – health and social services	25	\$114,375	\$148,688	\$131,532
28	Director general – school board	15	\$111,515	\$148,687	\$130,101
29	Management personnel – public service	1	\$109,032	\$141,663	\$125,348
30	Officer – health and social services	24	\$108,047	\$140,463	\$124,255
31	Director general – school board	14	\$105,346	\$140,461	\$122,904
32	Assistant director general – school board	14	\$105,346	\$140,461	\$122,904

Rank at maximum	Class of employment	Level	Salary scale minimum	Salary scale maximum	Salary scale average
33	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC5	\$100,454	\$138,243	\$119,349
34	Delegate of Québec		\$104,624	\$136,010	\$120,317
35	Officer or member – government body	4	\$104,624	\$136,010	\$120,317
36	Officer – health and social services	23	\$102,073	\$132,690	\$117,382
37	Director general – school board	13	\$99,517	\$132,689	\$116,103
38	Assistant director general – school board	13	\$99,517	\$132,689	\$116,103
39	Officer or member – government body – physician		\$94,931	\$128,156	\$111,544
40	Management personnel – public service	2	\$102,962	\$125,350	\$114,156
41	Officer – health and social services	22	\$96,421	\$125,350	\$110,886
42	Assistant director general – school board	12	\$94,013	\$125,350	\$109,682
43	Officer or member – government body	3	\$91,492	\$123,512	\$107,502
44	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC4	\$89,649	\$123,370	\$106,510
45	MNA (basic annual indemnity + allowance equivalent)		\$118,686	\$118,686	\$118,686
46	Officer – health and social services	21	\$91,091	\$118,416	\$104,754
47	Assistant director general – school board	11	\$88,812	\$118,416	\$103,614
48	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC3	\$81,761	\$112,513	\$97,137
49	Management personnel – public service	3	\$91,889	\$111,866	\$101,878
50	Officer – health and social services	20	\$86,048	\$111,866	\$98,957
51	Assistant director general – school board	10	\$83,899	\$111,866	\$97,883
52	Officer or member – government body	2	\$79,007	\$106,659	\$92,833
53	Officer – health and social services	19	\$81,290	\$105,679	\$93,485
54	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC2	\$72,966	\$100,408	\$86,687
55	Officer – health and social services	18	\$76,794	\$99,831	\$88,313
56	Management personnel – public service	4	\$82,000	\$99,830	\$90,915
57	Officer or member – government body	1	\$70,112	\$94,666	\$82,389
58	Officer – health and social services	17	\$72,550	\$94,309	\$83,430
59	Senior administrator – health and social services	HC1	\$65,116	\$89,605	\$77,361
60	Management personnel – public service	5	\$71,978	\$89,091	\$80,535
61	Officer – health and social services	16	\$68,533	\$89,091	\$78,812
62	MNA (basic annual indemnity)		\$88,186	\$88,186	\$88,186
<b>Note:</b> The remuneration of \$118,686 comprises the basic annual indemnity of \$88,186 and an amount of \$30,500 corresponding to the taxable equivalent of the non-taxable annual expense allowance currently paid. Québec's combined marginal tax rate was used to determine the taxable equivalent.					

TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
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EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

## APPENDIX VI

### EVOLUTION OF BASIC ANNUAL INDEMNITY IN RELATION TO AVERAGE SALARY IN QUÉBEC






APPENDIX VI - EVOLUTION OF BASIC ANNUAL INDEMNITY IN RELATION  
TO AVERAGE SALARY IN QUÉBEC

Year	Basic annual indemnity	Average salary	Basic annual indemnity average salary ratio
1971	\$15,000	\$6,270	2.39
1972	\$15,600	\$6,784	2.30
1973	\$15,600	\$7,327	2.13
1974	\$21,000	\$8,661	2.42
1975	\$22,700	\$9,980	2.27
1976	\$24,500	\$11,141	2.20
1977	\$27,800	\$12,262	2.27
1978	\$29,468	\$13,166	2.24
1979	\$29,468	\$14,235	2.07
1980	\$31,236	\$15,797	1.98
1981	\$33,110	\$17,611	1.88
1982	\$35,096	\$19,341	1.81
1983	\$37,202	\$20,895	1.78
1984	\$38,900	\$21,683	1.79
1985	\$40,400	\$22,286	1.81
1986	\$41,800	\$22,814	1.83
1987	\$43,500	\$23,774	1.83
1988	\$52,788	\$24,905	2.12
1989	\$55,058	\$25,862	2.13
1990	\$57,260	\$27,322	2.10
1991	\$60,123	\$28,462	2.11
1992	\$60,123	\$29,535	2.04
1993	\$63,475	\$29,880	2.12
1994	\$63,469	\$30,028	2.11
1995	\$63,469	\$30,234	2.10
1996	\$63,469	\$30,552	2.08
1997	\$59,661	\$31,010	1.92
1998	\$60,860	\$31,421	1.94
1999	\$61,773	\$31,608	1.95
2000	\$69,965	\$32,156	2.18
2001	\$71,714	\$32,501	2.21
2002	\$77,339	\$33,317	2.32
2003	\$78,886	\$34,234	2.30
2004	\$78,886	\$35,119	2.25
2005	\$78,886	\$36,277	2.17
2006	\$80,464	\$36,949	2.18
2007	\$82,073	\$38,521	2.13
2008	\$83,714	\$39,236	2.13
2009	\$85,388	\$39,682	2.15
2010	\$85,388	\$40,890	2.09
2011	\$85,388	\$41,892	2.04
2012	\$86,669	\$42,927	2.02

Source:

Statistics Canada, Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours.

Annual salary figures obtained by multiplying weekly salary by 52.18.



TRANSPARENCY  
INTEGRITY  
COMPETENCE  
BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

APPENDIX VII

**HAY GROUP  
REPORT**



# Report

## Members of the National Assembly of Québec Job evaluation and compensation survey

October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2013



# Content

- 1- Mandate and process
  - 2- Job evaluation methodology
  - 3- Job evaluation results
  - 4- Compensation analysis relative to the markets
  - 5- Observations and points to consider
- Appendix:
- Organizations in the three reference markets

1

# Mandate and process



# Mandate

- Assess five benchmark jobs using the Hay Group job evaluation methodology:
  - Member of the National Assembly (MNA)
  - Committee Chair
  - Government Whip
  - Minister
  - Premier
  
- Analyze the total remuneration for these jobs in light of three reference markets:
  - broader public sector
  - government organizations
  - private sector

## Process

- Identification and selection of the jobs to be evaluated
- Updating of the job descriptions
- Discussion with National Assembly personnel on the roles and responsibilities associated with the jobs to be evaluated
- Evaluation of the jobs identified using the Hay Group job evaluation methodology
- Review and discussion of preliminary findings with committee members
- Preparation of a preliminary review and findings report
- Meeting on September 25, 2013 with the Independent Advisory Committee on the compensation and conditions of employment of the Members of the National Assembly
- Adjustments and preparation of the final report

# 2

Job evaluation methodology



# Description of the Hay Guide Chart-Profile Method<sup>sm</sup> of Job Evaluation

## HAY METHOD OF JOB EVALUATION

The Hay Method involves a comparison of the factors used by thousands of organizations, public and parapublic organizations and non-profit organizations to evaluate jobs, whether technical support or clerical, skilled, specialized, management or executive positions. Our Method has been in use for over 50 years and is currently utilized in over 48 countries around the world. A significant number of our clients have long been relying on it with full confidence and have applied it through multiple reorganizations whether to grow or downsize. They have also used it to assess new goods and services organizations and maintain a certain consistency in a context characterized by change or by legal requirements that have disrupted the status quo.

**The Hay Method is effective because it sparks a dynamic process that organizations can adapt and apply to meet their needs.** Our Method is based on the notion that jobs can be measured in terms of their relative contribution to the overall objectives of the organization. By considering core aspects of content and context that are common to all jobs, the Hay Method provides a clear, systematic and easy-to-use instrument for defining and comparing the requirements of all kinds of positions, whatever their nature or level. Our Method, however, can also easily be customized to reflect the particular circumstances that affect only certain positions in certain organizations.

# Description of the Hay Guide Chart-Profile Method<sup>sm</sup> of Job Evaluation (cont.)

## The four factors used by Hay Group

### 1- Know-How

This factor measures the **skills and knowledge** that, **however acquired**, enable the incumbent to deliver satisfactory job performance. It has three dimensions:

- practical procedures and knowledge, specialized techniques and learned skills
- the ability to plan, coordinate, direct or control the activities and resources of an organizational unit or a function
- active, practising, person-to-person skills in the area of human relationships

### 2- Problem Solving

This factor measures the **thinking required** to address the problems inherent in a job. It has two dimensions:

- thinking environment
- thinking challenge (the inherent complexity of the problems faced and the difficulty in identifying solutions)

# Description of the Hay Guide Chart-Profile Method<sup>sm</sup> of Job Evaluation (cont.)

## The four factors used by Hay Group (cont.)

### 3- Accountability

This factor measures the relative **influence** of a job (presuming that job performance is satisfactory) **on the end results** of the organization or of a unit within the organization. The possibility of contributing to business results translates into three dimensions:

- the nature and degree of decision making in, or of the influence of, the job
- the unit or the function most clearly affected by the job
- the nature of that impact

### 4- Working Conditions

This factor measures **the context** of the job. It has four dimensions:

- **Physical effort** – The different levels of physical activity or different body positions, which vary in intensity, duration and frequency and contribute to physical stress and fatigue
- **Environment** – The different degrees of exposure, of varying intensities, to unavoidable physical and environmental factors which may increase the risk of accident, ill health or discomfort
- **Sensory attention** – The different levels of sensory attention (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch), which vary in intensity, duration and frequency, that are inherent in the job functions
- **Mental stress** – The different degrees of exposure, of varying intensities, to factors in the work processes that increase the risk of tension or anxiety

# 3

Job evaluation results

# Observations

The job evaluation was conducted in consultation with three Hay Group reward specialists who individually have over 20 years of experience.

In the analysis, we took into consideration the work done and findings obtained as part of evaluations conducted for other government organizations such as

- the Government of Alberta
- the Government of Canada
- the Government of New Zealand
- the Government of New Brunswick

We also took into account

- the total population served
- operating budgets
- local, provincial, national and international (interparliamentary and international relations) issues
- organizational structures



# Detailed job evaluation – (in decreasing order)

## National Assembly of Québec

### Evaluation of benchmark jobs

Results									
	Know-How		Problem Solving				Accountability		Total Points
	Evaluation	Points	Evaluation	%	Points	Evaluation	Points		
Premier	H V I3	2,112	H 5	87	1,840	I 7- P	2,432	6,384	
Minister	G V 3	1,216	G 5	76	920	H 7- S	1,400	3,536	
Government Whip	G III 3	700	G 4	57	400	F+ 6- C	528	1,628	
Committee Chair	F+ III 3	608	F+ 4	57	350	F 5+ C	460	1,418	
Member	F III 3	528	F 4	50	264	E 6 C	350	1,142	

September 22, 2013

# 4

## Compensation analysis relative to the markets

## Analytical process

- The job evaluation results were used to analyze total remuneration in light of the points obtained for each job
- The following reference markets were used for comparative analysis purposes:
  - broader public sector
  - government organizations
  - private sector
- A comparative compensation analysis was conducted by job type with reference to
  - all Canadian government organizations
  - the three largest provinces (Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia)
- The salaries at the National Assembly of Québec were compared against jobs with equivalent evaluations under the purview of Québec's higher senior positions secretariat (Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs)

*N.B.: "Compensation", in this analysis, means cash compensation and includes either base salary or indemnity, plus short-term incentives, if any.*

## Observations

To conduct our comparative analysis of total remuneration, we used

- Data from the Hay Group database for the targeted reference markets. The data is updated twice yearly. Our database is one of the largest in Canada and worldwide. In 2012, it covered more than 14 million individuals, a 40% increase over 2010.
- Compensation data for similar jobs in Canadian provinces provided by the National Assembly of Québec, updated in 2013 and validated by Hay Group.
- Salary data for jobs under the purview of the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs

# Comparative compensation analysis


Comparison against three reference markets:


- broader public sector
- government organizations
- private sector

# Member

National Assembly:		Member				
Total points:		1,142				
CAN\$		Total indemnities (base salary)		Short-term incentives		Total cash compensation
		Design	Actual	Design		
		118,690				
Member						
Broader public sector						
P50		160,000	160,000	6,000		170,000
Average		159,000	160,000	15,000		174,000
Variance relative to P50		-26%	- 26%	*		-30%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*		< P10
* Insufficient data						
Government organizations						
P50		151,000	145,000	*		152,000
Average		149,000	147,000	*		152,000
Variance relative to P50		-21%	-18%	*		-22%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*		< P10
* Insufficient data						
Private sector						
P50		179,000	183,000	50,000		231,000
Average		187,000	191,000	59,000		246,000
Variance relative to P50		-34%	-35%	*		-49%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*		< P10


# Member








# Member




# Committee Chair

National Assembly:		Committee Chair					
Total points:		1,418					
CAN\$		Total indemnities (base salary)		Short-term incentives	Total cash compensation		
		Design	Actual				
		Committee Chair		140,737		Design	140,737
Broader public sector							
P50		183,000	184,000	16,000	204,000		
Average		186,000	187,000	25,000	211,000		
Variance relative to P50		-23%	-24%	*	-31%		
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10		
* Insufficient data							
Government organizations							
P50		168,000	161,000	*	175,000		
Average		168,000	165,000	*	172,000		
Variance relative to P50		-16%	-P13	*	-20%		
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10		
* Insufficient data							
Private sector							
P50		210,000	215,000	73,000	285,000		
Average		222,000	225,000	86,000	308,000		
Variance relative to P50		-33%	-35%	*	-51%		
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10		


# Committee Chair



# Committee Chair




# Committee Chair




# Government Whip

National Assembly:		Whip			
Total points:		1,628			
CAN\$		Total indemnities (base salary)		Short-term incentives	
		Design	Actual	Design	
		151,086		*	
Whip					
Broader public sector					
P50		205,000	204,000	22,000	241,000
Average		210,000	208,000	31,000	241,000
Variance relative to P50		-26%	-26%	*	-37%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10
* Insufficient data					
Government organizations					
P50		188,000	176,000	*	188,000
Average		183,000	178,000	*	187,000
Variance relative to P50		-20%	-14%	*	-20%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10
* Insufficient data					
Private sector					
P50		237,000	241,000	94,000	336,000
Average		251,000	256,000	117,000	368,000
Variance relative to P50		-36%	-37%	*	-55%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10

# Government Whip




# Government Whip






# Government Whip



# Minister


National Assembly:		Minister			
Total points:		3,536			
CAN\$		Total indemnities (base salary)		Short-term incentives	
		Design	Actual	Design	
		186,361		*	
Minister					
Broader public sector					
P50		369,000	358,000	64,000	416,000
Average		386,000	374,000	105,000	492,000
Variance relative to P50		-49%	-48%	*	-55%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10
* Insufficient data					
Government organizations					
P50		*	*	*	*
Average		*	*	*	*
Variance relative to P50		*	*	*	*
Market position		*	*	*	*
* Insufficient data					
Private sector					
P50		515,000	495,000	486,000	1,000,000
Average		566,000	559,000	501,000	1 066,000
Variance relative to P50		-64%	-62%	*	-81%
Market position		< P10	< P10	*	< P10

# Minister




# Minister

## Private Sector Market



## Premier

National Assembly:		Premier	
Total points:		6,384	
CAN\$	Total indemnities (base salary)		Short-term incentives
	Design	Actual	Design
	212,816		*
Premier		Total cash compensation	
		Design	
		212,816	
Broader public sector			
P50		*	*
Average		*	*
Variance relative to P50		*	*
Market position		*	*
* Insufficient data			
Government organizations			
P50		*	*
Average		*	*
Variance relative to P50		*	*
Market position		*	*
* Insufficient data			
Private sector			
P50		938,000	1,245,000
Average		1,008,000	1,327,000
Variance relative to P50		-77%	-90%
Market position		< P10	< P10
		2,228,000	
		2,335,000	
		-90%	
		< P10	



## Comparative compensation analysis

By job type for:

- all Canadian government organizations
- Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia

# All Canadian government organizations

	Base Salary <sup>1</sup>			
	Premier	Minister	Whip	Member
House of Commons	\$320,510	\$236,979	\$189,130	\$160,255
Alberta	2 \$217,750	\$201,000	\$147,400	\$134,000
British Columbia	\$193,532	\$152,789	\$122,231	\$101,859
Manitoba	\$155,494	\$131,495	\$92,672	\$85,564
New Brunswick	\$164,000	\$137,614	\$111,307	\$85,000
Newfoundland and Labrador	\$167,766	\$149,429	\$108,874	\$95,357
Northwest Territories	3 \$190,421	\$167,681	\$112,672	\$112,672
Nova Scotia	\$198,065	\$135,570	\$92,738	\$87,485
Nunavut	3 \$183,284	\$169,505	\$96,056	\$96,056
Ontario	\$208,924	\$165,801	\$137,829	\$116,500
Prince Edward Island	\$140,600	\$114,500	\$71,100	\$67,400
Saskatchewan	\$158,566	\$138,538	\$105,459	\$91,800
Yukon	3,4 \$153,032	\$134,520	\$93,392	\$93,392
Québec	3 \$212,816	\$186,361	\$151,086	\$118,690
75th percentile	\$198,065	\$167,681	\$122,231	\$112,672
50th percentile	\$183,284	\$149,429	\$108,874	\$95,357
25th percentile	\$158,566	\$135,570	\$93,392	\$87,485
Average	\$188,611	\$156,571	\$113,912	\$102,103
Variance from 50th percentile	16%	25%	39%	24%

Consolidated data based on data provided by the National Assembly of Québec - September 2013

(1) Includes non-taxable expense allowances (if applicable) + the various allowances granted according to the job.

(2) Excludes the daily \$200 allowance granted to Committee Chairs.

(3) Non-taxable allowances were grossed up in keeping with the taxation rate applicable in the province concerned.

Source:  
<http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Services/Tax/Tax-Calculators-2013-Personal-Tax>

(4) Member for Yellowknife or Minister.



# Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia

Base salary <sup>1</sup>						
		Premier	Minister	Whip	Committee Chair	Member
Alberta	2	\$217,750	\$201,000	\$147,400	\$134,000	\$134,000
British Columbia		\$193,532	\$152,789	\$122,231	\$117,138	\$101,859
Ontario		\$208,924	\$165,801	\$137,829	\$132,817	\$116,500
Québec	3	\$212,816	\$186,361	\$151,086	\$140,737	\$118,690
Average		\$206,735	\$173,197	\$135,820	\$127,985	\$117,453
Variance from median		3%	8%	11%	10%	1%

Consolidated data based on data provided by the National Assembly of Québec - September 2013

(1) Includes non-taxable expense allowances (if applicable) + the various allowances granted according to the job.

(2) Excludes the daily \$200 allowance granted to committee chairs.

(3) Non-taxable allowances were grossed up in keeping with the applicable taxation rate and vary between 47.46% and 49.97% for Québec.

Source: <http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Services/Tax/Tax-Calculators-2013-Personal-Tax>

# Analysis – Compensation multiple between the functions evaluated

	Multiple of total indemnities (base salary)*			
	Between Premier and Minister	Between Premier and Whip	Between Premier and Committee Chair	Between Premier and Member
House of Commons	135%	169%	187%	200%
Alberta	108%	148%	163%	163%
British Columbia	127%	158%	165%	190%
Manitoba	118%	168%	173%	182%
New Brunswick	119%	147%	193%	193%
Newfoundland and Labrador	112%	154%	154%	176%
Northwest Territories	114%	169%	160%	169%
Nova Scotia	146%	214%	221%	226%
Nunavut	108%	191%	183%	191%
Ontario	126%	152%	157%	179%
Prince Edward Island	123%	198%	209%	209%
Saskatchewan	114%	150%	150%	173%
Yukon	114%	164%	164%	164%
Québec	114%	141%	151%	179%
Maximum	146%	214%	221%	226%
Median	118%	164%	165%	182%
Minimum	108%	147%	150%	163%
Average	120%	168%	175%	186%

\* Benchmark for comparison purposes: Member's remuneration.

The compensation multiples observed are lower than those generally observed in the private sector.

## Comparative salary analysis

# NAQ - SES

# Comparative salary analysis NAQ - SES

Hay		Gouvernement du Québec			
Level	Points	Job Type	Hay Evaluation	Job Type	Salary - SES 2013
		NAQ		Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs (SES)	2013
29	3,581	Minister	3536	SECRETARY GENERAL	186,361
28	3,020			SM 4 - DMO 9	245,750
27	2,551			SM 3 - DMO 8	204,791
26	2,140			SM 2 - DMO 7	198,594
25	1,801			SM1 - DMO 6 - SMA 2	187,098
24	1,508			SMA 1 DMO 5	175,608
23	1,261			DMO 4	151,227
22	1,056				136,010
21	880				
20	735				
19	614				
18	519				
17	439				
16	371				

Gov. Whip	1628	
Chair	1418	
Member	1142	

SM:	Deputy Minister
DMO:	Most senior officer or VP of gov. org. or enterprise
SMA:	Associate or Assistant Deputy Minister

151,086	140,737	118,690
---------	---------	---------

September 23, 2013

# 5

Observations and points to consider

# Observations

- The job evaluation methodology used to assess certain functions performed by MNAs is the same as that used to evaluate management positions across the Québec public service, including higher senior positions under the purview of the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs (officers and members of a government organization, deputy ministers, associate and assistant deputy ministers).
- The base indemnity for MNAs has not been reviewed for 13 years.
- The comparative compensation analysis was conducted for similar-value jobs using
  - jobs with equivalent total points for know-how, problem solving and accountability
  - similar-type jobs
- According to the job evaluation methodology used, the position of MNA is assessed at 1,142 points.
- The position of MNA is therefore equivalent to a DMO 4 level position under the purview of the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs.
- Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia are the three provinces that best lend themselves to comparison with Québec as regards population and annual government operating budget.

## Observations (cont.)

- The remuneration of Québec's MNAs is comparable to the average remuneration of their counterparts in Canada's largest three provinces in terms of population and annual government operating budget, but lower than that of their Alberta counterparts.
- Alberta is the only province of the three to have recently commissioned a similar comparative job value analysis (spring 2012).
- The jobs evaluated at the National Assembly of Québec rank slightly higher than those evaluated at the Legislative Assembly of Alberta, given such factors as the size of the population, the annual government operating budget and the additional areas of jurisdiction handled by Québec.
- The remuneration of a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Alberta is \$134,000 for a job assessed at around 1,000 Hay points.
- Non-taxable expense allowances are less and less common in other Canadian legislative assemblies.

## Points to consider

- Alberta is the only province that recently conducted an evaluation using the same methodology as that used in Québec and revised the remuneration of its MLAs accordingly. Comparisons with Alberta are therefore more appropriate than comparisons with the provinces as a group or with the largest provinces.
- Establishing the base indemnity (salary) for MNAs with reference to
  - a DMO 4 position under the purview of the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs, or
  - the position of MLA of Alberta (slightly higher ranking for the job of MNA)
- Replacing the annual non-taxable expense allowance paid to all MNAs by equivalent remuneration (Alberta confirmed this new practice in April 2013)
- Maintaining the current approach to determine remuneration for additional duties i.e., using multiples of the base indemnity that reflect the ratio generally observed in Canadian government organizations for the other four parliamentary roles evaluated: Committee Chair, Chief Whip, Minister and Premier
- Paying the same remuneration for an MNA position assessed at 1,142 points as that paid for an equivalent entry-level position under the purview of the Secrétariat aux emplois supérieurs (DMO 4), for which the yearly salary is \$136,000
- Factoring in the potential impacts of remuneration adjustments on social benefits and pension for a full analysis of total remuneration



# Appendix

Organizations in the  
three reference markets

# Organizations – broader public sector

HayGroup®

N=188

AMAPCEO	Cambridge and North Dumfries Hydro Inc.
ATB Financial	Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Agency for Co-operative Housing	Canada Foundation for Innovation
Alberta Innovates - Health Solutions	Canada Lands Company CLC Limited
Alberta Institute Purchasing Management Assn. of Canada	Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
Alberta Pension Services Corporation	Canadian Bankers Association
Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario	Canadian Bible Society
Annapolis Valley District Health Authority	Canadian Blood Services
Association of Canadian Community Colleges	Canadian Cable Systems Alliance (CCSA)
Association of Regina REALTORS Inc.	Canadian Dental Association
Association of Saskatchewan Realtors	Canadian Healthcare Association
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada	The Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum
Assuris	Canadian Life and Health Insurance Association Inc.
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd.	Canadian Payments Association
Autorité des Marchés Financiers du Québec	Canadian Public Health Association
Bank of Canada	Cape Breton District Health Authority
Bluewater Power Distribution Corporation	Cape Breton University
Brantford Energy Group of Companies	Capital District Health Authority
British Columbia Safety Authority	Centre Street Church
Burlington Hydro Inc.	Certified Management Accountants of Saskatchewan
Business Development Bank of Canada	Chartered Professional Accountants of Canada
CPP Investment Board	Chicken Farmers of Ontario
CSA Group	City of Brantford
Calgary Economic Development	City of Charlottetown
Calgary Public Library	City of Edmonton
The Calgary Stampede	City of Fort Saskatchewan
	City of Kelowna
	City of Nanaimo
	City of Regina
	City of Swift Current

## Organizations – broader public sector (cont.)

City of Toronto	Greater Toronto Airports Authority
City of Yorkton	Greenpeace Canada
Colchester East Hants District Health Authority	Guelph Hydro Electric Systems Inc.
Concordia University College of Alberta	Guysborough Antigonish Strait District Health Authority
Covenant Health	Halifax Port Authority
Credit Union Deposit Guarantee Corporation - Saskatchewan	Halifax Regional Municipality
Cumberland District Health Authority	Halifax Regional Water Commission
Cypress Regional Health Authority	Halton Hills Hydro Inc.
Dalhousie University	Horizon Utilities Corporation
Dans la rue	Hydro One Brampton
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Ontario	Hydro One Inc.
Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association	Hydro Ottawa Limited
Durham College	IWK Health Centre
Edmonton Catholic School District	Keewatin Yatthe Regional Health Authority
Edmonton Public Library	Kelsey Trail Regional Health Authority
Electricity Distributors Association	Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Inc.
Energource Hydro Mississauga Inc	LCBO
Engineers Canada	London Hydro
Export Development Canada	MCC Canada
Farm Credit Canada	MacEwan University
Federation of Canadian Municipalities	Mamawetan Churchill River Regional Health Authority
Festival Hydro Inc.	McMaster University
Five Hills Regional Health Authority	Memorial University of Newfoundland
The Good Samaritan Society	Menno Homes of Saskatchewan Inc.
Government of Alberta	The Montreal Port Authority
Government of the Northwest Territories	NB Power Holding Corporation
Government of Nova Scotia	New Zealand Trade & Enterprise
Government of Ontario	Northern Lakes College
Government of Saskatchewan Public Service Commission	Nova Scotia Egg Producers
Greater Sudbury Utilities	Office municipal d'habitation de Montréal

# Organizations – broader public sector (cont.)



Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions	South Shore District Health Authority
Ontario Assoc. of Cert. Eng. Technicians and Technologists	South West Nova District Health Authority
Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation	SpringBoard West Innovations Inc.
Ontario Pension Board	Standards Council of Canada
Ontario Power Authority	Strathcona County
Ontario Power Generation Inc.	Sun Country Regional Health Authority
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan Board	Sunrise Regional Health Authority
Orillia Power Corporation	TBayTel
Oshawa PUC Networks Inc.	TVOntario
Perley Rideau, Veteran's Health Centre	Tarion Warranty Corporation
Peterborough Utilities Group	Thunder Bay Hydro Electricity Distribution Inc.
Pictou County District Health Authority	Toronto Port Lands Company
Prairie North Regional Health Authority	Town of Ladysmith
Prince Albert Parkland Regional Health Authority	Travel Alberta
Prince Rupert Port Authority	Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
Red Deer College	Trillium Lakelands District School Board
Red River College	Union of Northern Workers
Regina Police Service	The United Church of Canada
Regina Qu'Appelle Regional Health Authority	United Way of the Alberta Capital Region
Regional District of Central Okanagan	University of Alberta
Registered Nurses Association of Northwest Territories and N	University of British Columbia
Retail Council of Canada	University of New Brunswick
Royal Canadian Mint	University of Regina
Royal Roads University	University of Victoria
SPARC BC	Vancouver Economic Commission
Safety Codes Council	Ville de Lévis
St. Francis Xavier University	Water Security Agency of Saskatchewan
Saskatchewan Assessment Management Agency	Westario Power Inc.
Saskatchewan Association of Health Organizations	Westbank First Nation
Saskatchewan Cancer Agency	Western Canadian District, Christian & Missionary Alliance
Saskatchewan Government Insurance	Workers' Compensation Board - Alberta
Saskatchewan Workers' Compensation Board	Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission of N.B.
Saskatoon Regional Health Authority	Workplace Safety and Insurance Board
SaskEnergy Incorporated	Yellowhead Regional Library
SaskPower	Yukon Energy Corporation
SaskTel	
The Senate of Canada	

# Organizations – Government

N=22

City of Brantford  
 City of Charlottetown  
 City of Edmonton  
 City of Fort Saskatchewan  
 City of Kelowna  
 City of Nanaimo  
 City of Regina  
 City of Swift Current  
 City of Toronto  
 City of Yorkton  
 Government of Alberta  
 Government of the Northwest Territories  
 Government of Nova Scotia  
 Government of Ontario  
 Government of Saskatchewan Public Service Commission  
 Halifax Regional Municipality  
 Regional District of Central Okanagan  
 The Senate of Canada  
 Strathcona County  
 Town of Ladysmith  
 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat  
 Ville de Lévis

# Organizations – private sector

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N=338

1st Choice Savings and Credit Union Ltd.  
3M Canada Company  
A&W Food Services of Canada Inc.  
ALS Canada Ltd.  
AMEC Americas Limited  
ATCO I-Tek  
AV Nackawic Inc.  
Abbott Laboratories, Limited  
Affinity Credit Union  
AIG Insurance Company of Canada  
Ainsworth Engineered Canada L. P.  
Air Products Canada Ltd.  
Akzo Nobel Canada Inc.  
Alamos Gold Inc.  
Alberta Newsprint Company  
Alberta-Pacific Forest Industries Inc.  
Alcon Canada Inc.  
Allergan Canada Inc.  
Alterna Savings and Credit Union Limited  
Ampcor Limited  
Angen Canada Inc.  
Amway Canada Corporation  
Andrew Peller Limited  
Apple Canada Inc.  
Aptalis Pharma Inc.  
ArcelorMittal Canada  
ArcelorMittal Canada Contrecoeur-Ouest Inc.  
ArcelorMittal Canada Hamilton  
ArcelorMittal Canada Saint-Patrick  
ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc.  
ArcelorMittal Mines Canada  
ArcelorMittal Tubular Products - Automotive Division  
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (Canada) Ltd.  
Atla Foods Inc.  
Arrow Transportation Systems Inc.  
Ashland Inc.  
Assiniboine Credit Union  
Assomption, Compagnie mutuelle d'assurance vie  
Astellas Pharma Canada Inc.  
AstraZeneca Canada Inc.  
Atlantic Packaging Products Ltd.

Atotech Canada Ltd.  
Avis Budget Group, Inc.  
Aviva Canada Inc.  
BASF Canada Inc.  
BHP Billiton Canada Inc.  
BIC Graphic Canada  
BMO Financial Group  
Babcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd.  
Barilla  
Barrick Gold Corporation  
Basell Canada Inc.  
The Bay  
Bayer Inc.  
Bekaert Canada  
Benteler Automotive  
Big Lots Canada, Inc.  
Blue Mountain Resorts Limited  
Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd.  
Bombardier Transportation Canada Inc.  
Bonduelle North America Inc.  
Brandes Investment Partners & Co.  
Brink's Canada Limited  
Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Co.  
Broan-Nutone Canada Inc.  
Bruce Power L.P.  
Buckman Laboratories of Canada Ltd.  
CGGVeritas  
CHC Helicopter  
CIBC  
CIBC Mellon  
CKF Inc.  
CNH America, LLC.  
Cabot Canada Ltd.  
Campbell Company of Canada  
Canada Safeway Limited  
Canadelle Inc.  
The Canadian Depository for Securities Limited  
Canadian Forest Products Ltd.  
Canadian National Railway Company  
Canadian Western Bank  
Canexus Corporation  
Canfor Pulp Limited Partnership  
CannAmm Occupational Testing Services  
Canoe Financial  
Canpotex Limited

# Organizations – private sector (cont.)

Capgemini Canada	The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Canada
Capital Power Corporation	Essar Steel Algoma Inc.
Cargill Limited	FMC of Canada, Ltd.
Catalyst Paper Corporation	FM Global
Caterpillar of Canada Corporation	Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec
Caterpillar Tunneling Canada Corporation	Fidelity Investments Canada ULC
Chemtrade Logistics	Fiera Capital Corporation
Chemtura Canada Co Cie	Finning (Canada)
Christie Digital Systems Inc.	Finning International Inc.
Chubb Edwards	First Calgary Financial Credit Union Limited
The Churchill Corporation	First Canadian Title Company Limited
Cigna Life Insurance Company of Canada	First West Credit Union
Coast Capital Savings Credit Union	Fisher & Paykel Appliances
Coastal Community Credit Union	Fortis Inc.
Combined Insurance Company of America	Fortis Properties Corporation
Compass Group Canada	FortisAlberta Inc.
Concentra Financial	FortisBC Energy Inc.
Conexus Credit Union	FortisBC Inc.
Continental Tire Canada, Inc.	FortisOntario Inc.
Co-op Atlantic	Franklin Templeton Investments
Country Ribbon Inc.	FundSERV Inc.
Crawford and Company (Canada) Inc.	GDF SUEZ Energy North America, Inc.
Credit Union Central Alberta Limited	Gap (Canada) Inc.
Cytac Canada Inc.	General Kinetics Engineering Corporation
The D&B Companies of Canada Ltd.	Glatfelter
Danfoss Inc.	GlaxoSmithKline Inc.
De Beers Canada Inc., Corporate Division	Goldcorp Inc.
De Beers Canada Inc., Exploration Division	Golf Town
De Beers Canada Inc., Mining Division	Grand & Toy
Deeley Harley-Davidson Canada	Griffith Laboratories Limited
Detour Gold Corporation	Group SEB Canada Inc.
Dominion Diamond Corporation - Ekati Diamond Mine	HSBC Bank Canada
Dow Chemical Canada Inc.	Harvard Developments Inc.
Dr Pepper Snapple Group	Henkel Canada Corporation
Dr. Oetker Ltd.	Henry Schein Canada
E.I. du Pont Canada Company	Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.
EMD Serono Canada Inc.	Holcim (Canada) Inc.
EWOS Canada Ltd.	Home Outfitters
Eden Valley Poultry Inc.	Home Trust Company
Eli Lilly Canada Inc.	HudBay Minerals Inc.

# Organizations – private sector (cont.)



Hudson's Bay Company	Mackenzie Financial Corporation
HumanWare	MacoPharma Canada Inc.
Hunter Dickinson Inc.	Mainstream Canada Ltd.
Huntsman Polyurethane	Manulife Financial
ICICI Bank Canada	Marine Harvest Canada
ING Bank of Canada	Maritime Electric Company
INVISTA (Canada) Company	McCormick Canada Co.
Industrial Alliance, Insurance and Financial Services	McElhanney Consulting Services Ltd.
International Financial Data Services (Canada)	The McElhanney Group Ltd.
Interquisa Canada	McElhanney Land Surveys Ltd.
Investors Group Inc.	Meridian Credit Union
Janssen Inc.	Methanex Corporation
John Deere Credit Inc. - Canada	Michelin North America (Canada) Inc.
John Deere Limited Canada	Millar Western Forest Products Ltd.
Johnson Matthey Ltd.	The Minto Group
K+S Potash Canada	Mission Group Enterprises
KGHM International Ltd.	Mitsubishi Canada Limited
KPMG MSLP	Moneris Solutions Corporation
Kellogg Canada Inc.	Montship Inc.
Kemira Chemicals Canada Inc.	Morneau Shepell Inc.
Kennametal Ltd.	The Mosaic Company
Kimberly-Clark Corporation	NEI Investments
Kinross Gold Corporation	National Bank Financial Group
Kongsberg Automotive	Navtech Systems Support Inc.
Kruger Products	Neovia Logistics Services
LANXESS Inc.	Newfoundland Power Inc.
Labatt Breweries of Canada	Nike Canada Corp.
Lake Shore Gold Corp.	Noralta Lodge Ltd.
Lantic Inc.	North American Palladium Ltd.
Lantic Inc. - Rogers Sugar Division	North Shore Credit Union
Laurentian Bank of Canada	Novartis Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc.
Lehigh Hanson Materials Limited	Novo Nordisk Canada
Leo Pharma	Nutreco Canada Inc.
Libro Financial Group	OEM Remanufacturing
LifeLabs	Occidental Chemical Corporation
Linamar	L'Oréal Canada Inc.
Liquor Stores GP Inc.	Otera Capital S.E.C.
Loblaw Companies Limited	Overwaitea Food Group LP
Lowe's Companies, Inc.	PPG Canada Inc.
MD Physician Services Inc.	PPG Canada Inc. - Industrial Coatings Division



# Organizations – private sector (cont.)

PPG Canada Inc. - Performance Glazing Division	Standard Life Assurance Company
Pan American Silver Corporation	State Street Trust Company Canada
Penske Truck Leasing	Steinbach Credit Union
PepsiCo Canada	Strathcona Paper LP
Pharmascience Inc.	Sultran Ltd.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Limited	Sun Life Financial Canada
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc.	Suncor Energy Inc.
Praxair Canada Inc.	Symcor Inc.
Primex Manufacturing Ltd.	Synergy Credit Union
Procter & Gamble Inc.	TD Bank Financial Group
Prospera Credit Union	TELUS Communications Inc.
Purdue Pharma	TVI Pacific, Inc.
RBC	Takeda Canada Inc.
Randstad Canada	Tata Global Beverages Canada
Richemont Canada Inc.	Technip Canada Ltd.
Rio Tinto - Diavik Diamond Mines	Teck Resources Limited
Rio Tinto Iron Ore	Teck Resources Limited - Highland Valley Copper
Rogers Communications Inc.	Teck Resources Limited - Trail Operation
Rolls-Royce Canada Ltd.	Teekay Corporation
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.	Tembec Inc.
Russel Metals Inc.	Teranet Inc.
SEMAFO Inc.	Thales Rail Signalling Solutions
SMS Equipment Inc.	Thompson Creek Metals Company
SNC-Lavalin Group Inc.	TimberWest Forest Corp.
Sandoz Canada Inc.	Tolko Industries Ltd.
Sanofi Canada	TomTom International
SaskCentral	Toromont CAT, A Division of Toromont Industries Ltd.
Scotiabank	Total E&P Canada
Seed Hawk Inc.	Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd.
Servus Credit Union Ltd.	Ultramar Ltée
The Shaw Group Limited	uniPHARM Wholesale Drugs Ltd.
Sherritt Coal	Uranium One Inc.
Sherritt International Corporation	Vale Inco Limited
Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation	Vallourec Tubes Canada Inc.
Shore Gold Inc.	Vancity Savings Credit Union
Shred-it International	Vterra Inc.
Sidel Canada Inc.	Wal-Mart Canada Corp.
Siemens Canada Limited	Wells Fargo Financial Corporation Canada
Sika Canada Inc.	Westcast Industries Inc.
Silver Standard Resources Inc.	West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd.
Skretting	Western Financial Group Inc.
Sleeman Breweries Ltd.	Westminster Savings Credit Union
Société en Commandite Tafisa Canada Inc.	Winners Merchants International L.P.
Sofina Foods Inc.	Xstrata Copper Canada
Sonoco Canada Corporation	Xstrata Nickel Canada
	Xstrata Zinc Canada
	Zurich Canada

TRANSPARENCY  
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BALANCE  
OBJECTIVITY  
RIGOUR  
FUTURE  
CHALLENGES  
ETHICS  
CITIZEN  
EQUITY  
INDEPENDENCE

## APPENDIX VIII

### **CURRENT INDEMNITIES AND PROPOSED INDEMNITIES**



## BASIC INDEMNITIES AND ADDITIONAL INDEMNITIES FOR PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE-HOLDERS

	CURRENT SITUATION				COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS			
	Basic annual indemnity	Percentage of additional indemnity	Additional indemnity	Total	Basic annual indemnity	Percentage of additional indemnity	Additional indemnity	Total
Premier	\$88,186	105	\$92,595	\$180,781	\$136,010	100	\$136,010	\$272,020
Minister, including Government House Leader	\$88,186	75	\$66,140	\$154,326	\$136,010	60	\$81,606	\$217,616
President of the Assembly	\$88,186	75	\$66,140	\$154,326	\$136,010	60	\$81,606	\$217,616
Leader of the Official Opposition	\$88,186	75	\$66,140	\$154,326	\$136,010	60	\$81,606	\$217,616
Leader of the Second Opposition Group	\$88,186	35	\$30,865	\$119,051	\$136,010	30	\$40,803	\$176,813
Vice-President of the Assembly	\$88,186	35	\$30,865	\$119,051	\$136,010	25	\$34,003	\$170,013
Official Opposition House Leader	\$88,186	35	\$30,865	\$119,051	\$136,010	25	\$34,003	\$170,013
Chief Government Whip	\$88,186	35	\$30,865	\$119,051	\$136,010	25	\$34,003	\$170,013
House Leader of the Second Opposition Group	\$88,186	25	\$22,047	\$110,233	\$136,010	20	\$27,202	\$163,212
Deputy Government House Leader	\$88,186	25	\$22,047	\$110,233	\$136,010	20	\$27,202	\$163,212
Chair of the Government Caucus	\$88,186	25	\$22,047	\$110,233	\$136,010	20	\$27,202	\$163,212
Chair of a parliamentary committee	\$88,186	25	\$22,047	\$110,233	\$136,010	20	\$27,202	\$163,212
Chief Official Opposition Whip	\$88,186	30	\$26,456	\$114,642	\$136,010	20	\$27,202	\$163,212
Parliamentary Assistant to a Minister	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Chair of Official Opposition Caucus, if 20 or more Members	\$88,186	22.5	\$19,842	\$108,028	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Whip of the Second Opposition Group	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Official Opposition House Leader	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Government Whip	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Deputy Official Opposition Whip	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Vice-Chair of a parliamentary committee	\$88,186	20	\$17,637	\$105,823	\$136,010	15	\$20,402	\$156,412
Member of the Office of the National Assembly	\$88,186	15	\$13,228	\$101,414	\$136,010	0	\$0	\$136,010
Temporary Chair of a parliamentary committee	\$88,186	15	\$13,228	\$101,414	\$136,010	0	\$0	\$136,010
MNA	\$88,186	0	\$0	\$88,186	\$136,010	0	\$0	\$136,010
<b>Note:</b> As recommended by the Committee, additional indemnities for Temporary Chairs and for members of the Office of the National Assembly are replaced by a lump sum of \$250 for each full sitting or meeting.								





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